US-Pakistan embrace a fillip for peace
By M K Bhadrakumar
The big news over the weekend is that the United States and Pakistan have
kissed and made up. What was played up in the recent weeks as a nasty showdown
between the two partners, with each side growling dangerously and scratching
the other almost to bleeding, turned out to be deceptive feline foreplay.
The outcome of the three-day foreign minister-level US-Pakistan strategic
dialogue that concluded on Friday once again confirms the reputation of the two
sides as consummate partners: one moment snarling viciously, to the alarm of
onlookers; and the next, locked in a perplexing embrace.
The balance sheet of strategic dialogue has now visibly tilted in
Pakistan's favor. What the Pakistani military has offered Uncle Sam in return
remains for the present a nuptial secret, but it will become known. Most
certainly, it has got to do with the Afghan endgame. Considering US
accommodation of some of the big-ticket items on Pakistan's wish-list, it can
be surmised that Pakistan has offered meaningful accommodation of the US game
plan in Afghanistan.
United States President Barack Obama's White House meeting with the visiting
Pakistani delegation (which included powerful army chief General Ashfaq Parvez
Kiani) has come as a political bonanza for Islamabad. The White House readout
on the meeting said that Obama underlined the US's readiness to advance the
US-Pakistan relationship "toward a true partnership based on mutual respect and
common interests".
What is even more important is that Obama agreed with the Pakistani delegation
on the "need for regional stability and specifically on the importance of
cooperating toward a peaceful and stable outcome in Afghanistan".
For Pakistan at least, "need for regional stability" is invariably code for
underscoring that enduring peace and stability in the region is not achievable
unless the Kashmir issue is resolved. To link Pakistan's concern in this regard
with cooperation over Afghanistan is a huge diplomatic victory for Pakistan. In
short, the US would appear to have recognized that the Afghan problem and
Pakistan-India tensions are interlinked and need to be tackled simultaneously.
Equally, Obama made an open commitment that he would make a "stand-alone" visit
to Islamabad in 2011 and also host President Asif Ali Zardari in Washington.
The fact that he made the announcement on the eve of his visit to India
(November 6-9), disregarding the strange feelings it might generate in the
Indian mind regarding a "hyphenation" in the US's regional policy towards the
two South Asian adversaries, shows the high US dependence on Pakistani goodwill
and cooperation over Afghanistan.
Conversely, Obama's proposed visit to Pakistan is also expected to
"incentivise" the Pakistanis to "perform" convincingly in stabilizing the
Afghan situation in the critical months ahead.
United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went out of the way to say
that the US had "no stronger partner when it comes to counter-terrorism efforts
against the extremists" in the region. The US has openly, and ostentatiously,
buried the hatchet, which was dramatized in large measure by US media reports,
based on briefings by administration officials, over an alleged Pakistani
double game in the Afghan war.
From Pakistan's point of view, the US also made an "enduring commitment to help
Pakistan plan for its defense needs" and in this connection, Clinton announced
that the Obama administration would ask the US Congress for additional military
assistance for Pakistan of a whopping US$2 billion, spread over the 2011-2016
period.
Significantly, a charade that the US military assistance is to beef up
Pakistan's capability to undertake counter-insurgency operations in the tribal
areas that border Afghanistan has been set aside. The latest formulation is
that the additional assistance is for planning Pakistan's "defense needs",
which are indeed principally and paramountly vis-a-vis India. In short, the US
stands committed to help Pakistan maintain reasonable parity with India in
conventional military strength.
The US is making this commitment in disregard of strong Indian protestations -
including during the recent visit by Indian Defense Minister A K Antony to
Washington - that the US has been handing over to Pakistan weapon systems, such
as those for its navy, that have absolutely nothing to do with hunting down
Osama bin Laden or exterminating the remnants of al-Qaeda from the region.
In response to the Indian demarche, all that the US officials are maintaining
is that the overall Pakistan-India military balance will not be upset. Clearly,
the Obama administration has underscored the US's commitment to remain
responsive to the Pakistani military's needs with regard to India even after an
Afghan settlement has been worked out.
Clinton revealed that the Obama administration had taken on board Pakistan's
request for concluding a civil nuclear cooperation agreement on par with what
the US signed with India in 2008. Clinton acknowledged that the item figured in
the deliberations of the strategic dialogue in Washington and that further
consultations and negotiations would be carried forward at the level of
"experts and officials".
This also means that Pakistan has crossed the hump, finally, on the issue.
Also, the US has decided to virtually acquiesce with China's move to set up two
more nuclear reactors in Pakistan. So far, the US has been taking the position
that given Pakistan's questionable track record in nuclear proliferation,
Washington would have a problem in reaching a nuclear deal with Islamabad on
par with its agreements with New Delhi.
The joint statement issued after the strategic dialogue underlines the US's
determination to develop with Pakistan a "strategic, comprehensive and
long-term partnership ... based on shared values, mutual respect and mutual
interests".
It is an almost-identical formulation that the Indians, who considered
themselves as "natural allies" of the US, would probably get. The two sides
have also resolved to "promoting peace, stability and transparency throughout
the region". In sum, the US has acknowledged that as a quid pro quo for the
help and cooperation from Pakistan in settling the Afghan problem, the US will
ensure that the latter's legitimate interests in Kabul are safeguarded and will
remain mindful of the Pakistani concerns over India.
What emerges is a finely, intricately-balanced matrix of compromise whereby
Pakistan will not torpedo the sort of Afghan settlement that the US is keenly
seeking - ensuring the Taliban's acceptance of the US's and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's long-term military presence in Afghanistan - and in
return the US will accommodate Pakistan's interest in having a friendly regime
in Kabul and will remain deeply engaged with Pakistan on a long-term footing
politically, militarily and economically. It is a signal success for Pakistani
diplomacy that it has brought overall "regional stability" into the centerpiece
of US-Pakistan strategic ties.
How this complex matrix of understanding translates on the ground is another
matter. Several imponderables remain. What happens to Taliban leader Mullah
Omar, whom the US reportedly wants to keep out of the Afghan settlement? Will
the Haqqani network be brought in under credible Pakistani guarantees? Will
there be a stepping up of the hunt for bin Laden, who senior US officials have
pinpointed recently as being sheltered in relative comfort inside Pakistan by
its security agencies? Will Pakistan settle for Afghan President Hamid Karzai's
blueprint of a broad-based settlement that accommodates various non-Pashtun
groups? How does the US ensure that the Indian influence in Kabul is kept below
a threshold acceptable to Pakistan?
Karzai and the erstwhile Northern Alliance groups, too, will be watching how
Pakistan goes about implementing the understanding reached in Washington. For
Karzai, there has never been any doubt that Pakistan has a crucial role to play
in reaching any workable Afghan settlement while his ties with India are at
best of tactical importance. But the big issue is Karzai's own political
future.
Of late, the US has made up with Karzai and placed itself manifestly behind his
reconciliation plan with the Taliban. But his unhappy experience has also been
that he comes under pressure the moment Washington revives its dalliance with
the Pakistani military. The outcome of the US-Pakistan strategic dialogue in
Washington is of existential importance to Karzai.
Similarly, the erstwhile Northern Alliance groups will be wary of the
US-Pakistan framework of cooperation, which they might suspect will lead to a
return of Pashtun dominance in the Afghan power structure. The political
reality is that there is a deep trust deficit between these groups and the
Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence. The non-Pashtun perception
will be that the Pakistani military will ultimately take the Americans for a
ride as the pressure of time begins to work on the Obama administration to show
"results" in the war in terms of the exigencies of US domestic politics.
What we may expect is that the Afghan peace talks could now accelerate and even
gain traction. Obama may then be able to face the US's NATO allies at their
summit in Lisbon next month with far greater composure. He may even find
himself in a position to present a somewhat plausible Afghan peace plan that
enables Western countries to heave a sigh of relief that there is light at the
end of the long tunnel that has been their bloody "combat mission" in the Hindu
Kush.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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