As the insurgency in
Afghanistan rages on, recent events appear to
confirm earlier reports pointing to a United
States interest in taking the once inconceivable
step of engaging the Taliban in negotiations.
Washington is setting its sights on
withdrawing most, if not all, of the 130,000
troops it commands under North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) auspices when Kabul assumes
responsibility for Afghanistan's security in 2014.
Despite the chronic violence and
instability that endures in Afghanistan, the US
administration looks to harness the killing of
al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and domestic
concerns revolving around economic issues in an
election year to extricate
itself from what is now
the longest war in American history.
In
doing so, the administration recognizes the
tremendous influence the Taliban wields across
Afghanistan - militarily, culturally, politically
and economically - as well as in Pakistan. Amid
questions surrounding the nature of its
motivations, Qatar - a US ally whose rising
diplomatic star continues to confound close
observers of Middle East politics, has positioned
itself to serve as an interlocutor to initiate
preliminary talks between the warring parties on
Washington's behalf.
Reports that US
special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc
Grossman met with representatives of the Afghan
Taliban in Qatar in January to explore the
prospect of opening a dialogue with the insurgent
movement remain fraught with speculation.
A delegation of ranking Taliban members,
including Tayyab Agha, a former secretary to
Taliban leader Mullah Omar, former Taliban foreign
minister Shir Muhammad Abbas Stanekzai and former
Taliban ambassador to Saudi Arabia Shabuddin
Delawar traveled to Doha in January to establish a
formal office in the Persian Gulf emirate.
The allegation that Grossman met with the
Taliban officials in Doha originated from a senior
Afghan official who spoke anonymously due to the
sensitive nature of the subject. Grossman recently
toured Afghanistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, India and Qatar to tout a
plan to initiate comprehensive peace and
reconciliation talks to end the war in
Afghanistan.
Pakistan, a critical piece in
the Afghan puzzle, rebuffed a US request to have
Grossman visit the country amid heightened
tensions between Washington and Islamabad. The
United States has refused to comment on Grossman's
alleged meeting with the Taliban.
Grossman
did, however, laud the Taliban's decision to
establish a presence in Qatar to help advance
efforts to end the war, though he qualified his
support by adding that the United States wants to
see the group condemn terrorism, break with
al-Qaeda, and work to support peace in the region.
Playing politics In a gesture
of diplomatic goodwill, Washington is reviewing a
Taliban request that it release five of its
leaders currently imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay as
a starting point for peace talks. The Taliban is
meanwhile doing its part to affirm that it is
taking diplomacy seriously: a former ranking
Taliban official extolled the credentials of the
representatives dispatched to Doha, who he
described as well-educated, fluent in English and
"moderate", but at the same time "committed" to
the movement.
Lost amid the delicate back
channel diplomacy surrounding the future of
Afghanistan is the Afghan government's anger over
Qatar's willingness to host the Taliban diplomats.
Afghanistan would later recall its ambassador to
Qatar in protest. To counter the Qatari
initiative, Afghan President Hamid Karzai
suggested that exploratory peace talks be held in
a different country, such as Saudi Arabia or
Turkey. According to Karzai, "Americans cannot
negotiate on our behalf with the Taliban and with
us on behalf of the Taliban."
Significantly, the Taliban proclaimed its
presence in Doha as a declaration of victory over
its adversaries. The statement announcing the Doha
office highlighted the Taliban's credentials as an
organic, capable, and legitimate actor in Afghan
politics. The Taliban leadership also appears keen
to demonstrate to its supporters and detractors
alike that its decision to explore the possibility
of entering into peace talks should not be
interpreted as a sign of weakness or surrender.
The Taliban statement suggests that the
group was always amenable to dealing with matters
in a pragmatic and respectful manner:
"Everyone concerned should choose the
rational and logical path of solving issues with
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. If the present
invaders had chosen a lucid path instead of
incursion, they would not have faced such a huge
personnel and financial loss in Afghanistan."
Defining the Taliban Painting
an accurate portrait of the myriad competing
interests at work in Afghanistan is, by any
stretch, a daunting enterprise. The complexity
inherent in enlisting the Taliban as a stakeholder
at the negotiating table raises important
questions about the approach of Washington to
Afghanistan.
Despite the major differences
between the two groups, the United States has
often equated the Taliban with al-Qaeda. The
ultraconservative variety of Sunni fundamentalism
espoused by the Taliban always represented a
regional and insular current that operated within
the confines of Afghan society.
This holds
especially true for the ethnic Pashtun population
that comprises the Taliban's main constituency.
Al-Qaeda, in contrast to the Taliban, is a
transnational activist movement with a global
worldview and the Taliban's alliance with the
movement was controversial among many Taliban
leaders who disapproved of the relationship.
The Taliban remain a highly fractious
movement that is divided along village, tribal,
ethnic and regional lines. As the Taliban build
their presence in Doha, two salient questions
arise. First, how does the United States define
the Taliban? Second, does the Taliban
representation in Doha accurately reflect the
larger Taliban current in Afghanistan?
In
this regard, the United States faces a series of
dilemmas. The United States continues to offer a
US$10 million reward for information leading to
the capture or killing of Mullah Omar. The role of
the numerous insurgent groups that rival the
Taliban for influence, including the Hizb-i-Islami
of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hizb-i-Islami Khalis (HIK)
and the Haqqani network, must also be taken into
account.
The Haqqani network, a Taliban
ally that has emerged as one of the most lethal
threats to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, strongly opposes negotiating with
Washington. Reports have also surfaced alleging
that the United States has already reached out to
the numerous other insurgent groups operating in
Afghanistan.
The Taliban representation in
Qatar will likely be able to persuade many of its
devotees to adhere to whatever course of action it
chooses to pursue as a result of its diplomacy. At
the same time, there are indications that segments
of the Taliban's rank-and-file are angry over the
decision taken by their leaders to engage with
their enemies without consulting them.
Many Taliban fighters are determined to
reject any compromises with Washington or Kabul
made on their behalf in Qatar, including orders to
lay down their arms. The Taliban's role in
facilitating Afghanistan's lucrative opium trade
is almost certain to be near the top of any
negotiation agenda.
According to the
United Nations, opium production levels in
Afghanistan in 2011 surpassed previous record
highs. Any attempts by the Taliban to curtail the
lucrative opium trade as a possible concession to
Washington during future negotiations are sure to
alienate many of its followers.
The
question of Pakistan The rise of the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an assembly of
ethnic Pashtun tribal militias based in Pakistan's
northern tribal areas that attempted to replicate
the Afghan Taliban on Pakistani soil, has plunged
Pakistan into chaos. As much as they share a
common ideological pedigree and operational links,
it is unclear how the Afghan Taliban's foray into
diplomacy will impact the situation in Pakistan.
Washington is certain to craft its demands
to the Afghan Taliban with an eye on the
deteriorating situation in Pakistan. Yet the
evolution of events in Pakistan in recent years
shows that the Pakistan Taliban is organic to its
surroundings. As a result, the Pakistan Taliban is
not likely to follow any dictates issued by its
Afghan progenitor it deems contrary to its own
interests.
That Islamabad continues to
view the Taliban in Afghanistan as a crucial ally
in the larger context of its rivalry with India
adds another layer of complexity to the
ramifications of peace talks. Paradoxically, as
Pakistan reels from al-Qaeda- and Taliban-inspired
militancy within its own borders, it continues to
view a Taliban-dominated landscape in Afghanistan
as a means to enhance its strategic depth.
Islamabad's support for the Taliban has
long been a point of friction between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. This reality, combined with the dire
state of US-Pakistan relations, means that
Islamabad will be projecting itself into the
negotiations to ensure that its interests are
protected.
Reflecting their shared
concerns about Washington's effort to engage the
Taliban in Doha at the expense of the interests of
regional actors, Pakistani President Asif Ali
Zardari, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and
Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad used the
occasion of the third annual
Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran trilateral summit in
Islamabad to call for an Afghan-led peace
initiative that is free of foreign intervention.
There is yet the question of how the
Taliban will react to US demands regarding its
association with al-Qaeda, but as more of
al-Qaeda's members are captured or killed in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban's position
with respect to al-Qaeda may become less and less
important as a host of other pressing issues take
precedence.
Conclusion Given
the many variables involved, it is too early to
envisage a realistic outcome to any substantive
negotiations that may transpire between the United
States and the Taliban. The multitude of competing
interests in play foreshadows an increase in
violence and possibly severe instability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the months ahead.
An agreement to consider the initiation of
formal peace talks, even tentatively, is likely to
be viewed by the United States, the Taliban, and
other critical stakeholders as a rationale to
strengthen their respective negotiating leverage
in relation to one another. In the framework of
Afghanistan, these dynamics are a recipe for
further bloodshed before any progress becomes
apparent.
Chris Zambelis is an
analyst and researcher specializing in Middle East
affairs with Helios Global, Inc, a risk management
group based in the Washington, DC area. The
opinions expressed here are the author's alone and
do not necessarily reflect the position of Helios
Global Inc.
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