Page 1 of 2 India promises to prop up Karzai
By M K Bhadrakumar
President Hamid Karzai's two-day visit to India presages a major realignment of
regional powers over the Afghan problem. India has taken a carefully
thought-out decision to pitch for a key role in the so-called "endgame" in
Afghanistan, commensurate with its aspirations as a regional power and in
defense of what it considers to be its vital interests against the backdrop of
a developing situation about which it is genuinely concerned.
India, however, will not get away unchallenged in its newfound "pro-activism"
and how the ensuing regional rivalries will play out in the coming period
remains far from clear. The cloudy horizons may have got just a bit darker as
Karzai's presidential jet takes off from the Indian capital on Wednesday.
Karzai, too, had a mission on his mind as he headed for Delhi. Late on Monday
evening, on the eve of his departure for India, he
spoke candidly about his political predicament. His much-touted reconciliation
policy toward the Taliban is at a dead-end and for crafting a way forward he
needs to get a fresh mandate from a loya jirga (tribal assembly) that
will be convened for the purpose.
He blamed Pakistan for being uncooperative in the peace process and yet he
acknowledged that he needed to talk to Islamabad, being mindful that it also is
what the United States and the international community want him to do - despite
the wave of "anti-Pakistan" sentiments sweeping large sections of Afghan
society and notwithstanding the deep and entrenched aversion to any truck with
Pakistan over the Taliban that many figures within his own coalition harbor.
The leadership in Kabul has traditionally reached out to India as a
counterweight to Pakistan. Karzai's visit to Delhi (his second visit in seven
months) falls within that classic mould, but what gives added dimension to his
mission is that his principal political allies at home - groups belonging to
the erstwhile Northern Alliance (NA) - also happen to be forces closely
associated with India for the past several years.
His two vice presidents, Mohammed Fahim and Karim Khalili, were leading figures
in the anti-Taliban resistance, which India promoted, and Fahim, in particular,
is the inheritor of the war machine of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud who was
substantially supported by the Indian security establishment during the
anti-Taliban resistance of the late 1990s.
If Delhi has decided to take the plunge and stand overtly behind the
Karzai-Fahim-Khalili axis of power that is taking shape in Kabul, it is because
the Indian political leadership is acceding to certain compelling reasons given
by the country's security establishment.
First and foremost, there is deep disillusionment over United States policies
and a resultant feeling that India must pursue an independent course in
Afghanistan to safeguard its security interests. The US's pattern of
intermittently quarreling and depending on Pakistan to advance its regional
strategy in Afghanistan exasperates the Indian establishment.
Just as Indian pundits concluded that the recent rift in US-Pakistan ties was
far too advanced to lend itself to repair, Washington has once again kissed and
made up with Islamabad. New details have begun emerging that the US Central
Intelligence Agency might have taken the help of Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence in contacting the Haqqani network and that the US would have
offered the Haqqanis a place in the Afghan government.
The fact that the US and Pakistan may be working together to finesse the
Haqqani network (which India holds responsible for the two murderous attacks on
its embassy in Kabul) and bring it into the peace process horrifies Delhi and
it runs contrary to repeated American assurances to Indian officials.
Besides, Delhi is convinced that Pakistan masterminded the assassination of the
head of the Afghan High Peace Council, Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was close to
India, as part of a calculated plan to systematically remove from the political
chessboard all figures who may challenge Taliban supremacy in the coming
period, especially as the drawdown of US troops accelerates.
Three-pronged strategy
Within the framework of the dialogue with Pakistan, the Indian leadership had
somewhat exercised self-restraint in robustly advancing its interests in
Afghanistan in the recent period, but the Indian security establishment seems
to have concluded that Islamabad is pushing the envelope nonetheless, aimed at
exterminating all Indian influence in Kabul in a future set-up dominated by its
Taliban proxies.
Equally, Delhi is not convinced about the efficacy of the troop drawdown plan
of President Barack Obama. Ironically, India shares the skepticism recently
voiced by Pakistani army chief Pervez Kiani as to whether the 2014 timeline to
hand over responsibility to the Afghan security forces is realistic under the
prevailing circumstances.
Thus, India is taking matters in its own hands, so to speak, to do what it can
to ensure that the present power structure in Kabul (which is very
well-disposed toward India) gains resilience in the near future.
The concrete outcome of Karzai's visit to India is three-fold and it reveals
the range of Indian thinking. First, India is poised to step in for the first
time in the post-Taliban era to fulfill a role that it used to perform before
the mujahideen takeover in 1992 when Afghanistan was under the communist regime
- namely, a commitment to be a mentor of the Afghan security forces.
Second, Delhi is making a strong pitch for a major role in the exploitation of
the multi-trillion dollar mineral resources in Afghanistan. Third, India and
Afghanistan have decided to work on their respective bilateral cooperation
grids with Iran with a view to developing a trade and transit route through
Iranian territory, bypassing Pakistan.
Clearly, India visualizes the non-Pashtun groups in central and northern
Afghanistan as a bulwark against a Taliban takeover in the country. Yet, India
will insistently maintain that its dealings with these groups will be strictly
within the framework of a state-to-state relationship, given the alchemy of the
political structure in Kabul supporting Karzai.
The point is, Tajik officer corps practically dominate Afghan forces and Delhi
can be confident that they can be trusted to resist a return to power of forces
such as the Haqqanis supported by Pakistan. In short, Delhi is virtually
falling back on the raison d'etre of its policy to support the NA in the late
1990s.
Delhi doesn't rule out the possibility of another outbreak of civil war in
Afghanistan. It is reviving its interest in "operationalizing" an airstrip it
built in Tajikistan out of its own funds and has sought permission from
Dushanbe to reopen a military hospital it built in the late 1990s at Farkhor on
the Afghan border to provide medical treatment to the NA warriors fighting the
Taliban.
Pakistan is sure to perceive the forthcoming Indian role as mentor of the
Afghan forces and Delhi's decision to resuscitate its infrastructure in
Tajikistan that used to provide underpinnings for the erstwhile NA's militia as
moves directed against its "legitimate interests" in Afghanistan. The stage is
getting set for a rather vicious eruption of Pakistan-India animosities.
Pakistan's "asymmetrical" response in the past typically took the form of
terrorist strikes at targeted Indian interests.
Indian restraint was commendable in the past when faced with the challenge of
terrorism, but there is a school of thinking in the Indian strategic community
that it is about time that India calls the Pakistani bluff. At any rate, India
seems to anticipate troubled times ahead and has just begun a massive two-month
military exercise on its desert border with Pakistan in Rajasthan sector,
involving some 20,000 troops belonging to its strike corps and its air force,
with an ambitious agenda to test its offensive plans to capture and hold enemy
territory deep inside.
Second, Delhi is encouraging Indian business to invest in Afghanistan's mineral
resources by way of emerging as a "stakeholder" in that country. Delhi is
currently pushing a policy of acquiring strategic "assets" abroad and
Afghanistan's vast mineral resources offer big scope for Indian investment.
Indian corporate giants are getting interested in the proposition, too. An
Indian consortium is preparing to participate in the tender for the Hajigak
iron ores in Afghanistan, which is estimated to hold reserves of 1.8 billion
tonnes. The two memoranda of understanding signed during Karzai's visit to
Delhi - relating to the field of mineral exploitation and the development of
hydrocarbon - signal the shared interest of the two countries in facilitating
large-scale Indian investments in Afghanistan.
To be sure, India's moves in this regard will be keenly watched by other
countries, especially China and the US, which are already neck-deep in the
scramble for resources in Central Asia. For the first time in the post-Soviet
era, India is spreading its wings in the region and is scouting for "assets".
While it lags far behind China, it seems to estimate that the game is far from
over.
Third, India's main challenge with regard to a trade and transit route to
Afghanistan needs to be addressed in priority terms and Karzai's visit provided
a timely opportunity to have consultations. Delhi has vaguely spoken for over a
decade regarding the importance of a Silk Route via Iran, but a new criticality
has arisen. The point is, India cannot hope to have an effective Central Asia
policy in the absence of a viable and dependable access route to the region.
Delhi views Iran as the obvious choice as a partner in this regard. Despite the
improved climate in India-Pakistan relations and notwithstanding the stirrings
of a more relaxed trade regime between the two countries, no one in his senses
in Delhi quite expects that Islamabad would facilitate an access route for
India's trade and investment ties with Afghanistan where the two countries are
locked in rivalry.
Pakistan is dragging its feet with regard to the implementation of the trade
and transit treaty it signed with Afghanistan under sustained American
prodding. India does not see any prospect of Pakistan agreeing to include it in
this treaty, as propagated by US officials.
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