Page 1 of
2 Ban on
Pakistan Taliban too little too
late By Amir Mir
ISLAMABAD - The United Nations Security
Council's July 29 decision to put the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban - TTP)
on its international anti-terrorism sanctions list
has come as too little too late and will hardly
affect the TTP's operations in the Waziristan
tribal regions of the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA).
The most wanted
fugitive, chief of the TTP Hakimullah Mehsud, and
his second in command, Waliur Rehman, have been on
the UN's sanctions list since October 2010 because
of their alleged al-Qaeda links.
The TTP
has declared open war against the Pakistani state
and its security establishment and has often
targeted government
officials and security forces
in its quest to topple the United States-allied
Pakistan People's Party-led government in
Islamabad.
The group also claimed
responsibility for the 2010 failed car bombing in
New York's Times Square, for which a
Pakistani-American, Faisal Shahzad, was jailed for
life in by a US court.
Therefore, the UN
sanctions are not only backed by Pakistan but also
by the United States. The measures mean that all
193 UN member states will freeze any assets of the
TTP or its leadership, prevent any weapons or
ammunition from getting to them, and bar its
leaders from entering the member countries.
But practically, the TTP leaders will not
be the least bothered about UN sanctions, given
that they barely have any assets abroad or any
foreign bank accounts; neither do they get arms or
ammunition from any member UN country, and nor do
they intend to travel to any of them.
The
adding of the TTP to the sanctions list comes as
the UN Security Council eases pressure on the
Afghan Taliban with a view to encourage them to
join peace moves in Afghanistan. The UN Security
Council decided last month to take the Afghan
Taliban off the al-Qaeda sanctions list to
differentiate the two and encourage Afghan
reconciliation efforts.
Since the
beginning of the US-led "war on terror" in 2001,
and particularly since the rise of the Taliban
rebellion within its own borders in recent years,
Pakistan has been seen as a state embroiled in a
jihadi insurgency that is threatening its very
survival. Almost a decade after the "war on
terror" was launched with the invasion of
Afghanistan to oust the Taliban, Pakistan is
buckling under the onslaught of a jihadi
rebellion, led by the TTP, whose meteoric rise has
literally pushed the Pakistani state to the brink
of civil war.
Genesis of the TTP The TTP is an umbrella organization of
various-sized Islamic militant groups based in the
FATA along the Durand Line (Afghan border) in
Pakistan. Although formed in 2007, the TTP
actually started taking root in 2002 when the
Pakistani military decided to carry out operations
in the tribal belt of Waziristan to combat
foreign, primarily Afghan, Arab and Central Asian
militants, fleeing from the US-led invasion of
Afghanistan into Pakistan.
These militants
had in fact moved to Pakistan following the fall
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to take
shelter in the Waziristan region due to the
naturally porous borders. The largest number of
militants moving to Pakistan chose South
Waziristan, one of the seven tribal agencies of
the FATA. From here they could keep waging their
battle against the allied forces in neighboring
Afghanistan, besides targeting the Pakistani army
that had already joined hands with the US in the
"war on terror".
The TTP was eventually
formed in North Waziristan region on December 12,
2007, when an assembly of 40 senior Pakistani
jihadis commanding a pooled force of about 40,000
gathered in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province and decided to come together
under a single banner, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP).
Baitullah Mehsud was chosen the
central amir or leader of the new
organization, while two key Taliban leaders in
North Waziristan and South Waziristan - Hafiz Gul
Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir respectively, were
appointed as deputies to the amir of the
new conglomerate.
Maulana Faqeer Mohammad
of Bajaur Agency was appointed the third in
command while Maulana Fazlullah was made the
secretary general and head of the Swat chapter of
the TTP. Maulvi Omar was appointed the
organization's official spokesperson.
TTP components Some of the key
militant groups that joined the TTP conglomerate
by pledging allegiance to Baitullah and submitted
themselves to his centralized command included the
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by
Maulvi Fazlullah; the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group of
the Taliban in North Waziristan; the Maulvi Nazir
group of the Taliban in South Waziristan; the
Tehrike Taliban of Omar Khalid, both factions of
the Tehrike Tuleba led by Mullah Safi and Mullah
Jalali respectively; the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) led by Tahir Yuldashev; the Tora
Bora Taliban created by Maulvi Khalis; and the
Lashkar-e-Mohammadia.
The meeting not only
had representation from all seven tribal agencies
of FATA, namely South Waziristan, North
Waziristan, Orakzai Agency, Kurram Agency, Mohmand
Agency, Bajaur Agency and Darra Adamkhel Agency,
but also from the settled districts of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province (which was earlier called
North-West Frontier Province, including Peshawar,
Swat, Malakand, Mardan, Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu,
Tank, Lakki Marwat, Kohistan, Buner, Upper Dir and
Lower Dir.)
A shura (consultative
council) of 40 senior Taliban leaders was also
formed to guide the TTP. The Pakistani Taliban
from the seven tribal agencies of FATA further
divided the tribal areas into administrative
zones; a military commander was to head each zone
and was to report to the supreme commander of
local Taliban and consultative council.
Within the administrative zone, separate
units were formed to run specific functions:
intelligence collection, identification and
elimination of "spies", revenue collection,
maintenance of law and order, and so on. A
majority of the groups that had joined the TTP had
long been involved in violent conflicts with the
Pakistani army in the tribal areas.
As far
as TTP ideology is concerned, it is based on
jihadi vernacular that reverberates Islamic
fundamentalism based on narrow and militant
interpretations of Wahhabism, Salafism,
Ahl-e-Hadith or Deobandi doctrines. And the common
enemy includes the United States, Israel, India,
as well as the Barelvi, Sufi and Shi'ite sects of
Islam.
TTP objectives The
stated objectives of TTP at the time of its
launching were waging defensive jihad against the
Pakistani security forces, uniting jihadi groups
against the coalition forces in Afghanistan and
converting Pakistan into an Islamic emirate, like
the Afghan Taliban did in Afghanistan during their
rule from 1996 to 2001.
A subsequent
statement issued by TTP spokesman Maulvi Omar on
December 13, 2007, which said the sole objective
behind the launching of the TTP was to unite the
Pakistani Taliban and set up a centralized
organization against the foreign forces in
Afghanistan, besides waging a defensive jihad
against the Pakistani security forces.
The
consolidation of the disparate local Taliban was a
logical step in the Pakistani Taliban's insurgency
drive in northwestern Pakistan. Before that, the
Pakistani Taliban, while allied with al-Qaeda and
the Afghan Taliban, had operated as local groups.
However, the creation of a unified Taliban
movement on the Pakistani side of the Afghan
border enhanced their coordination to carry out
military and political operations with the help of
their jihadi fellows from Afghanistan.
TTP strength There is no clear
estimate of the number of TTP fighters in
Pakistan: figures range from 10,000 to 40,000. The
exact number of foreign fighters amid the TTP also
remains uncertain: official figures have ranged
from 4,000 to 8,000. In September 2009, official
figures from the military in Pakistan put the
number of TTP fighters, including foreign
militants, in FATA alone at over 10,000.
It is interesting to note that the average
age of TTP leaders is quite young - 35. A general
trend among the growing Taliban movement is for
older commanders to be replaced by younger, more
robust leaders who are technologically savvy.
While in his mid-30s, Baitullah Mehsud became the
TTP amir.
Baitullah's successor,
Hakimullah Mehsud, is in his early 30s. Maulvi
Nazir, a Taliban commander of the Ahmedzai Wazir
tribe in South Waziristan who has allegedly been
involved in offering operational assistance to the
Afghan Taliban, is about 35 years of age. Maulana
Fazlullah, TTP commander and amir of the
Swat Valley, is reportedly also in his mid-30s.
TTP organizational structure The organizational structure of the TTP is
different when compared with that of the Afghan
Taliban - it lacks a central command and is a much
looser coalition of various militant groups,
united by hostility to the Pakistan government
because of its siding with the United States.
Therefore, the TTP's structure can well be
described as a loose network of dispersed
constituent militant groups that vary in size and
in levels of coordination. That's why the presence
and influence of the TTP is spreading across the
FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
Pockets within Punjab and Sindh provinces have
also been influenced by the TTP.
TTP
financing The nature of the TTP's
financial sources remains a contentious issue, as
fingers are routinely pointed at foreign
intelligence services.
But apparently,
numerous financial sources swell the TTP coffers,
including criminal activities - kidnapping for
ransom, charging protection money and collecting
donations from sympathizers inside and outside of
Pakistan. Pakistani officials, including Interior
Ministry Rehman Malik, have alleged in the past
that "enemies of Pakistan" provide financial aid
to TTP.
Other sources of income include
Islamic institutes that collect donations from
Taliban sympathizers within and outside Pakistan.
Expatriates living in the Arab world, especially
the United Arab Emirates, use the
hundi/hawala system to send money
contributing to the cause of the TTP. Criminal
activities such as kidnappings for ransom and bank
robberies swell the TTP coffers, as does the
looting of army ammunition and vehicles.
TTP money distribution network Within South and North Waziristan, the main
body collecting revenue is the TTP and Hakimullah
then decides where and how the money will be
distributed.
The TTP in Waziristan has
reportedly divided each tribal area into an
administrative zone; revenue collected across the
tribal agencies is submitted to a central
authority that then distributes money to the
various administrated zones on a monthly basis,
with Hakimullah receiving the lion's share.
In North Waziristan, the Taliban have
levied "taxes" on transport and trucking - for
example, 10-wheel trucks entering Waziristan are
required to pay 1,500 rupees (US$17) for "safe"
road access for six months.
The TTP also
charges smugglers for the "safe passage" of
contraband shipments from Afghanistan to FATA and
beyond and to Balochistan province. Protection
money is also extorted from non-Muslim minorities
such as a jaziya (the tax of an Islamic
state on non-Muslim citizens). For example, the
Sikh community living in FATA agreed in April 2009
to pay 20 million rupees to the militants as
jaziya after being coerced by the Taliban,
who confiscated their houses and kept a Sikh
leader hostage.
TTP motivation While the older generation of Pakistani
militants was a by-product of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan on the 1980s, the new generation is
a result of American intervention - and as such, a
different rhetoric is used by the extremists.
In addition, the Pakistani state's
seemingly abrupt withdrawal of support from the
Taliban regime in 2001, as well as violent jihadi
groups in Pakistan, compounded by the military
operations in the "autonomous" tribal regions, has
led to a situation in which the violent jihad of
many militant groups is aimed not just at
"infidels occupying Afghanistan", but also at the
local "infidels" who rule and run Pakistan and
maintain "the secular values of Pakistani society
and an apostate state".
The Durand Line
separating Afghanistan and Pakistan is not
accepted as an official border by the Pashtun
populations living on either side of it. Until
2002, when the Pakistani army launched military
action against the foreign militants and the
Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan for the
first time, the focus of the Pakistani chapter of
the Taliban was exclusively to support the Afghan
Taliban by sheltering them and supplying them with
fighters.
TTP modus
operandi However, the Pakistani military
operations in both Waziristan tribal agencies, and
the army operation against the Lal Masjid-linked
(Red Mosque) fanatics in Islamabad in July 2007
served as a turning point for the TTP, prompting
the latter to turn its attention from Afghanistan
to targeting the Pakistani security
forces.
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