No
cause for panic over the
Maldives By Nilanthi
Samaranayake
The recent coup in the
Maldives has caused consternation in the United
States and India, arousing fears that the
archipelago is falling into the hands of Islamic
extremists, that its political instability could
somehow increase China's influence in the
strategic sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, and that
India now faces a new security threat to its
southern flank. A careful consideration of these
factors shows that these fears are unfounded. The
tourist hamlet of the Maldives is unlikely to be a
source of regional instability any time soon.
On February 7, Mohamed Nasheed, who became
president through the Maldives' first multiparty
elections in October 2008, was forced to resign
against his will - allegedly at gunpoint.
Nasheed's former vice-president, Mohamed Waheed
Hassan, assumed the presidency and has appointed
an aide to Nasheed's autocratic predecessor,
Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Both the US
and India have recognized
the new government, albeit with the requisite
admonitions to avoid a descent into violence and
pursue the reconciliation of differences.
The coup is not good news for South Asia.
All countries in the region had been governed by
democratically elected leaders since 2008. India
also does not want any of the Maldives' sprawling
1,200 islands to serve as sites for Muslim
extremists to launch seaborne terrorist attacks.
In fact, some Maldivians were arrested in Pakistan
in 2010 for terrorist activity and training at
camps in South Waziristan. Indian Defense Minister
A K Antony recently discussed how the November
2008 Mumbai attacks jolted his country into
recognition of such maritime security threats.
But there are many reasons the Maldives is
not about to be lost to Islamic extremists or
China.
First, its economic growth depends
on tourism, with estimates that tourism and
related services constitute between one-third and
two-thirds of the country's gross domestic
product. The new Maldivian leader would do great
damage if the country became known as a hotbed of
Islamic extremism in the Indian Ocean instead of a
haven for wealthy tourists. In fact, the
government requested US and Indian assistance when
Somali piracy became a problem for the Maldives
National Defense Force (MNDF) to contend with.
Terrorist groups will undoubtedly try to recruit
in the Maldives, but the country's leadership
understands the implications of terrorism for its
economy and welcomes counterterrorism assistance
from the US.
Second, China does not
possess the capabilities to add the Maldives to
its supposed "string of pearls" in the region.
While China has become the only non-South Asian
country to set up an embassy in the Maldives and
sends the largest number of tourists to the
islands, it cannot compete with India's
civilizational ties and security offerings. the
Maldives has even sought to purchase land in India
for the relocation of its citizens in case they
become environmental refugees as a result of
climate change and rising sea levels. The MNDF
also benefits from a significant amount of
military assistance from India, including
counter-piracy help, maritime surveillance,
training, and surveys. A review of annual reports
from the Indian Ministry of Defense reveals that
the Maldives has more interactions with the Indian
Navy and Coast Guard than any other country in the
Indian Ocean. Conversations with MNDF officers
last year confirmed their need for India's help
with capacity-building efforts, as the Maldivian
military does not possess the ability to patrol
all its dispersed islands. No matter which leader
is in power - Waheed, Nasheed, or even Gayoom -
the Maldives does not want to forgo India's
security assistance.
Third, even if the
Maldives takes on a more Islamic color
politically, that would not be the end of the
world to India or the US. Gayoom, perceived as
more fervently Muslim in world view, had strong
relations with both countries during his 30-year
rule. After the coup, New Delhi quickly
acknowledged the legitimacy of the new leadership,
despite its seizure of power. India's relationship
with Myanmar since the early 1990s under its "Look
East" policy is evidence of the government's
willingness to engage with undemocratic regimes in
a trade-off for strategic benefits.
If
India does become concerned about violent Muslim
extremism emanating from the south, it can
intervene militarily, as it did in 1988 when
Gayoom requested assistance in quelling an
external threat by the People's Liberation
Organization of Tamil Eelam. India's navy has
modernized considerably since the 1980s and
possesses greater capabilities than when it
deployed in 1988 - or for that matter in 2004 to
deliver relief to Maldivian survivors of the
Indian Ocean tsunami. Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh asserted in a November 2011 speech to the
Maldivian Parliament that "this is our extended
neighborhood. We wish to work with the Maldives
and other like-minded countries to ensure peace
and prosperity in the Indian Ocean region."
The coup in the Maldives brings
uncertainty to the country's internal political
development and stability. Observers' fears about
increased Chinese sway in the Maldives and about
Islamic extremist threats to India do not seem
likely to materialize any time soon, however.
The world should allow this young
democracy to experience the travails associated
with the process of democratization, unencumbered
by the strategic baggage imposed by outside
observers.
Nilanthi Samaranayake
is an analyst in the strategic studies division at
CNA, a research and analysis service in
Alexandria, Virginia. The views expressed are
solely those of the author.
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