Indian navy pumps up eastern muscle By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - The Indian Navy is pumping up the muscle of its eastern command.
Force levels along India's eastern seaboard are being built up slowly but
steadily.
For decades, the navy's eastern command played second fiddle to the western
command, which is headquartered at Mumbai. Long considered the navy's "sword
arm" the western command cornered most of the resources and attention of
strategic planners.
That appears to be changing now. Strategists are assigning an increasingly
larger role for the eastern command in India's naval
strategy and foreign policy.
The enhanced attention being paid to the eastern command is prompted in part by
apprehensions over China's looming naval presence in the Bay of Bengal and the
Indian Ocean. But it is part of India's two decades-long effort to focus its
diplomatic, economic and military energies eastward as part of its "Look East"
policy. Besides, the navy's new eastward orientation is also aimed at enabling
India to emerge a significant player in the emerging Asia-Pacific security
architecture.
The Indian Navy is the world's fifth largest. It has three commands - the
western, southern and eastern commands. The eastern command, which is
headquartered at Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh, is home to the Indian Navy's
submarine arm. A tri-services command was set up in 2001 at Port Blair in the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
The eastern naval command has grown remarkably in recent years. In 2005, it had
30 warships under its command. Six years later, that number has grown to 50 -
roughly a third of the Indian Navy's entire fleet strength. It is poised to
expand further.
India's only aircraft carrier INS (Indian Naval Ship) Viraat is
to be assigned to the eastern command after the refurbished Russian aircraft
carrier Admiral Gorshkov (renamed INS Vikramaditya) joins the
western fleet. All five Rajput-class guided-missile destroyers (modified
versions of Soviet Kashin class destroyers), which were with the western
command have joined the eastern fleet.
The Indian Navy's only ship to be acquired from the Americans, the amphibious USS
Trenton, now renamed INS Jalashwa, has been put under the
eastern command. It will be joined soon by the indigenously manufactured
stealth frigates INS Shivalik, INS Satpura and INS Sahyadri
as well as the US-manufactured P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime patrol
aircraft and the Italy-made new fleet tanker, INS Shakti.
It will be the eastern command that will take charge of India's nuclear
submarines. INS Arihant, which is undergoing sea trials was constructed
at Visakhapatnam. Two other nuclear submarines are reportedly under development
here.
The eastern command has bases at Visakhapatnam and Kolkata. It will soon have a
forward base at Tuticorin and an operational turnaround base at Paradeep. In
addition to naval air stations at Dega and Rajali, the eastern command has got
a new one, INS Parundu at Uchipuli, where UAVs are being deployed.
Reports in the media have hinted at a nuclear submarine naval base somewhere
near Visakhapatnam. Codenamed Varsha, the project is under wraps.
The gap between the western and eastern commands appears to be narrowing. In
the wake of the eastern command's rising profile and strength, the Indian navy
recently upgraded the post of the eastern command's chief of staff to
three-star rank, ie the same as that of his counterpart at the western naval
command.
India's east coast faces six littorals - Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar,
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia - across the Bay of Bengal. Its Andaman and
Nicobar Islands are scattered midway between its east coast and the Straits of
Malacca.
China, though not a Bay of Bengal or Indian Ocean littoral, has been able to
secure for itself a presence in these waters by building strong political,
economic and defense relationships with several littoral states, including
building commercial/naval port infrastructure there that have dual civilian and
military use.
Besides Gwadar in Pakistan, which sits on the Arabian Sea, China is building
ports at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and at Chittagong in Bangladesh. In Myanmar it
has upgraded several ports including those at Sittwe, Kyaukpyu, Bassein, Mergui
and Yangon and is building radar, refit and refuel facilities at its naval
bases at Hainggyi, Akyab, Zadetkyi and Mergui.
China's presence in these ports may be presently benign. However, Indian
analysts warn that Beijing could seek to use these ports for military or
strategic purposes. Given its substantial influence in these countries, its
demands could well be conceded, they say.
That would bring the Chinese navy into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.
While analysts believe that China is still several years, if not decades away
from having the capability of supporting sustained naval deployment in the
Indian Ocean, it is this looming possibility that India is preparing for by
beefing up its eastern naval command.
Besides, building force levels of the eastern command to prepare for this
contingency, the Indian navy has also been building ties through port calls and
joint exercises with other Asia-Pacific navies, many of whom are China-wary.
While joint naval exercises are aimed at developing naval interoperability
among the participating fleets, those between India and other China-wary navies
carried out in the Bay of Bengal are also aimed at sending out a message to the
Chinese navy that its possible future presence in the Indian Ocean will not go
unchallenged, analysts have said.
The eastern command's participation in high profile bilateral and multilateral
naval exercises has grown over the decades. Several of these have taken place
in the Bay of Bengal. The Indian navy has exercised with the navies of
Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia since the early 1990s.
The Milan naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal include several Asia-Pacific
countries. In September 2007, for the first time ever, the Indo-US Malabar
exercises, which are usually held in the Arabian Sea, were held in India's
eastern seaboard and included Singapore, Japan and Australia too. The Indian
navy has forayed into the South China Sea, which China describes as a ‘core
national interest' as well as the Pacific Ocean on port visits and for joint
exercises.
However, India has denied that its joint exercises are directed at any country.
In fact, it has exercised with the Chinese navy too for some years now. Indeed
viewing the eastern command's growing importance only in terms of the ‘China
threat' is a flawed and limited understanding of India's outlook and ambitions.
The eastern naval command's rising profile has paralleled the evolution of
India's "Look East" policy. This has come a long way since its start in the
early 1990s. Its geographic scope has expanded beyond Southeast Asia to include
East Asia and the Pacific. Simultaneously, its content has grown beyond
commerce and trade to include engagement on security and strategic issues too.
In the process, India's trade with Southeast Asia as well as East Asia has
grown manifold but also its security-related engagement is increasing not only
with countries like Singapore and Vietnam but also with Japan, Korea,
Australia, etc. The navy has played an important role in achieving this
expansion. If in the 1990s, the navy remained confined largely west of the
Malacca Straits, the past decade has seen it make forays into the Pacific too.
Increasingly it is engaging in multilateral exercises in waters off Northeast
Asia and its vessels have ventured up to Vladivostok.
India has shown increasing capability to impact the Asia-Pacific security
architecture. While still not a key player in the region, neither is it
marginal. Its enhanced attention to the eastern command is aimed at providing
muscle to its effort to become a major player in shaping the emerging Asian
order.
But what kind of a player does it want to be? One that allows itself to be a
tool in the hands of others to contain China, thereby endorsing the rivalry and
balance of power-obsessed present order? Or one that pushes for a co-operative
Asian security architecture that puts Asia's concerns ahead of the interests of
outsiders?
Much of the global discourse on the evolving Asian security architecture has
focussed on maritime rivalry and containment of China. But there is scope for
co-operation given shared threats that countries face from pirates and
terrorists to sea lanes and choke points. The seas provide a potential area of
collaboration among Asia's naval powers. This can be used to begin building a
new co-operative Asian order.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in
Bangalore. She can be reached at sudha98@hotmail.com
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