Karzai kiss a prelude to Kandahar storm
By Ramzy Baroud
Clad in his usual attire of a colorful, striped robe, Afghan President Hamid
Karzai appeared more like an emperor as he began his fourth day in Washington.
Accompanying him on a somber visit to the Arlington National Cemetery were
United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Admiral Mike Mullen and top US (and North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
commander in Afghanistan Stanley McChrystal - the very men responsible for the
occupation of Karzai's country.
The clearly-rehearsed visit seemed set on giving the impression that the
relationship between Karzai and these men was that of
an independent, confident leader seeking the support of a benevolent
superpower.
But what were Karzai's real reasons for visiting Washington?
Typical media analyses have for months misrepresented the apparent chasm
between Afghanistan and the US under Barack Obama's administration. Even if the
administration were genuinely discontented with Karzai's policies, at least
until very recently, the resentment had little to do with the reasons offered
by much of the media.
It was not because Karzai was failing to deliver on governance, end corruption
and so on. The US war in Afghanistan was never, nor could it ever be, morally
grounded. Not unless the militant mindset that governs US foreign policy
somehow acquired a complete overhaul.
Bad days are awaiting Afghanistan, although it is hard to imagine how its
misfortunes could possibly get any worse. But they will, particularly for those
living in Kandahar in the south. Seated next to Karzai during his Washington
visit, Clinton promised that her country would "not destroy Kandahar in order
to save Kandahar".
The statement may sound assuring, but it is ominous and troubling. Clinton was
referring to the George W Bush administration's policy in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. She candidly admitted this by saying, "This is not Fallujah,"
referring to the Iraqi city that was almost completely destroyed in 2004 by a
massive US Marine Corps assault intended to "save" the city. "Lessons have been
learned since Iraq," stated Clinton.
But if lessons were learned, then why the fictitious language, the assertion
that the real intention was to "save" Kandahar? And what other strategy does
the US have in store for Afghanistan, aside from the debate on whether to use
unmanned drones or do the killing face-to-face?
It is not unlikely that Karzai was in Washington to provide a cover for what is
yet to come in the Taliban's southern stronghold. Considering past and repeated
claims of a growing divide between Kabul and Washington, a bloody attack on
Kandahar could be seen as the US acting unilaterally in Afghanistan. Add to
this scenario the constant and continued calls made by Karzai to engage the
Taliban. A US escalation without public consent from Karzai couldn't possibly
be seen as a part of a joint strategy.
At a presentation at the United States Institute of Peace, Karzai spoke of an
extended US commitment to Afghanistan that would last "beyond the military
activity right now ... into the future, long after we have retired, and perhaps
into our grandsons' and great-grandsons' - and great-granddaughters' -
generations. This is something the Afghan people have been seeking for a long,
long time," he said.
Clinton too was concerned about the plight of the "people". She promised to
"help the people of Kandahar to recover the entire city to be able to put it to
the use and the benefit of the people of Kandahar ... We're not fighting the
Afghan people ... We're fighting a small minority of very dedicated, ruthless
extremists who unfortunately are able to enlist young men ... for a variety of
reasons and send them out onto the battlefield."
Although Clinton wanted us to believe that the Bush era is over, with a new
dawn in US foreign policy on us, she used almost the same language, phrased in
almost the same context that the Bush administration used prior to its major
military assaults aimed at "saving the people" from some "ruthless extremists",
whether in Iraq or Afghanistan.
And a major assault there will be, for the Taliban's counter-surge threatens
the US's counter-insurgency operations.
An article by Marie Colvin in Marjah, Afghanistan, where the Taliban are once
more making their presence very clear, highlights the challenges facing the US
military throughout the country. Entitled "Swift and bloody: the Taliban's
revenge", the May 9 article starts with the claim that "rebels have returned"
[1]. Throughout, the report was dotted with similar assertions. "Marjah was
supposed to be safe ... All that progress is threatened by the Taliban 'surge'
... There were always fears that they would re-emerge ... The strength of the
Taliban's presence is gradually becoming clearer ... The Taliban are growing
bolder ..."
The term "surge" was once associated with General David Petraeus' strategy
predicated on the deployment of 30,000 new troops in Afghanistan. That it is
now being attributed to the Taliban's own strategy is ironic, to say the least.
Once meant to be a "success story", now convincing the world that things are
working out in Afghanistan might not be so easy after all. "Worries are growing
in the Pentagon that if thousands of marines and Afghan security forces cannot
entirely defeat the Taliban in Marjah, a town of only 50,000, securing the far
larger prize of Kandahar may be an even greater struggle than has been
foreseen," wrote Colvin.
The challenge, although bolstered with all the right (albeit predictable)
language is likely to be bloody, just like the rest of the Afghanistan episode,
which began much earlier than the invasion of 2001.
The US and Karzai (as a supposed representative of the Afghani people) must
come across as united in the face of the extremist minority. Karzai's visit to
the US was the political padding prior to the likely military storm. It was
meant to assure the public that the chaos that will follow is part of a
counter-insurgency effort; well-planned, calculated, executed and, as always,
passionately articulated.
Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally-syndicated columnist
and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father
Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story (Pluto Press, London), now available
on Amazon.com.
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