Whose finger on Pakistan's nuclear trigger?
By Amir Mir
ISLAMABAD - While the United States has officially refuted recent international
media reports questioning Pakistan's nuclear safety mechanisms, saying that its
security measures are state-of-the-art, it is the country's all-powerful army
leaders who will have the final say in the use of nuclear weapons if it ever
came to that.
This is despite the fact that in theory the prime minister's finger should be
on the nuclear trigger as chairman of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) that
handles the command and control of strategic nuclear forces and organizations.
Fresh controversy over the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons was set off
with an article in the December 2011 issue of a leading US magazine, The
Atlantic. Titled "The Alley from Hell", the
report described Pakistan as an unstable and violent country
located at the epicenter of global jihadism, which might not be the safest
place on earth to warehouse 100-plus nuclear weapons.
Tagging Pakistan as an obvious place for a jihadi organization to seek a
nuclear weapon or fissile material, the article said the Pakistani military and
security services were infiltrated by an unknown number of jihadi sympathizers.
The Atlantic pointed out three key threats to Pakistan's nuclear program: a
terrorist theft of a nuclear weapon, a transfer of a nuclear weapon to another
state like Iran, and a takeover of nuclear weapons by a militant group during a
period of instability. The magazine claimed:
In a country that is home
to the harshest variants of Muslim fundamentalism, and to the headquarters of
the organizations that espouse these extremist ideologies, including al-Qaeda,
the Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Toiba, nuclear bombs capable of destroying
entire cities are transported in delivery vans on congested and dangerous
roads.
And Pakistani and American sources say that since the raid on Abbottabad [in
May this year to kill Osama bin Laden], the Pakistanis have provoked anxiety
inside the Pentagon by increasing the pace of these movements. In other words,
the Pakistani government is willing to make its nuclear weapons more vulnerable
to theft by jihadis simply [in a bid] to hide them from the United States, the
country that funds much of its military budget.
The Pakistani
Foreign Office jumped in to dismiss the apprehensions as pure fiction, baseless
and motivated, adding that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was absolutely safe under
multi-layered custodial controls.
"The surfacing of such campaigns is not something new. It is orchestrated by
quarters that are inimical to Pakistan," said a November 6 statement issued by
the Foreign Office in Islamabad.
Highly-placed circles in the Ministry of Defense who were approached for
comments said that in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks in the US in
2001 and nuclear proliferation charges leveled against the founder of
Pakistan's nuclear program, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, in 2003, Pakistani
authorities had taken drastic steps to improve the institutional frameworks and
operational procedures for the country's atomic arsenal, with a view to
preventing any further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and
materials.
Defense ministry circles further confirmed reports that Pakistani authorities
were training 8,000 additional people to protect its nuclear weapons.
A Pakistani military spokesman, in a statement released on November 6 to
accompany the graduation of 700 of these security personnel, stated:
This
group comprises hand-picked officers and men who are physically robust,
mentally sharp and equipped with modern weapons and equipment. Extensive
resources have been made available to train, equip, deploy and sustain an
independent and potent security force to meet any and every threat emanating
from any quarter.
The graduation ceremony was attended by Major
General Muhammad Tahir, head of security for the Strategic Planning Division
(SPD), the arm of the Pakistani military that is tasked with protecting the
nuclear arsenal.
Officials in the Ministry of Defense say the credibility of their claims about
the country's nuclear safety mechanisms can be gauged from the fact that these
have been endorsed by none other than the administration of US President Barack
Obama.
They recalled that in an official statement released on November 7, the US
Embassy in Islamabad supported Pakistan while denying the title story of The
Atlantic:
The US government's views have not changed about nuclear
security in Pakistan. We have confidence that the Pakistan government is well
aware of the range of potential threats to its nuclear arsenal and has
accordingly given very high priority to securing its nuclear weapons and
materials effectively. Pakistan has a professional, highly motivated, and
dedicated security force that fully understands the importance of nuclear
security.
A spokesman at US Embassy, Mark E Stroh, recalled,
"President Obama had declared in March 2010 during the Nuclear Security Summit:
'I feel confident about Pakistan's security around its nuclear weapons
programs'."
According to a 2001 US Department of Defense report, Islamabad's nuclear
weapons are stored in component form, which suggests that the nuclear warheads
are stored separately from the delivery vehicles. Some reports say the fissile
cores of the weapons are separated from the non-nuclear explosives.
Whether this is actually the case is unclear; one report states that the
warheads and delivery vehicles are probably stored separately in facilities
close to one another, but it says nothing about the fissile cores.
According to an account of a 2008 experts' group visit to Pakistan, Lieutenant
General Khalid Kidwai, the head of the SPD, suggested that the nuclear warheads
(containing the fissile cores) may be mated with their delivery vehicles.
Kidwai said the SPD's official position was that the nuclear weapons would be
ready when required at the shortest notice, but the Pakistani doctrine was not
endorsing the US-Soviet Union model of weapons on hair-trigger alert. Likewise,
the 2001 US Defense Department report clearly stated that Pakistan could
assemble its weapons fairly quickly.
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief General David Petraeus,
who previously had commanded US forces in Afghanistan, told the Senate Armed
Services Committee on March 15: "There is quite considerable security for the
Pakistani nuclear weapons."
Asked about the security of Pakistan's weapons following the May 2011 fidayeen
(suicide) attack on the Mehran naval base in the southern port city of Karachi,
US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake stated in Washington on June 21:
"There is much more heightened security around Pakistan's nuclear weapons
facilities than at the Karachi naval base."
But it appears that American knowledge of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal remains
quite limited. For example, former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Mike Mullen, stated last year: "We are limited in what we actually know
about Islamabad's nuclear arsenal."
Similarly, former CIA chief Leon Panetta acknowledged in a May 18, 2010 speech
that the US did not possess the intelligence to locate all of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons-related sites. Therefore, despite repeated claims by Islamabad
about the safety of its nuclear arsenal that have been endorsed by top
government officials in the White House, the US has continued to monitor
Pakistan's nuclear program.
Information acquired by the US State Department about Pakistan's nuclear
program (made public in a cable revealed by WikiLeaks in December 2010) showed
that 120,000-130,000 people were directly involved in Pakistan's nuclear and
missile programs, working in the facilities and protecting them.
The cable acknowledged that Pakistan had developed a well-structured system of
security for its nuclear program, but added that doubts about the program of
the only Muslim nuclear state were not dying out.
The State Department cable claimed that the Russians, like the Americans,
Europeans, Indians and Israelis, raised their concerns that the nukes might
fall into the hands of what they call Islamic extremists. The cable said that
of the 120,000-130,000 people involved in the Pakistani nuclear program, any
one of them could be an "extremist".
Yet Defense Ministry circles in Islamabad insist that all key international
regulatory authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), have acknowledged the efficacy of Pakistan's comprehensive command and
control structures in making its nuclear assets impervious to any threat, both
internal or external.
Over the past decade, Pakistani authorities have instituted numerous advanced
security mechanisms, from tightened physical safety to technical controls on
the nuclear weapons themselves. Pakistan's command and control over its nuclear
weapons is believed to be compartmentalized and includes strict operational
security. The system is based on "C4I2SR" (command, control, communication,
computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance).
It was after then-army chief General Pervez Musharraf toppled the civilian
government in 1999 to become a president in uniform that Pakistan's key nuclear
institutions were placed under a unified control of the National Command
Authority (NCA).
The NCA was made responsible for the formulation of policy that exercises
employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and
organizations. While decision-making power pertaining to nuclear deployment was
given to the NCA, Musharraf made the Office of the President all-powerful by
making him cast the final vote to order a nuclear strike in his capacity as the
NCA chairman and the supreme commander of the armed forces. The prime minister
was the vice chairman of the NCA in that set up.
However, after the 2008 general elections and the subsequent exit of Musharraf,
the new president, Asif Ali Zardari, decided to transfer control of the nuclear
weapons to the prime minister - in this instance Yousaf Raza Gillani.
In a bid to establish civilian command over the nuclear arsenal, the National
Assembly passed the National Command Authority (NCA) bill on January 28, 2010,
primarily to place the NCA under the control of the elected prime minister. As
things stand, the prime minister, as head of government, is chairperson of the
NCA. The NCA also includes the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the
ministers of defense, interior and finance; the director general of the SPD;
and the commanders of the army, air force and navy.
The final authority to launch a nuclear strike requires consensus within the
NCA; the chairperson (prime minister in this case) must cast the final vote.
But there are those in the Pakistani security establishment who still believe
that passing the chairmanship of the NCA from the president to the prime
minister hardly makes any practical difference to the nuclear program, which
remains under the firm control of the mighty military establishment.
Technically, the nuclear control and command system is based on a three-tier
structure: the National Command Authority, the SPD and the Services' Strategic
Forces Command (SSFC). The NCA, which has 10 members, with the prime minister
as its chairman, has responsibility to formulate policies, deploy strategic
forces, coordinate activities of all strategic organizations, negotiate arms
control/disarmament, supervise implementation of export controls and safeguard
nuclear assets and sites.
The NCA has two committees: the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the
Development Control Committee (DCC). The ECC is responsible for directing
policy-making during peace time and deployment of strategic forces during war
time, making recommendations on the evolution of nuclear doctrine, establishing
the hierarchy of command and the policy for authorizing the use of nuclear
weapons, and establishing the guidelines for an effective command and control
system to safeguard against accidental or unauthorized use.
The DCC is responsible for exercising technical, financial and administrative
control over the strategic organizations involved in the nuclear weapons
program, and overseeing development of strategic weapons programs.
The Strategic Plans Division, which was actually created in 1998 as the
permanent secretariat for the NCA, is headed by a director general appointed
from the army (Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai is the incumbent) and comprises
some 50-70 officers from the three services.
The SPD is responsible for formulating policy options (nuclear policy, strategy
and doctrine) for the NCA, implementing the NCA's decisions, drafting strategic
and operational plans for the deployment of strategic forces. The SPD carries
out the day-to-day management of the county's strategic forces, coordinates the
activities of the different strategic organizations involved in the nuclear
weapons program, and oversees budgetary, administrative and security matters.
The SPD has eight directorates - including the Operations and Planning
Directorate, the Computerized, Control, Command, Communication, Information,
Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate, the Strategic Weapons Development
Directorate, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Directorate - and
several divisions. One of the main divisions is the security division, which
has a 10,000-strong force charged with guarding and protecting Pakistan's
nuclear weapons.
The Services Strategic Forces Command (SSFC) is raised from the three services
- the army, navy and the air force - which all have their respective strategic
force commands. The SSFC is responsible for daily and tactical operational
control of nuclear weapon delivery systems (although the NCA is still
responsible for overall strategic operational control). This operational
control includes technical, training and administrative control over missiles
and aircraft that would be used to deliver nuclear weapons.
According to the NCA's strategic operational policy guidelines, a decision to
launch a nuclear strike is made by consensus within the NCA with the chairman
casting the final vote. The NCA would communicate decisions and delegate
implementing authority to the SPD and down the institutional
hierarchy/structure. While the number of people required in different parts of
the hierarchy varies because of technical reasons, no single individual in any
part of the institutional hierarchy is in a position to launch a nuclear strike
or operate a nuclear weapon on their own.
Pakistan has already developed Permissive Action Links (PALs), a protective
fail-safe system that the US also uses to guard against any accidental or
unauthorized launches of nuclear systems. The PALs require a code to be entered
before a nuclear weapon can be detonated.
And Pakistan requires the "standard two-man rule", under which two separate
operators enter codes or turn keys to arm and launch nuclear weapons. Although
not originally equipped with PALs that require the entry of a code before the
nuclear weapon can explode, each Pakistani warhead is now fitted with this
code-lock device.
In practice, the army controls the NCA, which has the final say in sanctioning
any nuclear attack. It is the director general of the SPD, Kidwai, who controls
and guards the nuclear arsenal, under the supervision of army chief General
Ashfaq Kiani, with the assistance of the army.
Therefore, the short answer to the question whose finger is on the N-button is
this: Kiani and Kidwai and the will of the prime minister would hardly prevail
when a decision about the use of the nuclear option was taken.
Going by the contents of his April 30, 2009, news conference in Washington to
mark the first 100 days of his presidency, it seems that Obama is fully aware
of the army's firm control over the nuclear weapons program.
"I am confident that the Pakistan army will not allow its nuclear arsenal to
fall into the hands of Islamic militant groups like the Taliban or al-Qaeda,"
said Obama, while not expressing the same faith in Pakistan's civilian
government led by Zardari, which he dubbed as fragile, adding that the US was
gravely concerned about the situation in Pakistan.
Amir Mir is a senior Pakistani journalist and the author of several books
on the subject of militant Islam and terrorism, the latest being The
Bhutto murder trail: From Waziristan to GHQ.
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