The reason for the al-Qaeda-led militancy's success in the South Asia region is
twofold. Al-Qaeda delegated resistance operations to Ibnul Balad (sons
of the soil), and it restricted its connections to a select command and
promoted its ideological and strategic framework to that group. Al-Qaeda never
tried to approach the grassroot-level insurgency.
Secondly, al-Qaeda modified its structures according to local customs and
traditions.
Al-Qaeda is using a similar strategy in northern Afghanistan and
Central Asia, the home of Sufi Islam.
In classical philosophical interpretation, Sufi Islam gazes on spiritual
eternity, while Salafi Islam eyes the temporal aspects of reality. The fusion
of Salafism and Sufism has rarely emerged in Muslim history, but when it has
happened it has been during a foreign invasion, as in Libya where Omar Mukhtar
led the local resistance to Italian control of the country in the early 1900s.
Another example is the Muslim Brotherhood. Its founder, Hasan al-Banna,
belonged to the Sufi school of Hasafia, and he declared the Brotherhood both a
Sufi and a Salafi movement.
The phenomenon is so rare that no foreign actor, such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), alien to the evolution of Muslim thinking, could
contemplate the possible blending of these apparently contradictory ideas.
NATO has largely deployed non-combatant troops in northern Afghanistan,
believing that all the fighting has to be done in the Pashtun-dominated
southern areas. The Barack Obama administration's war reviews have not placed
much emphasis on the situation in northern Afghanistan, with most plans
centered on restive Helmand province and other southern areas.
NATO considers the Taliban a Pashtun movement under the influence of a Salafi
al-Qaeda, and it estimated there was little chance for the emergence of the
Taliban in northern Afghanistan, which is dominated by ethnic Hazaras, Tajiks
and Uzbeks and which is close to the Shi'ite sect, Sufism and secular trends.
They rightly understood that if the Taliban controlled the region in the late
1990s (when they were in control in Kabul), it was due to their military might
and with the help of the local Pashtun minority.
There were other reasons to believe an enduring rout of the Taliban in the
north.
After the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, the Taliban were easily
defeated in northern Afghanistan - they were killed, arrested or escaped to
southern Afghanistan or the Pakistani tribal areas across the border. They
didn't find a single refuge or sanctuary in the north that would have given
them a chance to make a comeback.
Several proposals have been put forward based on the assumption that the
Taliban would never flourish in the north. These include the Balkanization of
Afghanistan, as suggested by American think-tanks, including the division of
Afghanistan along ethnic lines between north and south. Another proposal,
discussed in the late 2000s, was to allow Taliban rule in southern areas, while
yet another idea that is still under discussion is that after 2014, American
forces would only be stationed in the north to keep themselves away from active
combat operations.
After their defeat, the Taliban didn't attempt to make a comeback in the north
- mainly as most of their leaders and commanders from the north had been
arrested or been killed or had fled to Pakistan. The Taliban also did not have
much grassroot following to tap into.
However, there were a few seedlings in the form of mosques and madrassas
(seminaries), built or strengthened during the years of Taliban rule from 1996
to 2001. At the same time, there were Uzbeks and Tajiks from Afghanistan in
Pakistan's South Waziristan and North Waziristan tribal areas. Last and not
least, there was an extremely isolated Pashtun population in the north.
In the decade after the fall of the Taliban, massive resentment built up
against the foreign occupation forces, which regarded Pashtuns as "allies of
terrorists" and boosted northern warlords as friends in the "war on terror".
Mosques and madrassas fueled the unhappiness with the foreign forces,
which helped Taliban leaders from north to reconnect with the people and start
operations in 2007-08.
Al-Qaeda, meanwhile, had cultivated the Uzbeks and Tajiks in the tribal areas
in preparation for capitalizing on the foundations the Taliban were laying for
an insurgency in the north - they were to broaden the insurgency across all
ethnic groups in the north as well as become active in the neighboring Central
Asian republics.
Soft Sufi, hard-rock militant
Qari Mustafa has the typical characteristics of a Taliban militant; long curly
hair and beard and a strong build. However, I did not detect behind his glasses
the usual steely look of a militant; the eagle eyes always on the lookout for
trouble. Mustafa's eyes had a strange calm, which was soon explained.
I visited Mustafa, 26, in a mud house where he was spending the winter, away
from Baghlan province about 200 kilometers north of Kabul, as during the cold
and snowy season the war almost comes to a halt. The Taliban commander was
staying in a khankha, a place where Sufis live in seclusion for maraqaba
- contemplation and other rituals.
"Are you a Sufi?" I asked as I eyed pictures and portraits in the room of Mecca
and Medina - the two most sacred Muslim places situated in today's Saudi
Arabia. A picture of a heart also hung on the wall, signifying the concept of tazkia
(purity of heart).
"Yes, I am a Sufi," Mustafa replied.
His response set me thinking. Central Asia has traditionally been the home of
Sufism, especially Naqashbandi Sufis, who revolted many times against the
occupation of the republics during the time of the former Soviet Union. These
Sufi circles became the underground Islamic movements in Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan that formed strong opposition to the ruling classes.
"You must be Naqashbandi," I said.
"Yes, I am," Mustafa replied, adding that Pir Bahaijan Agha of Ghazni in
Afghanistan was his spiritual guide. "It's not only me, all top commanders from
Baghlan and Kunduz hail from the Naqashbandi school of thought or from the
Qardri school," Mustafa added.
Coming from the village of Qarah Daqa in Baghlan, Mustafa received his
religious education in the province's Doshi district and then from a seminary
in Haripur, Pakistan. He was too young during the Taliban regime to be a part
of the movement, and he did not participate in the resistance to the US
invasion in 2001.
"I finished my studies and I was working as a prayer leader and a teacher in my
village mosque. Then some of my old friends as well as some of my teachers from
the madrassa convinced me that this was not the time to sit in a mosque.
This was the time to rise against the foreign occupation forces. I left the
mosque and became a part of the Taliban."
Mustafa's journey with the Taliban began, by his account, in 2005. He was an
ordinary foot soldier and took part in sporadic attacks in the north. By 2007,
the Taliban had attracted so many people that they could form enough groups for
limited guerrilla warfare in the north. At this point, a few dozen Taliban,
including Mustafa, were given the task of recruitment.
"I went to Kunduz, Baghlan and Samangan. I met all my old madrassa friends,
my relations, and within a few months I had gathered 30 trusted fellows. I
became a commander," Mustafa said.
"This is just the core group. They are regular Taliban. Let me explain how we
work. We have informers all across the region. They provide us with information
about a target. Most of the time it is the arrival time or the route of a NATO
supply convoy. Sometimes it is about the movements of the Afghan National Army,
the police or NATO forces. And sometimes it is about attacking a military
base," Mustafa said.
"For any particular operation, we often ask the people related to those who are
part of our group - relatives or friends - to support our operation, and this
is the way in which we increase our numerical strength. These are people who
work as farmers or laborers in the day and then participate in operations as
the Taliban with us during the night," Mustafa said, adding that after an
attack the local population always provided hiding places.
Mustafa maintained that the total strength of the Taliban in Baghlan province
was about 2,000, but if the irregulars he mentioned are added, the strength
would increase at least three times.
"The local population's support is the real strength behind the Taliban.
Earlier, their charity went to the madrassas, but now it all goes to the
Taliban. Similarly, when we plan any big operation, local businessmen become
our sponsors. We ask them for the money and they are always generous enough to
meet our demands," Mustafa said.
Mustafa then showed cell-phone video footage of a Taliban attack on a military
base in Kunduz.
"At the moment, all cities are controlled by the government and all regions
along with mountains are under the control of the Taliban. However, in winter
we evacuate much of those areas as well. This is for two reasons. The snow on
the mountains makes our movement difficult; similarly, all trees lose their
leaves during the winter and we lose our camouflage in the thick jungles of
Baghlan. Therefore, we have to leave our regions and take refuge in southern
border areas," Mustafa said.
"Are the Taliban only Pashtuns?" I asked.
"They are the majority, but the situation is changing a lot. Almost 20% of our
people now belong to ethnic Tajik and Uzbek communities living in northern
Afghanistan. Our connection is the madrassas. We all studied together,
and after the US invasion we convinced them to take part in resistance."
Mustafa confirmed that a good number of fighters were also coming from
Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russia.
"Russia? You mean from Chechnya? I asked.
Mustafa took out his cell-phone and opened it to a picture of a bearded man
with long hair and a cap, which made it difficult to distinguish his ethnicity.
"He is Khatab. My friend. He was from Russia. He converted to Islam and joined
us for jihad. One year ago, he was killed in battle," Mustafa said.
I questioned Mustafa on how their ideological counterparts in Uzbekistan,
Chechnya, Tajikistan and Russia connected with the Taliban in northern
Afghanistan.
"I can tell you that there is an active connection between the Central Asian
command and the Taliban in northern Afghanistan and they often join us, but how
they connect, this is beyond my level. Our superior commanders are in touch
with their counterparts in Central Asia and if somebody arrives in Afghanistan
or goes to Central Asia from Afghanistan, it is arranged at a senior leadership
level," Mustafa said.
I tried to turn the discussion to global trends in Islamic militancy, but it
appeared this was not Mustafa's forte. His vision and understanding were
limited to northern Afghanistan. He knew al-Qaeda not as strategists, but as
fellow jihadis. However, he was clear-headed on two counts; al-Qaeda had
established bases in Kunduz province, and the war had to enter Uzbekistan,
sooner or later.
"Uzbekistan is the center of all activities against us. All supplies come
through Uzbekistan, and all other support for NATO is also from Uzbekistan, and
therefore to overwhelm NATO we will have to take our war to Uzbekistan to force
them to give up their support to NATO," Mustafa said in very plain and simple
words about a future dimension of the Afghan war.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief and
author of upcoming book Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban, beyond 9/11 published
by Pluto Press, UK. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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