SPEAKING
FREELY Pakistan's empty nuclear
claim By Saloni Kapur
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
Pakistani Prime
Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani stated earlier this
month that his country sought access to civilian
nuclear technology, arguing that this would
maintain a balance of power in South Asia - the
suggestion was that a bipolar sub-region with
India and Pakistan as regional powers would be
more conducive to security than a unipolar one
with India dominant. Gilani's reasoning is based
on the neo-realist proposition that a bipolar
world is less likely to face wars than a unipolar
one, where the
lone superpower's
actions go relatively unchecked.
While
this theory applies at the global level, Gilani's
attempt to apply it to South Asia is fallacious.
South Asia does not exist in a vacuum, immune to
outside influences. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), dominated by the United
States, has a strong presence in Afghanistan and
has a major stake in what happens in the
sub-region and especially in Afghanistan and
Pakistan (AfPak).
I would argue that the
United States acts as a counterbalance to India's
power in South Asia. Although the United States
(and other NATO member countries) are not
physically situated in the Indian subcontinent,
they exert a definite influence on the politics of
the sub-region and have exhibited an enduring
interest in what transpires in South Asia. In
addition to NATO military operations in
Afghanistan, the United States military's killing
of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, its
continual drone strikes against Taliban militants
in north-western Pakistan, and the United States'
presumed negotiations with the Pakistani
government to secure the release of United States
embassy employee Raymond Davis, also in 2011,
demonstrate the United States' power in South Asia
and particularly in AfPak.
It may be
argued that India and the United States have
similar concerns vis-a-vis Islamist militants
based in Pakistan, and the two could conceivably
act in unison against Pakistani interests. To this
I would retort that there is a third power that
balances the equation - the militants themselves.
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba - the
major militant groups operating in Pakistan - may
be non-state actors, but they operate at a global
level and are a force to contend with. India is
highly unlikely to harbor imperialist ambitions
towards Pakistan, because to invade Pakistan would
be to inherit its high risk from terrorism. In
that respect, the militants act as a
counterbalance to India's powerful status in the
subcontinent and prevent it from seeking to extend
its boundaries westwards.
It is true that
the United States and its allies invaded
Afghanistan with the express purpose of defeating
the Taliban - a far cry from desisting from
invading it for fear of Taliban attacks. However,
in Pakistan's case, the fact that the country
possesses nuclear arsenal is enough of a deterrent
to protect it from a similar invasion. The
possibility of militants having access to
Pakistan's nuclear weapons makes irking them ever
so risky, which is why the United States' recent
attempts to engage the Taliban in peace talks seem
to be the only realistic route to a solution to
the situation in AfPak.
Indeed, this is a
second reason that Gilani's argument that access
to civilian nuclear technology would increase
stability in South Asia falls flat on its face. If
we are to accept his contention that possession of
nuclear capabilities would raise Pakistan to the
status of a power in the South Asian context, then
Pakistan already is one. Civil technology may
notionally enhance its status, but would
realistically do nothing to increase Pakistan's
might. As for bringing Pakistan economically at
par with India, it would be delusional for
Pakistan to even seek to compete with India's high
growth rate, fueled by its huge domestic market,
its vast manpower and its service sector, at least
in the near term.
That said, giving
Pakistan civil nuclear technology may not be such
a bad thing, considering that it would help
Pakistan out of its electricity crisis. The
country's power companies are in a financial soup
and citizens regularly face power cuts for many
hours a day, especially in the blistering summers.
While it is understandable that the international
community should have grave concerns regarding
Pakistan's nuclear capabilities and the
possibility of terrorists gaining access to
nuclear weapons in Pakistan, the fact is that
these capabilities already exist.
Providing Pakistan with civilian
technologies may be unpalatable because it would
appear to bestow Pakistan's nuclear capabilities
with acceptability, but in real terms it would not
increase the international security risk posed by
Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons. The
international community's concern about
proliferation of nuclear technology via Pakistan
is valid - the potential for such activities would
admittedly grow if Pakistan were to start using
nuclear energy on a large scale. However, the
truth is that that is a risk that has already
materialized - Pakistani nuclear scientist A Q
Khan's proliferation activities are well known -
and the possibility of further proliferation
through Pakistan persists, regardless of whether
the country is granted access to civil nuclear
technology.
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
