Bin
Laden sets alarm bells
ringing By Syed Saleem Shahzad
ISLAMABAD - After a prolonged lull, the
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
has launched a series of covert operations in the
rugged Hindu Kush mountains of Pakistan and
Afghanistan following strong tip-offs that
al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has been
criss-crossing the area in the past few weeks for
high-profile meetings in militant redoubts.
The US has been on Bin Laden's trail ever
since he fled Afghanistan when the US invaded the
country in 2001 to oust the Taliban, but the
54-year-old with a US$50 million reward on his
head has always remained several steps in front.
Asia Times Online has learned that
decision-makers have put a lot of weight on the
information on Bin Laden's movements as it
has come from multiple
intelligence agencies, in Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Saudi Arabia. For at least two years, little
credible news has emerged of Bin Laden's movements
and motives. Now, intelligence officials believe
they have top-grade accounts as they come from the
inner circles of militant camps.
Officials
are said to be "stunned" by the visibility of Bin
Laden's movements, and their frequency, in a
matter of a few weeks in the outlawed terrain of
Pakistan and Afghanistan, the most unprecedented
reports about him since he evaded the US in the
Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan in 2001.
The development has fueled speculation in
intelligence circles that al-Qaeda could be
planning another major attack along the lines of
the September 11, 2001, assault on New York and
Washington, and the July 2007 foiled bomb attack
in London.
However, extensive
investigations by Asia Times Online, including
exchanges within al-Qaeda's camps, point in
another direction: given the nature of Bin Laden's
meetings, this appears to be the beginning of a
new era for a broader struggle in which al-Qaeda,
through its Laskhar al-Zil (Shadow Army), will try
to capitalize on the Arab revolts and the
Palestinian struggle and also revitalize and
redefine its role in Afghanistan.
A
meeting in Bajaur Several weeks ago, Bin
Laden is reported to have met with Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, the legendary Afghan mujahid and
founder and leader of the Hezb-e-Islami
Afghanistan (HIA) political party and paramilitary
group, in a militant camp in thick jungle on the
fringes of Kunar and Bajaur provinces in
Afghanistan. The encounter was publicized by leaks
from the HIA's inner circle and the news was
circulated within militant camps in Pakistan's
North Waziristan tribal area via top-level
Pakistani militant commanders in Bajaur.
Despite him being an ally in the war in
Afghanistan, the Taliban led by Mullah Omar have
always been skeptical about Hekmatyar's
intentions, while Bin Laden and some other
al-Qaeda leaders view him differently. Hekmatyar's
representatives of the HIA have been in direct
active negotiations with the Americans and have
also brokered limited ceasefire agreements with
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces
in Afghanistan.
Bin Laden fought alongside
Hekmatyar in the jihad against the Soviets in
Afghanistan in the 1980s and they remained in
contact during Bin Laden's days in Sudan, where he
had settled in 1992. When Bin Laden returned to
Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, he stayed in regions
that were controlled by warlords loyal to
Hekmatyar.
Intelligence sources privy to
the meeting in Bajaur said Bin Laden could not
afford to meet Hekmatyar simply for a dinner
party, which was hosted by a Pakistani militant
commander of Salafi tendencies and who was a
member of the HIA during the Soviet jihad.
"The talks appeared to discuss some grand
strategy and Osama bin Laden aims to take
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar on board, especially as
Hekmatyar's commanders have brokered ceasefire
agreements with NATO forces in Afghanistan and
Hekmatyar's representatives have been negotiating
a truce with the Americans," an intelligence
source told Asia Times Online.
Beyond
terror operations Adding to the view of the
importance of Bin Laden's meeting with Hekmatyar
is that it took place when the interest of the CIA
and its special forces had already been piqued by
reports of the al-Qaeda leader's movements in
Kunar and Nuristan for meetings with various
militant commanders and al-Qaeda bigwigs. Bin
Laden would have been aware of the dangers and was
obviously prepared to take the risk.
While
intelligence agencies might be involved in a
guessing game about Bin Laden's plans and a
possible grand al-Qaeda operation, his movements
can be read in the perspective of recent discourse
in al-Qaeda circles and a major shift in its
policies.
International Islamic militancy
that had its roots in the decade-long war against
the Soviets in the 1980s was broadly divided into
two main schools of thought; both considered
themselves righteous despite embodying
contradictory themes. These were doctrines of
armed struggle espoused by Palestinian Sunni
Islamic scholar and theologian Dr Abdullah Azzam,
and Egyptian ideologue and Bin Laden's deputy, Dr
Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Azzam preached in favor
of defensive jihad by Muslims to help the Afghan
mujahideen against the Soviets. He firmly believed
in a broader Muslim bloc including Muslim ruling
establishments and never supported revolt against
Muslim regimes. Despite being Palestinian with
Jordanian nationality and a background in the
Muslim Brotherhood, Azzam kept himself aloof from
the Palestinian revolt against the Jordanian
monarchy in September 1970 (called Black
September).
Azzam was very close to the
Saudi Arabian royal family and considered it
essential to lobby it for support of Islamic armed
movements like the Afghan resistance against the
Soviets and the Palestinian resistance against
Israel. He struggled to achieve unity among Muslim
rulers and Islamists to resist Western hegemony.
He was less dogmatic than others in his strategic
purview.
After Azzam's assassination in
Pakistan in 1989, Zawahiri emerged as the main
ideologue of Islamic armed opposition. Coming from
the same ideological background of the Muslim
Brotherhood as Azzam, Zawahiri faced an entirely
different world after the end of the Cold War in
the early 1990s when, under American instructions,
Muslim regimes were intolerant of Islamic
militancy.
Zawahiri therefore promoted the
idea of ideological divides within the Muslim
world, and encouraged revolts and terrorism to
polarize societies to such a point of chaos that
they would be unmanageable and amenable to Western
intervention. It was believed that such
intervention would open the gates for a battle
between the West and the Muslim world.
Like Azzam, Zawahiri is not too dogmatic,
but he encouraged narrow ideological views in
resistance movements as a strategy to boost
revolts against Muslim-majority states.
Of
the two schools of thought, Azzam's has never been
criticized and is respected by all while
Zawahiri's has come under heavy fire from
mainstream Muslim scholars and intelligentsia.
Zawahiri’s adherents had no argument in his
defense other than him operating under the law of
necessity.
A recent ideological discourse
within al-Qaeda's ranks shot down Zawahiri's
arguments. This was sparked by key al-Qaeda
ideologues and commanders such as Sulaiman Abu
al-Gaith (see Broadside
fired at al-Qaeda leaders Asia Times Online,
December 10, 2010) and Saif al-Adel.
Adel
emphasized that while polarization within the
Muslim world was essential after 9/11 to gather
strength behind al-Qaeda, nowadays, especially in
light of the great Arab revolt, there was a need
to switch to Azzam's viewpoint that sees no need
for polarization within Muslim-majority states
viz-a-viz the Muslim world's confrontation against
Western hegemony.
After this, al-Qaeda
began a new phase with the Muslim Brotherhood and
Palestinian groups to revive its old contacts and
establish a new nexus for a joint struggle against
Western interests in the Muslim world.
Bin
Laden's meeting with Hekmatyar and other militant
commanders in the Hindu Kush can be seen as a part
of this new war in which al-Qaeda aims to involve
the whole Muslim nation.
Hekmatyar's HIA
has been a part of al-Qaeda's Laskhar al-Zil,
which comprises elite guerrillas. Possibly,
al-Qaeda aims to revitalize its operations in
Afghanistan, and throughout the world, along with
mainstream resistance groups (sons of the soil or
Ibnul Balad) and in addition to Islamic
political parties.
While fears attached to
Bin Laden’s unprecedented visibility and movement
for a grand al-Qaeda operation cannot completely
be dismissed, it is more possible that al-Qaeda
will undertake both worldwide terror operations
and join forces with mainstream Muslim groups.
Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia
Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief and author of
upcoming book Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban,
beyond 9/11 published by Pluto Press, UK. He
can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com
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