SPEAKING FREELY Winning and losing in Afghanistan
By Gaurav Agrawal
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their say.
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In the beginning, there was nothing. Then came the Big Bang. Don't worry, I
don't intend to go that far back.
In the beginning, there was nothing. Then came the 9/11. Please forgive this
observation as it is not meant to be offensive. I, by all means, sympathize
with the victims of that horror and their families and condemn such an act in
strongest possible way. But this article is not to discuss that event. I
mention it merely to emphasize the Big Bang-ish kind of impact it had on the
geopolitik of South Asia region.
A death is a death and a tragedy. Those people lost their lives that day,
tomorrow you and I could lose ours. But it is still its equally true that a
death may serve or may harm the interests of those surviving.
In the pre-9/11 world Afghanistan was dominated by powers that were working in
close collaboration with and to a large extent under control of the Pakistani
army. US and other Western powers had no real interest in it except that the
hardliners who ran it and the often troubled region provided them a good market
for their weapons.
What they did with these weapons was not something US or others were really
interested in. To Pakistan, Afghanistan was like the abandoned land lying
beyond its backyard that it easily encroached upon by propelling the hardliner
Islamists to the power.
To India, Afghanistan was a lost battle - a situation so beyond mending that
they had resigned and taught their people that India had no real interest in
Afghanistan. This may perhaps have been true in the politics of that time.
Then 9/11 happened. US and the West got wedded to Afghanistan. One cannot
deliberate on the merits or demerits of the action, simply emphasize this was
the worst kind of marriage one can have in international politics. It lacked
pragmatism and was driven more by personal considerations. With the wedding
came the dowry of sorts, the Pakistani army and its intimate relations with the
terror groups that the US and the West sought to eliminate.
A war began and, of course, India offered the lip services, but then it was not
really their war and India had worse things to worry about.
Fast forward to the present. Osama bin Laden has been killed, Taliban weakened,
but not decisively defeated. US and their allies after having suffered heavy
casualties and costs have announced a pullout by 2014. International
conferences are being organized around the world to find the "solution". Let us
re-examine the interests and positions of the various stakeholders involved in
the war now.
The United States and the West have been able to save face after killing Osama
and some other top radical militants. Yet costs are running high, so the US and
the West are looking for an exit. But they don't want to look irresponsible in
front of the eyes of the world and their own people. That is why they are
trying to create a semblance of some type of an orderly withdrawal.
Afghans, who have endlessly suffered over the last ten years, it is them.
Today, they stand weaker than they were in 2001, the rivers are red with blood
and fields are laden with even more mines. Despite the current presence of the
US and Western troops and a government which has lasted for many years,
Afghanistan still bleeds every day.
Perhaps the only thing worth guessing in a post-US and Western withdrawal
scenario is how many days will it take for the Taliban mercenaries to come down
from the hills and reoccupy Kabul and Kandahar.
The Pakistani army may be viewed as victorious from this conflict. The real
power Pakistan held over Afghanistan and in the entire "war on terror" was its
command over the very terrorist groups which it was now supposed to eliminate.
If these groups were really eliminated, what position of significance would
have been left for Pakistan? Its golden goose would be lost. The US and West
surely from the beginning were not naive enough to really believe that Pakistan
would kill its golden goose. Yet they threw money at Pakistan to secure its
help in the "war on terror".
This brings us to an interesting inference. Was the so called "war on terror"
merely a farce borne out of domestic compulsions of George W Bush? Maybe he saw
in it an opportunity to secure his re-election?
Pakistan's cooperation may have been merely "rented" for a few years until the
situation became conducive enough for US and West to walk out. It increasingly
appears that no one was ever really interested in either weeding out terrorism
or protecting the Afghan people. Philosophy and moralities have no place in
politics anyway.
Bush did in fact get re-elected and President Barack Obama made sure this will
not adversely impact his re-election chances. Musharraf and the Qayani
strengthened their hold in their internal politics and still retain
Afghanistan. Afghanistan still bleeds and the Taliban may merely be in
hibernation and waiting for the day to come back.
No one still seems to care for the Afghan people. The only that may help them
is that Obama must look "responsible" when pulling out. This may be perhaps
that's why the pull out date is in 2014 after the elections so that any
consequences of the pullout are seen only in the next term of the Us
presidency.
India seems to have pretended this war was never ours and Afghanistan didn't
matter to them. However they may have got it very wrong. If there is one entity
on earth that has got this war so wrong, it may be India. This was India's war
and it was always their war. They had so much to gain from it. Such as the
immense utility of a pro-India Afghanistan staring at Pakistan from its other
side. it would be a real nightmare for Qayani.
Rarely does a situation like this present itself to a nation. The entire
international community wanted so badly to remove the shadow-Pakistani
government in Afghanistan. There was an armed intervention and it succeeded in
removing them.
Meanwhile India slept, when they could have sent their soldiers in and gained
influence on the negotiating tables. The worst scenario for India now would be
when the Hamid Karzai regime is unable to stall a return of the pro-Pakistani
Taliban elements to power in Afghanistan.
If history is a guide, the US and other Western powers would care little about
and will not be there to save the day. Presenting a problem that India is quite
familiar with.
India now needs to make Karzai and his men strong enough to resist successfully
the impending Taliban onslaught which will have the full backing of the
Pakistani army. For India the war is not lost yet and there may still be time.
India may have finally recognized these facts and the importance to act, but
only time will tell. For example, the security pact signed with Karzai this
year should have come a few years earlier and by now the Indo-Karzai
cooperation should have attained meaningful form.
Now the clock is ticking, and the Taliban are waiting.
Gaurav Agrawal holds a MBA in Finance from Indian Institute of Management
and has worked in the Credit Derivatives trading in Hong Kong.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say.Please click hereif you are interested in contributing. Articles
submitted for this section allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards of Asia Times Online's
regular contributors.
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