Relations between the
United States and Pakistan have deteriorated badly
over the past year. Pakistan was initially
embarrassed when US Special Forces found and
killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden just down
the street from a Pakistani army camp, but the
country - or at least its generals who hold sway
there - turned the raid into an affront to
national honor.
Last November, US troops
fired on a Pakistani army camp, killing 24
soldiers. Its national honor injured once more,
Pakistan closed off North Atlantic Treaty
organization (NATO) supply lines into Afghanistan
and confidently awaited an apology and redress
from the US. Neither has happened; neither is
likely to happen.
In the past week,
President Barack Obama snubbed his Pakistani
counterpart at the NATO meeting held in his
hometown of
Chicago, and a Pakistani
tribal court sentenced Dr Shakil Afridi, the
medical doctor who assisted the US in the Bin
Laden operation, to a draconian 33-year sentence.
The US is racing to respond with a US$33 million
cut in aid to Pakistan. The parity in the sentence
and the aid cutoff is not a coincidence and will
not be lost in the conversion to rupees.
The US shows no concern over Pakistan and
its supply lines. This raises the question not
only of the future of the US-Pakistani
partnership, but also the question of Pakistan's
usefulness to the US. One might further wonder
what options the US has for supplying the war in
Afghanistan and what plans it has for its
erstwhile South Asian partner. None of the
prospects augur well for Pakistan's political and
military elite.
Pakistan cut off
US/International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
supplies into Afghanistan once before. In 2010,
after US aircraft struck inside Pakistan,
Islamabad severed supply lines through the Khyber
Pass. Dependent on Pakistani routes, American
generals had no choice but to apologize. But it
became clear to the US that Pakistani supply lines
were unreliable and it began to use longer, more
expensive but more stable routes through Russian
and Russian-influenced territories, including
Uzbekistan just to Afghanistan's north.
Approximately 75% of supplies into
Afghanistan were coming through Russia last
autumn. After the November border incident closed
Pakistani routes once more, all such supplies have
come through Russian territories. Six months
without the use of Pakistani routes and the war
goes on. American generals are breathing a sigh of
relief over their foresight; Pakistani generals
are anxious over their miscalculation and where it
is leading.
The supplies coming through
Russian territories are reportedly "non-lethal",
that is, they exclude bullets, artillery rounds,
bombs and the like. But the US has almost
certainly built up immense stockpiles inside
Afghanistan. In any event, the war turned away
from ground engagements back in 2007 and no longer
requires large amounts of bullets and bombs.
Operations today mainly involve patrolling
enclaves in the south and counter-insurgency
operations that provide medical services and
agricultural help. The old combat sweeps are few
in number. Afghan army units and insurgent leaders
are feeling each other out on local truces.
US/ISAF troop levels are declining rather sharply.
Combat could pick up, perhaps at the
behest of the Pakistani army, and almost certainly
aiming at ISAF supply depots, which are to say the
least combustible. The Taliban have begun their
warm-weather offensive, but in recent years this
has meant more improvised explosive devices, not
more ground engagements. The US will have to
increase mine-clearing operations and road
patrols, neither of which calls for large amounts
of lethal equipment.
There may be
surreptitious sources of lethal equipment in the
region. Pakistani army and Frontier Corps
commanders may supplement their meager salaries
with sales across the Durand Line that separates
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iranian commanders to
the west may have similar inclinations and indeed
are thought to have already done so with opium
dealers.
The manufacture of guns and
ammunition is one of the more vigorous industries
of the tribal areas of Pakistan and has been since
the days of Rudyard Kipling if not the Moghuls.
The town of Darra Adam Khel is thought to have
some 900 weapons factories. [1] The loyalties and
scruples of the owners are unclear but money is
thought to speak loudly, clearly, and cogently in
Khyber marketplaces.
More reliable sources
can be found with Indian intelligence. It is
likely to have clandestine supply routes from its
days of supporting the Northern Alliance against
the Taliban from the early 1990s to the Taliban's
ouster in 2001, and these are almost certainly
kept at the ready.
The US's recent refusal
to issue an apology to Pakistan contrasts with
General David Petraeus' (now director of the
Central Intelligence Agency) contrition when
supply lines were cut two years ago.
Obama's refusal to meet Zardari recently
was a calculated insult. The US must have
confidence in stable supply channels for lethal
equipment and perhaps Russia has privately given
that confidence. After all, Russia is very much
interested in seeing Islamist militants ground
down in Afghanistan lest is spread into Central
Asia. What Russian President Vladimir Putin will
ask in return is unclear but cooperation in
hydrocarbon development and countering Chinese
influence may be high on his list.
The US
has additional leverage against Pakistan. Cutting
off Western supply lines hurts Pakistanis as well,
especially among the Pashtun workers in the port
of Karachi and along the approaches into
Afghanistan in Khyber and Balochistan - two
regions with limited respect for the Islamabad and
the generals.
Further, the US can cut more
aid to the Pakistani army and state and future
International Monetary Fund loans may be in
question. Pakistan may have more in common with
Greece than a visit from Alexander long ago.
A case may be made that Pakistan, or at
least its generals, are sponsors of terrorism.
Several countries may support the effort: India
can point to the 2008 Mumbai attack by
Lashkar-e-Toiba which operates openly in Pakistan;
Iran has objected to Pakistan-based Jundallah
groups that strike inside its portion of
Balochistan; even China is wary of Uyghur
guerrillas operating along the Durand Line. The
example of harsh sanctions lies just to the west
in Iran.
Pakistan has also run afoul of
two transnational professional networks who will
spread the message and press for justice.
Reporters are part of an international association
and they are appalled by the deaths of dozens of
their colleagues in suspicious circumstances,
including Asia Times Online correspondent Syed
Saleem Shahzad in May of last year.
The
draconian sentence handed down on Dr Afridi is
beginning to stir action within the well-placed
and influential medical profession - a group
closely tied to humanitarian causes in the world.
They, like many other people, are bewildered that
a man who helped find the deadliest terror leader
in history has been severely punished while those
who hid him walk freely in Abbottabad and
Islamabad.
Note 1. See
Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra, Afghanistan,
Arms and Conflict: Armed Groups, Disarmament and
Security in a Post-War Society (London:
Routledge, 2008), p 39.
Brian M
Downing is a political/military analyst and
author of The Military Revolution and
Political Change and The Paths of Glory:
War and Social Change in America from the Great
War to Vietnam. He can be reached at
atbrianmdowning@gmail.com.
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2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights
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