Editor's note: Al-Qaeda on Thursday named Ayman al-Zawahiri as
its new chief to succeed the slain Osama bin Laden, and vowed "there will be no
let up in its jihad against the United States and Israel". The group added,
""We support the uprisings of our oppressed Muslim people against the corrupt
and tyrant leaders who have made our nation suffer in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya
Yemen, Syria and Morocco." The following report was written before al-Qaeda's
announcement.
By Murad Batal al-Shishani
Since the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, was killed on May 2, much
analysis has appeared speculating on potential changes to the organization and
its leadership. This article aims to answer the basic question of in which
direction core al-Qaeda (based along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border) will go
in the post-Bin Laden era according to the ideology of its remaining leaders.
These figures include Egyptian jihadi Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, who will probably
emerge as the undeclared leader, as al-Qaeda members considers themselves not
an organization, but rather "vanguards" of the jihadi movement. As al-Qaeda
ideologue Abdul Majid Abdul Majid put it: "Al-Qaeda is no longer just a
hierarchal organization [built] on specific names, but has become a jihadi
mission held [in common] by all mujahideen of the umma [Islamic
community]." [1]
Some indication of al-Zawahiri's emerging role can be found in his eulogy for
Bin Laden which was released on jihadi websites on June 8. [2] In the message,
entitled "The Noble Knight Alighted," al-Zawhiri announced the renewal of
al-Qaeda's Bai'a (oath of allegiance) to the Amir al-Mu'mineen (Commander
of the Faithful) Taliban leader Mullah Omar, indicating that al-Zawahiri has
the authority to do so on behalf of those "vanguards".
In order to assess the future behavior of al-Qaeda this article will examine
the ideology of three members of al-Qaeda's Shura council in addition to
al-Zawahiri: Abu Yahya al-Libi (aka Hassan Muhammad Qaid), Abu Abdulrahman
Attiya al-Libi (aka Jamal Ibrahim Shtelwi al-Misrati) and Abdul Majid Abdul
Majid. A fourth shura member, Abu Khalil al-Madani, is not included in
this analysis due to a lack of information about his views.
Saif al-Adel in the al-Qaeda leadership
Although al-Zawahiri has been described as the deputy leader of al-Qaeda over
the past 15 years, some recent reports have suggested that Egyptian commander
Saif al-Adel would be appointed as the new al-Qaeda leader. However, al-Adel is
a military professional, as can be noted from his writings, which means that
his lack of ideological credentials make such reports unlikely. [3]
A retired Egyptian military officer, al-Adel is believed to be the leader of
al-Qaeda's military committee and returned to the Pakistan tribal area of
Waziristan in 2010 after being released from detention in Iran. Saif al-Adel is
commonly identified in reports as the alias of a retired Egyptian intelligence
(or special forces) officer named Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi; however, there are
reasons to question this identification. Al-Adel's father-in-law, an Afghan
jihad veteran named Abu Hamid al-Masri (aka Mustafa Hamid), has denied Makkawi
is al-Adel's real name.
In 2004, the London-based Islamic Media Observatory released a statement saying
al-Adel and Makkawi are not the same person. [4] More recently, an Egyptian
newspaper published a letter from an individual identifying himself as Muhammad
Ibrahim Makkawi, a veteran of the Afghan jihad, stating that he is not Saif
al-Adel and has been experiencing problems as a result of this
misidentification. The author appears to also be in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
region, but claims to have denounced al-Qaeda since 9/11.
It is important to note that killing Bin Laden does not mean the dismantlement
of al-Qaeda. A June 16, 2010, video recording by Abu Yahya al-Libi, entitled
"Our Leaders' Blood Fuels Our Battle", eulogized the former leaders of al-Qaeda
in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, who were killed in a US
air strike on April 19, 2010.
Al-Libi's eulogy indicates the mindset influencing the behavior of al-Qaeda
post-Bin Laden: "There is no mujahid who has fought in bouts and stepped into
battlefields, whether he is a leader or a soldier, [who] has not prepared
himself for death; he is eagerly awaiting it, hour by hour, no, moment by
moment ... this worship [jihad], which is part of our glorious religion, cannot
be stopped, disrupted or delayed by the death, killing or capture of someone,
whoever he is and [whatever] his status is." [5]
Abu Yahya escaped from the American detention centre in Bagram-Afghanistan in
2005. Since then he has appeared as one of the most prominent ideologues of
Salafi-jihadism after studying Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) in
Mauritania. Jihadists often refer to his writings, especially his opinions on
killing civilians.
Far enemy and near enemy
Bin Laden was fond of the idea of fighting against "the far enemy" (the
"Crusaders and Jews"). Seventy percent of his speeches and appearances were
focused on the far enemy, with 20% consisting of general advice and
instructions to jihadis, and just 10% directed at toppling local regimes of
"the near enemy" ("apostate" regimes in the Muslim world). [6] These figures
suggest that although Bin Laden served as a symbol for jihadis, he was a
strategist more than a religious ideologue.
Unlike Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri is focused more on the near enemy, this being due
to his background as leader of a national jihad group before it adopted
Salafism and joined the larger international jihad movement in the 1980s, of
which al-Qaeda is the prime example.
Al-Zawahiri's focus on "the near enemy" comprised 50% of his speeches; in
contrast "the far-enemy" was the focus of only 15% of his speeches, the rest
being comprised mainly of general advice and instructions.
The works of Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abu Abdulrahman Attiya al-Libi and Abdul Majid
Abdul Majid reflect a similar lack of focus on fighting the far enemy. This
suggests that core al-Qaeda will focus on targeting near enemies in the future.
In his June 8 eulogy for Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri made explicit calls for jihad
against the near enemy in Pakistan, Syria, Yemen and Libya.
Ideologues and operatives
Al-Qaeda and all its branches have a functional division between
political-ideological leaders and military operatives. Switching broad
strategies would increase the roles of certain leaders from both groups. For
instance, al-Zawahiri will rely on operatives who prefer to target near
enemies, such as his old comrade Abu Muhammad al-Masri (aka Abdullah Ahmad
Abdullah).
Al-Masri's preference for targeting "near enemies" was a source of disagreement
with Bin Laden himself after the 9/11 attacks. Al-Masri is an al-Qaeda
operative and appears on the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's most wanted
list. He is accused of involvement in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the US
embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi and is believed to be located in the
area of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Al-Zawahiri will also need to rely on operatives such as al-Adel and Ilyas
Kashmiri to maintain al-Qaeda ties with local insurgents in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Kashmiri's current status is uncertain; a
statement allegedly from Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) announced his death
in a June 3 drone strike in North Waziristan, although the spokesman was
previously unknown, there were mistakes in the text unlikely to be made by a
HuJI spokesman.
Moreover, the photo of an allegedly dead Kashmiri was actually the body of Abu
Ismail Khan, one of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists involved in the 2008
Mumbai attack. Kashmiri is known to be an al-Qaeda commander and leader of the
Waziristan-based and HuJI-associated Brigade 313, which is made up of members
of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and allied Kashmiri groups, including LeT and
the Karachi-based Jundallah movement.
However, focusing on the near enemy could be the first challenge to
al-Zawahiri's leadership. Al-Qaeda's rhetoric promoting violent jihad has had
very little effect on the youths agitating for political change in the streets
of the Arab world, which has also hurt its recruitment base.
However, if political violence were to continue to escalate in Libya, Syria and
Yemen, for instance, it would provide new opportunities for a movement that has
always gravitated to areas in crisis.
Individual jihad
In this context, it is expected that the ideological role of Abu Abdulrahman
Attiya al-Libi will increase. Attiya is a prominent al-Qaeda theorist and a
leader of the jihadist movement in Libya. A graduate of sharia studies in
Mauritania and an expert in explosives, he is considered close to al-Zawahiri.
He was also close to Bin Laden and al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab
al-Zarqawi before the latter was killed in 2006. Attiya has also been described
as a coordinator between al-Qaeda leaders and other Islamic groups. Looking at
his writings, one notes that all of them fell into the category of "general
advice and instructions" until the turmoil in Libya started last February. At
that point he started to send messages more regularly denouncing Muammar
Gaddafi and North Atlantic Treaty Organization military operations in Libya.
Attiya al-Libi's role as a general theorist is essential for al-Qaeda. This was
indicated in a recent two-part video recording produced by al-Sahab Media
Production entitled "La Tukalif ila Nafsak" (You are not tasked [held
responsible] except for yourself only). The first one-hour episode was devoted
to encouraging al-jihad al-fardi (individual jihad), particularly among
Muslims who live in the West.
The tactic was described in the recording by both Attiya al-Libi and Abu Yahya
al-Libi. [7] Attiya al-Libi stressed the importance of individual jihadi
attacks being in line with "the mujahideen's general strategy ... all Western
countries are not the same." He further urged potential jihadis to contact "the
leaders of mujahideen, if that's possible" before undertaking individual
operations.
Besides its tactical advantages, individual jihad suggests that the "far enemy"
remains a priority for al-Qaeda. This will increase the importance of the work
of Abdul Majid, who clearly stated the priority of targeting the United States
when he was asked about the strategy of jihadists: "As for the overall strategy
of jihad, I think it is known to all, which is [based] on the importance of
focusing on the head of kufr [disbelief] and corruption in the globe -
America." [8]
Conclusion
Al-Qaeda will continue after Bin Laden by relying on its ideology, but a change
will be seen in its behavior. These changes will be reflected in new roles for
the movement's leaders, particularly those involved in developing the group's
ideology.
Under al-Zawahiri's leadership, al-Qaeda will be more near-enemy-oriented, but
this will depend on developments in the Arab world and the direction of the
popular opposition movements. Relying on military operatives to maintain ties
with locals in the region could become a problem for core al-Qaeda if they do
not dedicate an ideologue for such missions.
Though al-Zawahiri will play an important role as al-Qaeda's new leader, the
increased roles of various ideologues will mean that the movement will be led
in a more collective fashion than has existed previously.
Notes
1. Not much is known about him or whether this is his real name. Unlike most
Egyptian jihadis he has not come from al-Gama'a al-Islamiya or al-Jihad, but is
rather a product of the traditional Egyptian Salafist movement. For the full
text of his interview, see: www.tawhed.ws/r, June 19, 2010.
2. www.as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php.
3. For Saif al-Adel's writings, see: www.tawhed.ws/a.
4. www.aljahad.info/vb/showthread.php.
5. The video can be watched at this link: www.archive.org/details/dema3.
6. All figures compiled by the author.
7. For more details on the al-jihad al-fardi tactic, which was first encouraged
by Bin Laden, see Terrorism Monitor, June 17, 2010. 8. www.tawhed.ws/r, June
2010.
Murad Batal al-Shishani is an Islamic groups and terrorism issues analyst
based in London. He is a specialist on Islamic movements in Chechnya and in the
Middle East. He is a regular contributor to several publications in both Arabic
and English. He is also author of the book The Islamic Movement in
Chechnya and the Chechen-Russian Conflict 1990-2000, Amman, 2001 (in Arabic),
and Iraqi Resistance: National Liberation vs. Terrorism: A Quantitative Study,
November 2005 Iraqi Studies Series, Issue 5, Gulf Research Center-Dubai.
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