WASHINGTON - The numbers are in and they are both ugly and unacceptable. At
least, 1,074 Afghan civilians were killed in armed violence and security
incidents in the first six months of 2010, according to the respected
Afghanistan Rights Monitor.
Crucially, however, the number of people killed in North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and United States air strikes in the same period fell by
half. An earlier tightening of allied rules of engagement - overseen by former
NATO commander General
Stanley McChrystal - helped to reduce that figure, according to the Afghan
authors of the report.
In the six months between the start of January and the end of June, insurgents
were responsible for killing some 661 civilians and of those 282 were killed in
improvised roadside bombs. The numbers show that, despite fighting from behind
a human shield and melting away, the Taliban and related insurgents are killing
far more innocents than NATO and Afghan forces. That cannot be good for their
own "hearts and minds" campaign.
By comparison, NATO and other international forces were responsible for 210
Afghan civilian deaths. Afghan security forces also appear to be improving
their aim, killing 108 civilians this year, down from 386 in the previous six
months. This suggests that NATO can begin to provide more airlift and firepower
assets to the Afghans as they move closer to the tip of spear in the war
against the Taliban. (Memo to the Pentagon: Don't forget to train Afghan
helicopter pilots.)
As US commanders debate the military's restrictions on the use of firepower in
Afghanistan, these numbers are worth keeping close at hand. Any loosening of
NATO's current "rules of engagement" and reversal of the trend towards fewer
killings by NATO and Afghan forces could undermine American efforts both in
Afghanistan and across the more important theater of the Islamic world.
Heightened pleas in Washington and on the ground from US fighters to be given
leeway to significantly increase lethality also miss the central focus of
counter-insurgency, which is the protection of the Afghan population.
Citizen groups with an interest in war and peace are already pushing back.
"Winning the population isn't just a cliche," wrote Sarah Holewinski, executive
director of the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC,) in a recent
letter to The Washington Post. "Those soldiers now condemning the restraint
they must use in this war fail to see that what's good for the Afghans is good
for them."
The Afghan war with all its current troubles is an apt metaphor for America's
larger struggle against a clever foe who seeks to draw US forces into myriad
fights around the world.
Indeed, it is no secret that al-Qaeda and its affiliates want to tie the United
States down like Gulliver and condemn America with a long war of attrition
while the US military flails around trying to swat small and often invisible
threats. The Barack Obama administration has displayed adequate circumspection,
thus far, towards these global designs.
Similarly, in Afghanistan it is essential that policymakers continue to
distinguish the forest - peace - from the trees - terrorists.
In extended stays with small US units in Afghanistan over the past three years,
I discovered that the most successful American counter-insurgents are those who
remain disciplined - even reluctant - in their application of force.
These young officers recognize, as Australian David Kilcullen, formerly a top
counter-insurgency advisor to McChrystal, writes in a new book on the subject:
"Killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is nearly impossible."
In Pashtun areas, which embody the heart of the Afghan insurgency, guerrillas
closely monitor NATO tactics and local opinion. If American forces are doing
their best to avoid civilian casualties, tribal elders are more likely to
embrace their American colleagues. Intelligence flows over candy and cups of
green tea. When the environment is soured by unexpected civilian deaths,
however, these same elders retreat behind mud walls - brooding and aloof.
When US forces kill civilians by accident, as I've witnessed, a vicious cycle
of killing ensues. This, in turn, creates a stalemate and a lockdown in
development resources that undermines the Obama administration's planned-for
exit.
Destroying a village to "save it", works no better in Afghanistan than it did
in Vietnam. The current Pentagon civilian leadership and top brass, schooled in
the lessons of that much-bloodier conflict, are all too aware of this. They are
paying far more attention to groups like Holewinski's CIVIC, which has been
instrumental in persuading the US military in the past decade to step up direct
financial amends for accidental civilian injuries and deaths in the field.
It is worth recalling - as do most Afghans - that in the first four years of
the war, US forces carried out standard damage assessments then simply turned
their backs on the Afghans.
Make no mistake, though, the next year in Afghanistan will be a bloody one.
When NATO fighters risk their necks on patrol in ideal guerrilla terrain, the
Taliban will either emerge from the shadows or fire wildly from behind a
civilian shield. New evidence that the Taliban fighters are relying more and
more on improvised explosives to attack NATO and Afghan forces, including
civilians, suggests that they are really not as keen as some of their admirers
would have it to fight toe-to-toe with US and allied patrols. Afghan civilians
see this first hand.
If the United States were to step up the zero-sum hunt for individual Taliban
fighters and markedly intensify the lethality of its own firepower - including
more Apache and Warthog attacks - Washington would merely be reverting to
strategy that failed between 2001 and 2008.
The Taliban and their al-Qaeda mentors in Pakistan are anxious that US forces
step up the fight, but also want to see their foe commit targeting errors. They
are poised to deploy many scores of jihadis to troubled corners of Afghanistan
where increased civilian casualties increase due to errant US attacks. More
death and civilian angst makes villagers more pliable and likely to respond to
insurgent requests to embed new gun posts and fighters.
On the other hand, where restraint is evident and where tribal elders cooperate
openly with US forces in exchange for development, the Taliban and their
associates have far less mobility. This is also enhanced when US compensation
for innocent victims works quickly and systematically.
Parallels between the fight in Afghanistan and the Obama administration's
struggles to pacify the broader Islamic realm are many. As I discovered in
research for my book, My Brother, My Enemy, Islamic militants with a
global agenda are trying to disrupt local politics from placid fishing villages
in the Spice Islands of Indonesia to the mosques of Sahelian Africa.
Osama bin Laden has long made known his adamant desire to draw US forces into
protracted struggles in order to drain off American resources and point his
long, boney finger at America's so-called "imperialist designs".
America should be wise enough by now, in this its longest war ever, to work
more through Islamic allies and not to fall for his ploys.
And while there is still plenty of room to criticize Obama's anti-terrorism
strategy, it remains in striking contrast to the excesses of that of his
predecessor. The new US chief in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, and his
officer's corps are rightfully war-weary and despite conspiracy theories to the
contrary, do not relish a long stay in Afghanistan.
They understand that a highly militarized America abroad - as it remains today
- is less capable of doing the business of America, which is, after all,
business and not imperialism or occupation.
It is the Obama administration's apparent long-term goal to try to drain the
sea of recruits that Bin Laden and company tap into daily. For that to happen
any time soon, however, the stars would have to align perfectly.
In the meantime, let's hope good sense prevails and that NATO forces fire off
only as many rounds as are required to protect Afghan civilians. That's the
best and only hope for getting out and moving on.
Philip Smucker is a commentator and journalist based in South Asia and
the Middle East. He is the author of Al-Qaeda's Great Escape: The
Military and the Media on Terror's Trail.
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