Osama as an Afghan exit
strategy By Shibil Siddiqi
The United States turned to
nation-building in Afghanistan, complete with a
dissimulating narrative of liberating women, and
importing human rights and democracy, when it
failed to get Osama bin Laden "dead or alive". Now
Bin Laden is dead, and there are strong
indications that his killing will lead to a shift
in American strategy in Afghanistan.
The
US occupation of Afghanistan faces two distinct
military challenges. The first is managing an
essentially nationalist Taliban insurgency with
Islamist overtones. The second is destroying
al-Qaeda, a transnational terrorist organization,
and its like-minded allies. Under the operational
cover of the former, it is the latter that has
informed core American interests in Afghanistan.
In a speech delivered in early 2009, US
President Barack Obama
reiterated that the American
occupation of Afghanistan had a "clear and
focussed goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat
al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan ..." American
intelligence assessments have also concluded for
years that al-Qaeda has only a nominal presence
left in Afghanistan.
Its operatives have
long since migrated to the relative security of
Pakistan, and have set up more lethal franchises
in Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and the Maghreb.
Al-Qaeda's links with Afghanistan's Taliban
insurgency are also tenuous at best.
Leaving Afghanistan on the basis of
intelligence estimates, however, lacks both the
psychological satisfaction and narrative power of
exiting on the back of a job well done. The
problem, from the American perspective, in acting
on such assessments has been pulling off an
American withdrawal that is not seen by the
American public and the wider world as a strategic
defeat. Such a perception would undoubtedly
diminish American power.
In this context,
Bin Laden's killing has provided Washington an
opportune "mission accomplished" moment. The US
can now begin a shift back to the old script about
Bin Laden being the effective marker for success
in Afghanistan, and sever its counter-terrorism
objectives from the quagmire of
counter-insurgency.
For it is clear that
the ramped up counter-insurgency effort has,
despite some tactical successes in Afghanistan's
south, been a strategic failure. Far from imposing
a new military reality on the ground, it has been
unable even to alter the Taliban's perception that
they are winning the war (simply because they are
not losing it).
Another indication of a
brewing change in policy was the announcement on
April 28 - two days before the Bin Laden
kill-mission - that the top US commander in
Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, had been
appointed the head of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). The timing of Petreaus' appointment
is highly notable, given that on April 28 the Bin
Laden operation was probably in its final planning
stages. Also, his CIA directorship is set to begin
in September, when the American "surge" in
Afghanistan is to begin its drawdown.
Fresh from the "success" of his troop
surge in Iraq, perhaps Petreaus believed that
Afghanistan could become his victory lap. As
someone who has literally written the book on
American counter-insurgency, he has been a strong
proponent of such a troop-heavy approach in
Afghanistan. He also proved to be a wily political
operator. Utilizing skilful lobbying and public
relations tactics, Petraeus deftly outmaneuvered
those within the Obama administration, including
most notably Vice President Joe Biden, who favored
an early pullback by switching to a
counter-terrorism model.
As the August
deadline for a drawdown of the "surge" approaches,
Petraeus has largely stuck to his guns, favoring
only a token scaling-down of troop levels.
However, as head of the CIA, he will ironically
gain oversight of counter-terrorism operations,
but will lose his clout in directing the military
mission, including the pace of the American
withdrawal.
The Afghanistan war is already
deeply unpopular with most Americans - a
significant factor with elections presidential
elections slated for next year. In addition, there
is already a rising chorus within Congress calling
for a faster drawdown in light of Bin Laden's
death, citing Afghanistan's diminished strategic
value as a result of the dispersal of al-Qaeda,
and the fiscal crisis in the US.
With Bin
Laden in the body-bag, and without the resistance
of Washington's star general, the White House will
find it easier to adopt an accelerated half-life
for its counter-insurgency. Already, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton has expressed the view that
Bin Laden's death, "opens up possibilities for
dealing with the Taliban that did not exist
before".
This does not mean that American
military presence in Afghanistan will be reduced
to zero anytime soon. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has reiterated that it will
hover by Kabul's side for the long-haul, despite
Bin Laden's demise and even once security
responsibilities are handed over to Afghan forces
in 2014.
This presents a strong likelihood
of an abundance of military trainers and a rump of
troops remaining in Kabul for years to come.
Moreover, the US will also likely continue to
conduct counter-terrorism operations using Special
Forces and CIA operatives in both Afghanistan and
Pakistan. But there is little doubt that the
American occupation of Afghanistan has effectively
entered the end-game.
Indeed, the US is
conscious of the opportunity-cost of its military
power bogged down in Afghanistan as its global
competitors, including China and Russia, continue
their rise. Thus, the US has been searching for an
exit strategy for a while, hinging it largely on a
question of political timing rather than military
exigencies. This has mostly revolved around
exploiting Pakistani intelligence links to the
Taliban to target their leadership and force them
to come to the negotiating table.
Pakistan's cooperation with the US has
been opportunistic and stuttering in this regard,
in the hopes that prolonging the process will
enable it to drive the direction of the
negotiations. Pakistan believes that this will
fulfill its own strategic paradigm of ensuring a
friendly and anti-Indian regime in Kabul.
But Bin Laden's death has altered the
American political calculus, delivering up fresh
possibilities for crafting an exit strategy.
Though it still remains an important link to the
Taliban, Pakistan's leverage will diminish both as
a result of political pressure over the potential
complicity of its security establishment in hiding
Bin Laden, as well as in the face of an as yet
embryonic consensus in Washington towards a faster
withdrawal from Afghanistan in light of Bin
Laden's death.
The American invasion and
occupation of Afghanistan was always about
demonstrating American power and hitting back at
Bin Laden, even if other narratives had to be
crafted to justify the mission's high-mindedness
or strategic value. With his death in Pakistan,
Bin Laden's story can now be uprooted and severed
from Afghanistan. Like Bin Laden, the tale of
Afghanistan's unending suffering will also be
buried at sea.
Shibil Siddiqi is
a Fellow with the Center for the Study of Global
Power and Politics at Trent University and a
contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, the
Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives and ZNet.
He can be reached at shibil.siddiqi@gmail.com.
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