SPEAKING
FREELY India's Agni V sends strong nuclear
signal By Namrata Goswami
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
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One of the most
noted historians of the Cold War, John Lewis
Gaddis, stated that existence of nuclear weapons
made the long, post-1945 peace possible. Given the
devastating potential, states possessing nuclear
weapons lock themselves into a mutual
deterrence posture. This was
most evident between the US and the erstwhile
Soviet Union during the Cold War.
This
appears to be the inevitable situation between
China and India at present. With the successful
test of the 5,000 kilometer-range
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Agni
V, from Wheeler Island, off the Odisha coast on
April 19, India has joined an elite club of
nations that possess ICBM capability; namely the
US, the UK, China, France, Russia, and Israel. The
Agni V test has also significantly strengthened
India's minimum nuclear weapon's credibility
vis-à-vis China. The Agni V can reach Chinese
cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Significant is
the fact that India has a "no first use" policy
and hence Agni V is purely a strategic deterrent
against potential adversaries (read China) if they
threaten India with nuclear strikes.
Nuclear signaling, which implies overt
psychological pressure on the adversary in order
to deter any military aggression into ones own
territory is the political rationale of nuclear
weapons. And this is how the Agni V test should be
interpreted. Indian values, national interests and
military force structures are not geared towards
any offensive or expeditionary ends. The 'first
order' interest of the Indian state is to defend
its territory against external threats. And hence,
improving its defense force structures and nuclear
deterrence adds credibility to its response
mechanism towards this end. It is also a signal to
China that India will not be coerced by China with
regard to the border dispute in India's eastern
sector. Nuclear deterrence also offers a robust
defense for safeguarding the interest of Arunachal
Pradesh within India. As is well known, China
claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh by
stating that it is Southern Tibet.
That
said, nuclear escalation 'signaling' between two
of the rising powers of Asia is not without its
downsides. First, China already possesses ICBM
capabilities ranging from 5, 500 km to 8, 000
kilometers. It's Dongfeng 31 or the D-31 is a
solid fuel ICBM with a range of 8,000 kilometers.
China is at present also developing the
Dongfeng-41 (D-41) with a range of over 11, 500
kilometers. It also possesses the JL-2 nuclear
tipped ICBM with a range of 7,000 kilometers and
can be launched from sub-marines. Secondly, this
situation of a potential nuclear arms race could
result in a "security dilemma". Security dilemma
by definition implies that when the first state
arms itself, the second state fearing the first
state's armament, in turn arms itself. The first
state then responds to the second state's armament
by further arming itself resulting in a vicious
cycle of armament.
That could happen to
India and China. For instance, China equipped
itself with the ICBMs and acted aggressively with
India on the border issue by escalating its claims
on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in the
eastern sector. India responded by deploying the
Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which has a
flight range of 290 kilometers, in the eastern
sector to strengthen its defense posture vis-à-vis
China. It has now tested the Agni V with the
capability to hit Chinese cities by 2014. China in
turn, develops the D-41 with a flight range of
11,500 kilometers and targets India. The
consequence of all this is a classic "security
dilemma" requiring deft handling as any wrong
signaling of intent or offensive military posture
from either side could lead to conflict
escalation.
In this situation, it is
important for India and China to work out a
mechanism of 'bilateral nuclear dialogue' in order
to reassure the other side that these weapons are
purely strategic weapons meant for the purpose of
deterrence. Both India and China could jointly
commit to a "no first use" policy with regard to
their nuclear weapons. Most importantly, this
situation of mistrust and potential conflict
escalation should be mitigated by deft diplomacy
in order to ensure that both countries are sincere
about resolving the border dispute in the eastern
sector within the 2005 framework agreement.
Dr Namrata Goswami is a Research
Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and
Analyses, New Delhi. The views expressed here are
those of the author alone.
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows
guest writers to have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
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