Iran
and the US vie in
Afghanistan By Brian M Downing
Iran over the past decade has devoted
considerable attention to getting American forces
away from its borders. In Iraq, it backed Shi'ite
militias who formed an important part of the
insurgency. It later pressed Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki to oust US forces, though he did allow
US training missions and oil companies to remain.
Efforts to oust the US from Afghanistan
have been unsuccessful. Iran arms the Taliban with
a modicum of weapons, mainly as a reminder to the
US that these supplies could increase sharply in
the event of attacks on Iranian nuclear
facilities. Iran loathes the Taliban as an
unstable Sunni cult that is backed, albeit
indirectly, by Saudi Arabia.
The recent
US-Afghan strategic partnership, which calls for a
US presence for another 12 years, was very much
opposed in Tehran. It is still trying to use its
influence with northern Afghan peoples to
reject the agreement in
parliament. This is unlikely to be successful but
Iran has another, more long-term way to counter US
interests in the region.
Upset by the
US-Afghan strategic agreement, Iran has threatened
to expel from its territory tens of thousands of
Afghan refugees, many of whom have been there
since the Russian war in the 1980s. This will not
have much effect and it likely reflects the wrath
of the politically-ascendant Revolutionary Guard
Corps rather than a cautious plan from other parts
of the Iranian state.
More importantly,
however, Iran is using its extensive influence
with the non-Pashtun peoples of the north. They
are a majority of the country's population and
over-represented in the national assembly, owing
to low Pashtun voter turnout in the war-torn south
and east.
These northerners respect Iran.
Their language and culture are Persian-influenced;
Iran backed them during the Russian war and
against the Taliban; and Iran is helping with
development programs in the western part of the
country, especially with roads connecting the two
countries' commerce, a point to be looked at
presently. Further, Iranian emissaries are known
to deliver handsome sums of money to President
Ahmed Karzai - a man who is known to have buoyant
collegiality with such emissaries and keen respect
for their interests.
These ties and
collegial feelings, however, are unlikely to prod
the national assembly to reject the US-Afghan
partnership. Iran is an international pariah; the
US has a great deal of international influence,
including some with India - another favorite of
northern Afghans. Further, the US has demonstrated
resolve in fighting the Taliban, training the
northern-dominated army, and bringing about at
least preliminary negotiations with insurgents.
Northerners will not push the US out as its
departure could bring civil war and perhaps even a
Taliban return.
Iran has two policies that
are within its reach. First, it can convince
Karzai to forbid the use of Afghan bases to attack
Iranian bases, to conduct reconnaissance missions
over Iran, and to launch guerrilla operations into
Iran. Second and far more importantly, Iran can
use its proximity to capitalize on Afghan economic
development in a manner that will upset US policy
to isolate and stifle Iran.
A Soviet
geological survey in the 1970s showed promising
geological deposits in many parts of Afghanistan.
As is now well known, a more recent American
survey confirmed the Soviet findings: Afghanistan
is rich in copper, iron, semi-precious gems, and
rare earths. North-central Afghanistan may even
have appreciable oil deposits and collegial
Chinese emissaries have won exploration rights
there. With global commodity prices on the rise,
Afghanistan is poised to prosper. It needs a
settlement with the Taliban - and reliable export
routes.
The most obvious route is south
into Pakistan then down to its capacious port
facilities in Karachi and Gwadar. China built the
latter and is building a railroad line from
northern Afghanistan to the Khyber Pass. Roads and
ports are in place or soon will be, but doubts
fall upon Pakistan. It is rent by sectarian and
ethnic strife, plagued by inept and corrupt
government, and may face a fiscal crisis of
Athenian proportions in a year or so. The roads
from Afghanistan to Gwadar pass through
Balochistan province, which has a problematic
insurgency. China must wonder if its convoys
coming out of Afghanistan will one day face the
same arbitrary closures and fees that the American
traffic going into Afghanistan had to face until
it turned to the northern route.
This
northern supply line would be another export route
but it is long and has no waterborne routes until
the truck and rail traffic reaches the Black and
Baltic Seas. The route is more reliable than the
Pakistani route but it is of course more
expensive. The US/ISAF convoys may be paving the
way, so to speak, for a northern export route for
Afghan resources.
Iran can offer Karzai a
third route - one more reliable than the Pakistani
route and less expensive than the northern route.
Afghan ores can be transported west into Iran then
south to the ports of Chabahar and Bandar-e-Abbas.
Iran will benefit from jobs and transit fees and
also from limiting US access into Afghanistan.
Iranian routes may enjoy support from two
of the main business developers in Afghanistan -
India and China, which though geopolitical rivals,
have reasonably cooperative arrangements elsewhere
in South Asia and have collegially secured mining
rights from Karzai. Both powers are on good terms
with Iran, which supplies them with considerable
amounts of hydrocarbons. Neither India nor China
is supportive of the US effort to boycott Iranian
oil. China is eager to solidify ties with a key
oil supplier and India wishes the same and also to
consolidate near Central Asian markets.
The US will of course press Karzai to snub
Iranian plans to use its ports, sensible though it
seems to neutral observers. Karzai will be eager
to have more than one export route for his
resources and he will likely see Pakistan much as
everyone else now is - unstable and unreliable.
Further, he will see Pakistan, or at least its
army and its Haqqani network client, as
responsible for a recent wave of bombings and
assassinations in Kabul, which likely shaped his
decision to ink the partnership with the US.
To some extent Iran shares Karzai's dim
view of Pakistan. Tehran has correct ties with
Islamabad but sees it as supportive of the Taliban
and other anti-Shi'ite groups such as
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Iran objects to Pakistani
troops and mercenaries serving in Saudi Arabia,
sometimes in the cause of repressing Shi'ites, and
sees Pakistan as moving closer to the Saudis as
the former seeks financial help and the latter may
be seeking nuclear technology one day.
Brian M Downing is a political/military
analyst and author of The Military Revolution
and Political Change and The Paths of
Glory: War and Social Change in America from the
Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at
brianmdowning@gmail.com.
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