ISLAMABAD - United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's October 27
briefing to a congressional committee on foreign affairs, saying that any
Afghan-led peace process would have to include the Quetta shura Taliban
and its leader, Mullah Omar, clearly shows that the US approach has evolved
further after her
recent high-profile visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan where she discussed
strategy with the top political and military leaders of the two countries.
Testifying at a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Clinton did not
dismiss the prospect when asked by Republican Representative Steve Chabot,
whether reconciliation talks with the Taliban and other insurgents would
include talks with Mullah Omar.
The US would be willing to negotiate with the Afghan Taliban leader if he met
conditions that had been laid out. Her statement also emphasized several other
key points reflecting a major change in the American approach towards seeking a
peaceful end to the Afghan conflict that has raged for 10 years. "There is no
solution in the region without Pakistan and no stable future in the troubled
region without a partnership," she added.
As she returned home after concluding trips to Kabul and Islamabad, Clinton
told the US media:
The United States and Pakistan had reached 90-95%
agreement on the issues that at one stage appeared close to breaking up their
relationship. The United States needs to negotiate with the Haqqani network
while continuing to work with Pakistan to destroy the safe havens it has inside
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. US aid to Pakistan should
not be conditioned to disbanding the Lashkar-e-Toiba [militant group].
Earlier, during her trip to Pakistan, Clinton clearly changed the sharp edge of
the much-touted American policy for a more conciliatory stance towards
Pakistan's aggressive response to demands for launching a massive military
operation in the North Waziristan tribal area to oust the Haqqani network from
there. The network is a key player in the Taliban-led insurgency in
Afghanistan.
Instead, she proposed that Pakistan facilitate the US peace talks with the
Afghan and Pakistani Taliban as well as the Haqqani network, adding that the US
had no evidence that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was hand in
glove with the Haqqanis or that the ISI had encouraged them to attack foreign
targets in Afghanistan.
As Clinton returned to Washington, the State Department said on October 26 that
Pakistan and the US had agreed on a framework for holding direct talks with the
militants and were now working to operationalize the plan.
At a press briefing, two State Department officials explained what the
secretary meant when she said in her recent interviews that the US and Pakistan
had agreement on 90-95% of issues they confronted. They said the US, Pakistan
and Afghanistan had already reached an understanding on holding a "trilogue"
with the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan had to play its part in this by
encouraging reconciliation.
"That Pakistan has to play its part in this; it has to encourage
reconciliation. And that as efforts are made at reconciliation, if the US can
play a helpful role, that we would be available to do that," said one of the
two US officials. After agreeing on this framework, the US and Pakistan were
now working on the need to operationalize it.
"What does it mean and particularly in the context of the awful, horrific
experience that the Afghans had with the death of [Afghan Peace Council head]
Burhanuddin Rabbani. We're all working off the script that is going to protect
against that kind of thing happening again," the official said.
Operational details like where to hold the dialogue, who to talk to and in what
form and formats and for how long were now being worked out, the State
Department official added.
"We needed to start with ensuring we were all on the same page in terms of the
framework."
The two officials explained that in their recent meetings with the US
delegation, which included the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military
chiefs, Pakistani leaders kept referring to the resolution passed by the
all-parties conference on the proposed talks with the militants.
"What does the all-parties conference mean to them? It means that every party
in Pakistan got together and agreed that reconciliation, if it can be done
right and if it is Afghan-led and if it meets the red lines, is in Pakistan's
interests," said the State Department official.
Well-informed diplomatic circles in Islamabad say the State Department's
briefing indicated a significant change of attitude on Washington's part and
Clinton's powerful delegation, which visited Pakistan, stood guarantee to it.
This included CIA director General David Petraeus; Special US Representative
for Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman; US ambassador to Pakistan Cameron
Munter; US chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey; and Assistant
to the President and Deputy National Security Adviser Lieutenant-General Edward
Lute, who oversaw the killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad,
Pakistan, earlier in the year.
Therefore, Clinton refrained from brow-beating Pakistan during the US
congressional briefing on October 28, despite the fact that US lawmakers, many
of whom are still upset with Pakistan over its alleged links to militants,
created several opportunities for her to do so. Congressman Chabot asked
Clinton if the US was prepared to negotiate with Mullah Omar "and if so, under
what circumstances and what would our conditions be?" Clinton replied:
Well,
congressman, the negotiations that would be part of any Afghan-led peace
process would have to include the Quetta shura [council of advisors]
Taliban [in Pakistan's Balochistan province] which is still led by Mullah Omar.
However, we really don't know if the Quetta shura is willing to
participate in such a process. We are pursuing every thread of any kind of
interest expressed.
Mullah Omar, being the supreme commander
of the Afghan Taliban, who has been declared one of the most-wanted fugitives
by the American Federal Bureau of Investigation, has already rejected the
possibility of holding peace talks with the Americans until and unless US-led
forces withdraw from Afghanistan.
In a statement carried by the SITE online monitoring service on August 30,
2011, the one-eyed reclusive Taliban leader said the ongoing battle against
US-led forces would lead to an imminent victory for the Afghan Taliban.
The allied forces stationed in Afghanistan are already racing against the clock
to train Afghanistan's poorly equipped army and police force by the end of
2014, the deadline set for US combat troops to leave and when all security
responsibilities will be handed over to Afghans.
On the other hand, Mullah Omar views the scheduled withdrawal as a victory for
the Taliban and the defeat of the West's high-tech military.
It has been almost a decade since Mullah Omar vanished into the inhospitable,
mountainous terrain of Afghanistan, never to be seen again. American
intelligence agencies as well as senior US military officials are almost
certain that he continues to guide his forces and run his shura while
hiding somewhere in an urban locality of Pakistan, either in Quetta or in the
southern port city of Karachi.
Pakistan has steadfastly refuted this claim, but American military officials
now openly allege, especially after the May 2 Abbottabad episode, that elements
within the ISI have been protecting Mullah Omar and other key Taliban leaders.
Analysts believe the Pakistani security establishment is in no mood either to
give up the Afghan Taliban or to harm Mullah Omar due to the fact that any deal
in Afghanistan realized after talks among various parties needs to have the
blessing of a central Taliban figure who can serve that purpose effectively.
And that central figure is none other than Mullah Omar.
Amir Mir is a senior Pakistani journalist and the author of several books
on the subject of militant Islam and terrorism, the latest being The
Bhutto murder trail: From Waziristan to GHQ.
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