Russia's quiet rapprochement with
Pakistan By Stephen Blank
Quietly and unobtrusively, a
Russo-Pakistani rapprochement has been developing
behind the scenes of world politics for the last
two years. On Pakistan's side, the almost
spectacular deterioration of relations with the
United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has led it to seek new
friends, especially as the alliance accelerates
its withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Russia
also fully understands that Pakistan is a crucial
player in Afghanistan and that, as NATO withdraws,
it becomes all the more urgent for Moscow to seek
some sort of modus vivendi with Islamabad.
Russia initiated four-party talks with
Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan to discuss
the future of the last of these. Furthermore,
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari met six times
with Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev between 2008 to 2012, and
President Vladimir Putin is set to visit the South
Asian country in September.
This modest,
albeit real, rapprochement is, however, built upon
a long-standing foundation of mistrust. Russian
officials have long been concerned over the safety
and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
arsenal. Due to those concerns and Pakistan's
record, foreign policy analysts like Alexei
Arbatov observed that for Russia, Pakistan is a
principal potential threat to non-proliferation.
Other observers, like the former director of
Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service and
Ambassador to India, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, view
Pakistan, Iran and North Korea as destabilizing
nuclear powers. Therefore, Russia wants Pakistan
to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT).
While this residual Russian
suspicion remains, other factors have impelled
Moscow to seek a rapprochement with Islamabad. The
deteriorating Afghan situation, the realization
that it must deal with Pakistan on its own merits
- apart from the Indo-Pakistani connection - to
help secure Afghanistan and Central Asia, and the
opportunities provided by the erosion of the
US-Pakistan alliance are too important for Moscow
to avoid. Thus, Russia has now determined to deal
with Pakistan independently and acknowledges that
relations will be on a bilateral presidential
level - as they are with India.
Moscow has
been alert to these possibilities for some time.
Already, in 2009, Russian state television accused
the US of trying to destabilize Pakistan to damage
China, Pakistan's "all-weather" ally and friend.
Since then, Moscow has also announced its
support for Pakistan's efforts to join the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While
this latter move may be regarded as a concession
to Beijing, which has long-supported Pakistan's
entrance into the SCO, there is no sign that China
is ready to welcome India, which Moscow has
supported, into the SCO. But there is no doubt
that Pakistan's membership in the SCO would
strengthen the SCO's claim and perhaps its
capacity to involve itself in Afghanistan after
the departure of the International Security
Assistance Force.
There are tempting
energy and economic objectives as well that could
lead to advantageous geopolitical outcomes between
the two countries. Russia's Gazprom has regularly
hinted at its interest in investing in or helping
to build the proposed but troubled
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas
pipeline. Since that pipeline has been a potential
showcase for US policy, Russian participation
would not only enhance Moscow's ties and influence
with all the players, it would also undermine US
credibility and policy in Central Asia.
Beyond the TAPI pipeline, Moscow clearly
also has interests in expanding its energy profile
throughout South Asia, for example in assisting
Sri Lanka's oil exploration projects.
As
expected, the new rapprochement is also founded on
trade. Russian exports to Pakistan rose to US$620
million in 2008 from $93 million in 2002, and both
sides feel there is room for further growth.
Then-prime minister Putin said in 2011 that Russia
views Pakistan as a reliable and very important
partner. Putin's remarks were indicative of how
far Russian-Pakistani relations has progressed,
despite Moscow's long-held suspicions of
Islamabad's aims.
Yet, perhaps the most
striking aspect of this rapprochement is that it
now may also encompass security cooperation.
Discussions are already underway about expanding
defense ties by holding joint military exercises,
exchanging trainees and trainers, and selling
Russian weapons to Pakistan. It remains to be seen
if such cooperation will truly materialize and
expand. But if it does, the reactions of India and
China to these events will merit close scrutiny.
To be sure, Moscow-Islamabad relations are
not exclusively positive. Pakistan's support for
terrorist groups, its fast-growing nuclear
program, as well as its past history of
international nuclear proliferation are surely not
forgotten.
But, as the Central and South
Asian configuration of states now undergoes a new
transformation, Russia needs to reach out to
Pakistan and has the opportunity to exploit
Washington's difficult relations with Islamabad.
Therefore Putin's upcoming visit to Pakistan in
September will be, for many reasons, a visit worth
watching.
Dr Stephen Blank is a
professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of
the US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA.
The views expressed here do not represent those of
the US Army, Defense Department, or the US
government.
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