SPEAKING
FREELY Al-Qaeda loses its Arab
identity By Riccardo Dugulin
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
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On the eve of the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, fundamentalist
Arab militants who had fought to counter the
communist offensive in the country joined forces
to develop and maintain a network based on a
politicized interpretation of the Islamic law and
the concept of global Jihad.
Through the
triumvirate created by Abdallah Azzam, Osama bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda was created
as a loose
and flexible structure of
war proven Arab youths ready to head back to their
home countries with the idea of exporting the
experience and techniques used in Afghanistan to
expel what they perceived as illegitimate leaders.
This radical Islamist organization was
since its inception based on a clear Arab
framework. The primary targets of militants were
Arab authoritarian regimes (in Algeria, Egypt or
Saudi Arabia) and the overall pro-Palestinian
rhetoric was clearly anchored in an Arab
generational passion.
The modus operandi
of this newly formed network had its foundation in
terrorist actions loosely inspired by the deeds of
Muhammad and his companions following his
expulsion from Mecca and by the early raid of
Hashishin in the 11th Century. The politicized
used of a fundamentalist reading of the Koran was
derived from an Arab tendency developed in 20th
Century mainly by Sayyid Qutb and already put in
practice by Juhayman al Uteybi during the siege of
Mecca in 1979.
Later words written by
al-Zawahiri in the knights under the Prophet's
banner (2001) elucidate the way the group
perceived itself. The concept of a Muslim Arab
avant-garde movement aimed at inspiring the Arab
masses with its demonstratives attacks was at the
core of al-Qaeda's strategic structure.
In
2012, Ayman al-Zawahiri is the last funding member
of al-Qaeda still alive. Scores of high-level
leaders and operatives have been killed or taken
into custody by Western or Arab forces. al-Qaeda
has lost all its major engagements against Arab
governments. The 2011 demonstrations in Egypt
showed that a determined and rather peaceful mass
movement could oust dictators without the need of
Islamist terrorism.
Regardless of these
setbacks, al-Qaeda has mutated into a worldwide
terrorist franchise no longer existentially linked
to its core tenets of ridding the Arabian
Peninsula of the Al Saud rule, destroying Israel
and instituting a worldwide Muslim Khalifa.
With this generational change and the
constant need to readapt in order to survive,
al-Qaeda risks losing its Arab essence in order to
remain operative. This possibility creates an
window of opportunity which needs to be carefully
assessed by counter-terrorist organizations as it
may create an essential rift between traditional
supporters and local terrorist organizations. The
underlying question is if al-Qaeda remains an Arab
entity or if it came to be a franchised used by
fundamentalist terrorist worldwide, detached to
its Arab roots.
At a first glance,
al-Qaeda is still mainly an Arab network. With the
creation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) the
organization has been able to rejuvenate itself
and open new fronts. The terrorist organization is
quickly developing a regional stronghold in Yemen
and Southern Algeria where it has freedom of
movement, the capability to train and, to some
extent, the possibility to acquire relatively
sophisticated weaponry. Both AQIM and AQAP
maintain a very strong Arab dynamic.
The
greatest majority of their recruits are from the
Arab world as is their funding. On another level,
private donors from the Gulf monarchies still make
up for the majority of capital received by the
traditional al-Qaeda in the Pakistani tribal area
and its recent offshoots.
As these
terrorist organizations are trying to maintain
their operational tempo and expand their safe
havens, new regions are being exploited by armed
gangs attempting to pick up the al-Qaeda
franchise. In Sinai's no-man land, where Egyptian
authorities are struggling to regain the control
of the region, fundamentalist groups are massing
Libyan weaponry along with fighters to organize
attacks against Israeli targets.
The core
objective of these former sympathizers of the
Gama'at Islamiyya is based on the belief that
small scale attacks against Egyptian security
forces and against Israeli citizens may in the
medium term hinder the peace treaty. The aim of
these attacks is to create a situation which
instability pushes the Israeli government to react
in such a way where peace between both States is
no longer sustainable.
On the other hand,
the introduction of suicide bombings in Syria may
tend to underline a possible attempt by local
fundamentalist organizations to open up a new
al-Qaeda-like front. If for the moment the central
core of al-Qaeda has simply voiced its support to
the year-old Syrian rebellion, a tendency has been
developing in the last months which may highlight
an increased risk of al-Qaeda opening a new front
in the country.
As violence spiked in Iraq
in 2005-2007, a high number of Syrian Sunni
fundamentalist fighters crossed the border to fuel
the insurgency. Local sources estimate that the
great majority of these elements are from the
region of Idlib, a present hotspot of the
rebellion and the targeted city of a twin suicide
bombing on April 30.
It is possible that
former fundamentalist fighters who participated in
the Iraqi insurgency are now trying to open a new
al-Qaeda frontline in Syria. In fact, al-Qaeda has
been massively absent from the Arab revolutions
and using terrorism against Syrian targets may be
a way the network is attempting to get back in the
spotlight.
The present tactical evolutions
of jihadi terrorism in the Arab world should not
invite hasty conclusions. The core Arab nature of
al-Qaeda network and its operatives is being
firmly challenged by a number of recent
evolutions.
A first major structural
change is the nature of the financing. The Ezedin
Abdel Aziz Khalil case is extremely interesting.
In fact, if in the 1990s and early 2000s, al-Qaeda
found its financing center in the Arab monarchies
of the Gulf, it is now turning to contacts inside
Iran. Due to increased pressure by Crown Prince
Nayef Al Saud, private financing of jihadi
terrorist organizations contrary to the Saudi
foreign interests have been closely monitored.
This evolution highlights the growing reliance of
al-Qaeda in regard of non-Arab actors. If Osama
bin Laden had received help from the Taliban since
the mid-1990s his direct financing was not so
closely linked to non-Arab elements.
This
situation is also very much present in the current
Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali. AQIM Arab
militants have joined forces with non-Arab
elements to control areas of a country
traditionally beyond the al-Qaeda sphere of
interest. Overall, from Mali to Pakistan, al-Qaeda
and its offshoots have a smaller Arab fighting
force which is highly dependent on non-Arab
capitals and protection.
A strong
fragmentation of al-Qaeda targets can also be
noted. The Somali example is interesting to be
noted. If the Al Shabaab Islamist brigades in
Somalia pledged their allegiance to al-Qaeda,
their insurgency is nevertheless extremely
independent and escaping the traditional global
tenets of traditional al-Qaeda network.
Furthermore the terrorist organization is
being challenged by the widespread attacks staged
by Boko Haram in Nigeria. Contacts between the two
Islamist networks have been established but the
Nigeria terrorist organization remains independent
and by its escalation of violence may overshadow
al-Qaeda's lack of operational successes.
A last point in regard of the mutation of
the al-Qaeda structure may be seen in the
development of "lone-wolf" terrorist attacks in
the Western world. The major foiled attacks in the
US were undertaken by non-Arab elements. On
Christmas day 2009 a Nigerian born youth
radicalized via contacts with AQAP tried to blow
up a commercial airliner. In May 2012, Faisal
Shazad, a Pakistani native, attempted to detonate
a car bomb in Times Square.
The origins of
these terrorists indicate a shift in the
recruitment network of al-Qaeda.
As an
overall assessment, it can be said that al-Qaeda
is attempting to regain the ground it lost
following multiple defeats and setbacks. Through
the creation of AQIM and AQAP and the jihadi
escalation in the Sinai and Syria, the terrorist
organization is trying to maintain its Arab
nature. Nevertheless, due to funding issues and
operational changes, it is consistently losing the
link to the Arab world it had forged during the
1990s. This doesn't mean that the core jihadi
franchise represented by the al-Qaeda terrorist
ideology is weakened, but it is likely that in
coming years international terrorism linked to
Arab grievances may not be the sole objective of
the network as it will have to deal with non-Arab
elements.
Riccardo Dugulin holds
a Master degree from the Paris School of
International Affairs (Sciences Po) and is
specialized in International Security. He is
currently working in Paris for a Medical and
Security Assistance company. He has worked for a
number of leading think tanks in Washington DC,
Dubai and Beirut.
Speaking Freely
is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.
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