Before and after President Barack Obama
announced the new United States strategy on
Afghanistan, I engaged in a variety of media
panels and private discussions with commentators
and analysts from Arab and Muslim-majority regions
of the world.
Some of the individuals I
spoke with are close to the Taliban and others are
critical of the Islamist militia. Contrary to the
president's assertions, all of these experts
affirmed that Taliban morale is high and there is
no sense of defeat among the jihadis.
The
administration's plan for Afghanistan may include
reconciliation with the Taliban, but the latter
have no plans that allow American gains, much less
bilateral negotiations to end the conflict.
It appears that the administration is
tangoing with an imaginary
partner. British premier
Neville Chamberlain's wishful September 30, 1938,
proclamation, "I have returned from Germany with
peace in our time," should serve as a chilling
reminder to those who are under the illusion that
a war is receding when, in fact, it is about to
escalate into global conflict.
The Taliban
strategy is not obscure; most of it has been
announced, publicized and is based in ideology, as
has been the case with totalitarian movements
throughout history. The US's inability to grasp
Taliban plans is not due to the jihadis'
highly-developed denial and deception skills, but
rather to the unwillingness or inability of the US
and its allies to see it.
The Taliban's
long-term strategic plan is simple: practice
taqiyya to gain terrain and power; resume
jihad to eliminate the other forms of governance;
and implement their version of sharia to reverse
democracy.
Al-Taqiyya Al-Taqiyya has historical and, by some
accounts, theological meaning. Originally, the
term referred to a defensive tactic Shi'ite
dissidents employed to protect themselves from the
wrath of the Sunni caliphate during times of war
between the two sects in the early part of the 7th
century.
Taqiyya sanctions
deception to conceal intentions and affiliations
to avoid retaliation by those in power. Today,
Sunni Salafis and Shi'ite Khomeinists have added
to the meaning of the term making it an offensive
tactic of war as well.
In contemporary
usage, the term refers to subterfuge or
dissimulation by war planners and commanders to
deceive a foe regarding their ultimate aims. Used
this way, taqiyya is strategic deception,
not much different that Cold War maneuvers used by
the Soviets.
Negotiations take place
"under the table" via third parties to lure
administration officials into accepting the
Taliban's offer. To the US, the Taliban might
respond, "We will accept a deal but we can't say
so in public." But to their constituents, they
would assure: "Americans think we will cut a deal
with them but the only thing we're going to cut in
pieces is our commitment to them."
The
bottom line: The administration will sail out of
Afghanistan on an ocean of Taliban deception. With
taqiyya, the Taliban can make Washington
believe that jihadi militias have mutated into a
soft Justice and Development Party as in Turkey or
a stealthy Muslim Brotherhood.
Jihad As they deceive
Washington policymakers, the Taliban have no
compunction about pursuing jihad until their
banner flies again on the presidential palace in
Kabul. Why would they do anything else?
Jihadi ideology and planted hallucinations
define the movement. If they abandon these tactics
they will become marginalized warlords with no
political identity.
The Taliban exist,
intimidate and attract because they practice
jihad. There is no counter-measure in US strategy
in Afghanistan to best the Taliban's jihad
strategy. The US wants to bestow legitimacy on the
Taliban without a counter-radicalization strategy.
The new administration counter-terrorism
doctrine is targeted strikes against Taliban
leaders and units, but it does not include a
counter-insurgency that mobilizes the general
populace against the jihadis to isolate them.
Jihad's most important component, indoctrination,
is not on US radars anymore. But ironically it is
the fuel of the Taliban's war machine.
Sharia Clearly, the
Taliban's goal in Afghanistan is to implement
sharia (Islamic law) on every square inch
of land they bring under their authority. The
imposition of sharia is non-negotiable.
"Talib ul Shari'ah" (Student of sharia) is
the origin of the movement.
What this
means is that communities under Taliban rule will
be governed according to their laws, as was the
case before 2001. Women (especially girls),
religious minorities and secular political parties
will be affected. Advances in liberty since the
Taliban's fall will be reversed.
The
Taliban's sharia is not just about divorce
and inheritance; it is about eliminating all other
forms of man-made law. The Taliban will transform
the government into an emirate.
The
Taliban plan for Afghanistan isn't new; they will
adapt it to the new US plan for that country. It
will be dominated by taqiyya, jihad
and sharia.
Dr Walid
Phares is the author of The Coming
Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle
East. He teaches Global Strategies in
Washington DC, and advises members of the US
Congress and the European parliament.
www.walidphares.com
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