SPEAKING
FREELY Dirty games cross the Afghan
divide By Luqman Saeed
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Ahmed Shah Durrani
(1722-1772) was the founder of the modern state of
Afghanistan. Participants in the tribal council of
1747 agreed to crown him emir of Afghanistan in
1747. [1] With this decision, Durrani Pushtuns
were to rule Afghanistan until the fateful Marxist
coup of 1978. Although a state was formed, its
power to administer and territorial configuration
kept on varying. Islam, which plays a vital role
in the lives of Afghanis, has always
proved to be unifying force
in resistance to foreign occupiers. In spite of
the display of unity against invaders, infighting
within the ruling clan, between different ethnic
groups and resistance to state power have also
been hallmarks of the modern history of
Afghanistan.
Knowledge of the ethnic
diversity and plurality of Afghan society helps in
understanding these conflicting tendencies. Afghan
rulers who tried to centralize power always
confronted violent opposition from people of
different clans and ethnicity. This
insurrectionary tendency holds a profound lesson
for the major powers involved in the ongoing
conflict in the region. As plural a country as
Afghanistan is, it requires an extraordinary
understanding of demographic realities in an
attempt to produce a viable political solution for
Afghanistan.
According to CIA figure, the
population of Afghanistan is approximately 28.4
million. For centuries, people from different
ethnic backgrounds have settled in the country. By
the 15th century, major ethnic groups had come to
live in the regions they happen to be today.
Inhabiting the region to the south of the
Hindu-Kush mountains, Pushtuns make up 42% of the
population.
The two major Pushtun tribes
are Ghilzais and Durranis. The latter have
remained the rulers of Afghanistan since 1747,
with control of the government fluctuating between
Sadozai [Ahmad Shah Durrani (who reigned from
1747-1772), Timur Shah (r 1772-93), Mahmud Shah (r
1800-03, 1809-18) Shah Shuja (r 1803-9, r 1839-42)
Ali (r 1818-19)] and Barakzai clan [Dost Muhammad
(r1826-39), Muhammad Afzal (r1866-67), Abdur
Rehman Khan (r 1880-1901), Habibullah Khan (r
1901-1919), Amanullah Khan (r 1919-29)]. [2]
On Northern side of Hindu-Kush live the
Tajiks, who historically are more urbanized than
the Pushtuns. They speak Dari and, comprising 27%
of Afghanistan's population, are the
second-largest ethnic group. Tajiks are credited
with the flourishing of Sufism in Afghanistan. The
Tajik Kart dynasty, once the first wave of Mongols
invasion ended, was given the responsibility of
ruling Herat and western Afghanistan by the
Persian ruler in 1245, and played a tremendous
role in flourishing art and Sufism in the country.
The Northern-Central region is inhabited by Uzbek
and Turkic people who collectively make up 12% of
the population. Cultural affinity exists between
these ethnic groups and people of Central Asia.
Empires from Central Asia have ruled Afghanistan
ever since the time of Persian Samanid in 10th
century, based in Bokhara and Samarkand. Hazaras,
who comprise 9% of the population, are descendents
of the Mongols and are Shi'ites. They are located
in Central Afghanistan and in the past have been
subjected to persecution time and again.
After assuming the throne, Ahmad Shah
Durrani started expanding his empire. He increased
his territorial control to as far Amu Darya,
bordering Central Asia, thus bringing Uzbeks and
Turkmen living there under his control. Weakening
Mughals failed to be a match for Ahmad and ceded
Peshawar and substantial territory west of Sindh
river to the ruler of Afghanistan. But infighting
weakened the territorial control once Ahmad Shah
Durrani died. Timur Shah (r 1772-93) could not
hold on to the expanding empire. He had to put
down the Pushtun insurgency in the east. His five
sons ruled until 1826 when inter-tribal feud
brought the Barakzai family to the throne.
The feuding were primarily driven by
jealousies, lust for power and control. Dost
Muhammad became emperor in 1826 after an uprising
by Barakzais in order to avenge the death of his
brother Fateh Khan, who was killed by Mahmud Shah
(r 1800-03, 1809-18). Mahmud Shah considered Fateh
Khan a threat as he had successfully suppressed an
uprising in Herat. A power struggle led to the
fall of Sadozai family. This tribal infighting
continued until the scene was set for first
Anglo-Afghan war while the territorial gains by
Ahmad Shah Durrani beyond the frontiers of that of
contemporary Afghanistan which had united all of
the Pushtuns were lost.
The English had
always been anxious that a weak Afghanistan could
lead to Russian encroachment. Their first alliance
with Afghan ruler was with Sadozai's Shah Shuja (r
1803-1809, r 1839-42). As the infighting between
Sadozai and Barakzai clan led to the elevation of
Dost Mohammad to the throne, the British invaded
the country in 1839 on the pretext of installing
the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan to the throne.
Within eight months they occupied Kandahar, Ghazni
and then eventually Kabul. Sporadic resistances
were squashed and the British succeeded in
installing Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul. For
three years, Shah Shuja tried to prove himself an
effective ruler but in vain.
Unwilling to
accept even the indirect rule of the foreigners,
riots broke out in 1842 which resulted in, until
then the biggest humiliation for the British
Empire. The commander of forces in Kabul, Sir
William Macnaghten, was massacred along with his
companions. General William Elphinestone, who
succeeded him, decided to withdraw from Kabul. Of
4,500 troops and 12,000 civilians who left the
Balla Hissar fort, only one Englishman and 20
Afghan supporters of Shah Shuja were able to make
it to Jalalabad a week later. [3] In spite of this
humiliating defeat, the English kept on targeting
Pushtun tribes. Between first and second
Anglo-Afghan war, 100 such attacks were launched
against the tribes on either side of the border.
[4]
The second Anglo-Afghan war broke out
in November 1878. Sher Ali (r 1863-66, 1868-79)
had avoided stationing British military observers
in his country. Russians presence in the
Constantinople had rung alarm bells in Britain and
in order to entrap the English empire, a plan had
been hatched by the Russians to invade India
through Afghanistan. [5] Peace was concluded
between the two empires but the presence of
Russian envoy in Afghanistan and humiliation felt
by the British as they were denied any such
privilege, thus increasing their insecurity,
resulted in an invasion on November 22, 1878. Sher
Ali fled to North. Initially victory seemed
confirm but the presence of foreigners yet again
united the Afghans as people from different tribal
and ethnic background rose up against the foreign
invaders. British envoy Louis Cavnagri was
massacred along with 75 other men by Afghans. More
British troops were sent to Kabul to control the
situation and Martial law was imposed. Arrests and
executions ensued. Such actions could not keep the
Afghanis off from showing resistance. Fierce
fighting broke out in Kabul which resulted in huge
no. of casualties although more on Afghan side.
Undeterred, another attack was launched from Herat
under the leadership of Sher Ali's son Muhammad
Ayub Khan who massacred more than 1,000 British
army personnel in Kandahar thus forcing them to
retreat to Kabul. In order to secure a safe way
out, the British searched for credible leader
which they found in Abdur Rehman (1844-1901),
nephew of Sher Ali.
The reign of Iron
Emir, as Abdur Rehman was known, was marked with
terror. He followed the legacy of Sher Ali of
national consolidation, but his manner was brutal.
By transferring sections of the population within
the country, he disturbed demographic realities.
The brutal suppression of Hazaras in the north was
followed by an uprising lasting three years from
1891-93. The people of Hazaras refused to
surrender and were reduced to enslavement while
their land was given to people from other ethnic
groups. Tension that still persists between
Hazaras, who are mostly Shi'ites, and other ethnic
groups can be traced back to this brutal policy of
Iron Emir. Pagans in the northeastern mountains,
known as Kafiristan, were forcefully converted.
Uzbeks also rose up against the Emir in
1888 and were dealt heavy handedly. He had to face
40 revolts during his reign as his policies
violated the autonomy of other tribes and
ethnicities. He was succeeded by Habibullah.
Habibullah's 1901-1919 reign can be regarded as
mixture of conservative and modernist policies. He
introduced new ways of communications that had
been shunned by his father and provided tribal
chiefs with the opportunity to have their say in
government policies. Integration of tribal chiefs
into national affairs had the dual advantage. It
not just respected their so cherished autonomy but
also provided them with a legitimate platform for
them to express their disagreements. Modern
educations and amenities were introduced, although
limited to urban areas, but not as swiftly as to
disturb the sensitivities of Afghan people.
Habibullah's successor, Amanullah (r 1919-1929)
was credited with introducing the first secular
constitution of the country, but failed to observe
such caution. Bent on introducing radical reform
in his effort to imitate Ataturk's Turkey, he was
overthrown by traditionalists in 1929.
After Zahir Shah (1914-2007) took over,
his more experienced prime minister Muhammad
Hashim (1884-1953) consolidated the Afghan state
through his authoritarian tactics. Shah Mahmood
(1888-1959) who succeeded him introduced political
and social liberties. This was the time of radical
activism of both Leftist and Islamist.
Disenchanted from the government, both wings tried
to promote their own views and at times ended up
in violent clashes on Kabul university campus.
Muhammad Daoud further advanced the social
reformist agenda and by the end of his first Prime
Minster-ship, high enrollment in schools and women
participation in social life could be regarded as
an achievement. But his pro-Pashtunistan policy,
ie to claim the land beyond the Pakistan's
frontier inhabited by Pushtuns, led to Pakistan's
support for the dissident Islamist elements who
loathed the progressive stance of the government.
Domestic political conflict led to the
Marxist coup of 1978. Afghanistan being a highly
unsuitable country for Marxist revolution because
of its diversity and religious and cultural
sensitivities rose up in revolt. [6] Soviet fear
of Islamic uprising within its own domain led to
the fateful December 1979 intervention.
Afghanistan was once again united against the
foreign invaders though ethnic division was
conspicuous in the formation of resistance groups.
The matters got worse once the Soviets left and
these groups started fighting each other to form
their own central government. Monarchy which had
been able to give Afghanis a symbolic unity was
long dead. [7]
The ill-fated policies of
nations such as the United States and Pakistan
also complicated matters. Disunity among Afghan
resistance groups had initially been deemed
favorable by Pakistan as to avoid any future
threat of guerilla movement causing her trouble.
[8] But once the Soviets left, this disunity could
not be undone. Civil war ensued and neighboring
countries started supporting their chosen proxies.
Pakistan's favorite was Gulbuddin Hikmetyar
Hizb-Islami, but later Islamabad switched its
support to incipient Taliban movement.
The
Taliban's uncompromising conviction of imposition
of Shari'at in Afghanistan by controlling the
central state increased the momentum of civil war.
Pakistan supported this view for her own strategic
purposes and also thwarted any effort by the
government of Burhanudin Rabbani to bring Afghan
factions together once the Taliban threat became
clear. [9] Eventually once Taliban were able to
advance as far as to Kabul, the ethnic divide
manifested itself in sheer bloodiness. Offenses in
Mazar Sharif in 1997-98 resulted in a huge number
of casualties as Pushtuns and Non-Pushtuns, now
united in their opposition to Pushtun Talibans,
committed ethnic cleansing.
During all
these years of civil war, Iran, Russia and Central
Asian states supported anti-Taliban Northern
Alliance. Ethnic cleansing of an extent, never
occurred in Afghanistan history ever before,
horrified the international community. Ahmed Shah
Masud's forces, who was Tajik by ethnicity,
massacred Hazara's in 1995 whereas Hazara's
massacred Taliban in 1997 and were slaughtered by
them the following year. Along with this division
on ethnic-line, divisions within the Taliban
Pushtuns also surfaced. Taliban's shura was
dominated by Durrani-Pushtuns and this
centralization of power was resented by Ghilzais
Pushtun who had dominated Afghan Jihad.
As
Taliban resorted to guerilla warfare after the
fall of Kabul in 2001 and with the increase of
insurgency in recent years, peace in Afghanistan
seems a distant reality. Two lessons that are to
be learnt from Afghan history are totally ignored
by the actors involved. Afghans have never
succumbed to the foreign invaders. Their mutual
hostility to occupation has always brought them
together. Although majority of current insurgents
are Pushtuns, this Pushtun and non-Pushtun divide
in resistance is also result of policies for which
no rationale Afghan history can provide.
Diversity of Afghanistan does not allow
any room whatsoever for one ethnic group to have
an absolute authority over the whole country. In a
tribal society by nature, the centralization of
power by one clan, tribe or ethnic group does not
provide suitable model of government. A strong
central state in Afghanistan would require
compromises of autonomy by the other clans and
ethnicities, which is anathema for Afghanis.
Regional countries that have over the time
supported the proxies in Afghanistan should learn
this lesson for their own good. The conflict will
not subside unless an all inclusive government
with representation from all ethnic groups is
formed. As US forces are not going to stay in
Afghanistan indefinitely, it's the regional actors
who have to decide whether they are going to keep
playing the dirty game in Afghanistan or will
respect the plurality of Afghanistan by stop
waging proxies war in this unfortunate country.
Notes
1. Runion L
Meredith, The History of Afghanistan,
Greenwood Press, 2007. 2. Wahab S and
Youngerman B, A Brief History of
Afghanistan, 2nd Edition, Infobase Publishing
2007. 3. Ibid. 4. Ahmed E and Barnet J R,
"Bloody Games", The New Yorker, April 11, 1988. p
44. 5. Wahab S and Youngerman B, A Brief
History of Afghanistan, 2nd Edition, Infobase
Publishing, 2007. 6. Ahmed E and Barnet J R,
"Bloody Games",The New Yorker, April 11,1988. p
44. 7. Ibid. 8. Rashid, Ahmed, Taliban:
Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central
Asia. London, I. B. Tauris, 2000. 9. Ibid.
Luqman Saeed is a research in
economics and freelance writer.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their
say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
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