SPEAKING
FREELY India plans strategic encirclement
of China By Daniel Thorp
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
The conclusion of
the Rio+20 Summit in Brazil in June saw only a
disappointing outcome, despite it being labelled a
"once-in-a-generation chance" to direct the global
economy in a sustainable direction and the much
positive talk from various world leaders. However,
while discussions concerning the global economy
took place, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and his
Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, held talks on
the sidelines concerning their
bilateral relationship,
with both urging strengthened cooperation between
the Asian giants.
Singh emphasized that
India had no intention to contain China, and he
would not tolerate any anti-China activities on
Indian soil. We have seen numerous examples of
Chinese and Indian politicians meeting to discuss
relations strewn with optimistic language.
However, despite sustained reassurances from both
sides that their respective governments are not
pursuing any containment and encirclement
strategies of their neighbor, actions over recent
years paint a very different picture.
There has been a particular growing fear
of a "China Threat" within Indian government and
strategist circles over the past decade, with many
feeling Beijing is engaging in encirclement and
containment strategies in a persistent attempt to
tie India down to the Indian subcontinent.
Responding to this perceived threat, New Delhi has
gradually been undertaking a combination of
internal balancing, by means of increasing its
military capabilities on both land and at sea, and
external balancing, via military cooperation with
states in East and Southeast Asia.
Indian
internal balancing has taken various forms and has
been reflected in the increasing defense budget
which was announced as US$41 billion for 2012-13,
a 17% increase on the previous year.
Firstly, this has helped to fund an
ongoing military modernization program with the
recent deal for 126 French Rafale fighters to be
supplied by Dassault over the coming decade in
conjunction with over 200 fifth-generation fighter
aircraft to be developed in cooperation with
Russia by 2017.
Secondly, India has been
strengthening its defenses along its disputed
border regions with China; 100,000 additional
troops were stationed along the Line of Actual
Control in 2011, along with the deployment of the
300-kilometer range BrahMos cruise missile along
the eastern border region. These deployments have
been complemented by increasing infrastructural
developments including new roads and the
construction and upgrading of assorted air bases
across the regions.
Finally, and most
significantly, India has been bolstering its
nuclear capabilities with its "flawless" test of
the Agni-V missile, which is able to carry a
nuclear warhead and with a 5,000-kilometer range
can strike a majority of major Chinese cities
along its eastern seaboard.
In addition to
military modernization on land, New Delhi has been
developing its naval capabilities with naval
commanders taking a visible turn in the direction
of the teachings of Alfred T Mahan and his
sea-based geopolitical philosophy, with ambitious
future plans for a fully fledged and highly
capable blue water navy able to protect coastal
waters, vital sea lanes of communication and
project power deep into the Indian and surrounding
oceans.
Naval modernization has included
the establishment of two new deep-sea naval port
facilities at Kawar on the southwest coast and
near Viskhapatnam as part of the Eastern Naval
Command. In tandem with the establishment of the
Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) at Port Blair in
the Andaman Islands, the Indian Navy is able to
project power across the Bay of Bengal and into
the Strait of Malacca, intensifying China's
"Malacca Dilemma".
These developments have
been complemented by the increasing purchases and
indigenous development of naval hardware,
including the nuclear submarine INS Chakra
on a 10-year lease form Russia and the locally
developed INS Airhant. Additionally, the
former Russian aircraft carrier Gorshkov,
renamed INS Vikramaditya, is to be
commissioned into service of the Indian Navy by
December 2012. These recent enlargements will make
up part of a planned 160-vessel fleet including
three aircraft carrier groups by the mid 2020s,
outlined by Indian Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh
Mehta.
Internal balancing is taking
considerable shape with increasing hardware
purchases and consistent upgrading of military
capabilities along the border with China and also
in the naval realm, where China is undergoing
rapid expansion, increasing competition in and
around the Indian Ocean. This balancing has also
taken considerable shape in terms of external
balancing and cooperation with other states in the
region.
Military cooperation with other
states extends across the realms of both land and
sea. On land, New Delhi has become increasingly
invested in its relations with Afghanistan,
establishing a Strategic Partnership in October
2011, eyeing a greater role following the planned
2014 withdrawal of coalition forces.
With
Tajikistan, India has increased its interaction
with Tajik security forces and has provided
funding for the upgrading of the Farkhor and Ayni
air bases succeeding construction of a military
hospital and logistics depot. Ayni air base is of
particular significance with reports that
Tajikistan, India and Russia are in talks over the
joint use of the base and that an Indian air force
currently has Mi-17 helicopters and has leased
Russian fighter jets stationed at the base.
New Delhi has also increased cooperation
with Mongolia, signing an agreement on Defense
Cooperation in 2001, positioning radar systems
able to monitor Chinese missile tests, holding
bilateral military exercises since 2004 and having
a quiet discussion over basing rights.
Indian relations with Tajikistan and
Afghanistan in particular also have the potential
to undermine China's use of Pakistan as a proxy
state against India in an attempt to split its
focus along two fronts. With greater influence in
Afghanistan, New Delhi can potentially undercut
Pakistani influence in a country which Islamabad
has traditionally considered as within its
strategic sphere of influence.
Extending
into the maritime realm, further cooperation and
encirclement can be observed as India has
developed ties with some historically contentious
neighbors of the Chinese. First of all,
Indo-Singapore relations have flourished in recent
years with their Defense Cooperation agreement of
2003 upgrading ties and extending bilateral
military exercises into all three wings of the
armed forces, and most significantly the SIMBEX
naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal and South
China Sea.
Relations with Singapore have
particular geopolitical importance as Singapore is
at the western approaches to the South China Sea
and eastern approaches to the Strait of Malacca,
both vital sea lanes of communication for India
and China. Close security relations between New
Delhi and Singapore allow for strong power
projection by the Indian navy into the South China
Sea, an area of particular sensitivity to China
with its claims of sovereignty over the sea; they
also allow for India to threaten the closure of
the Strait of Malacca, exacerbating Beijing's
"Malacca Dilemma".
Next stop along India's
maritime encirclement of China is Vietnam, with
New Delhi and Hanoi sharing a history of conflict
with China. Strong ties exist dating back to their
1994 defense agreement and include military
training and bilateral naval exercises carried out
in the South China Sea which have drawn much
criticism from Beijing, not helped by the talk of
India providing BrahMos missiles to Vietnam,
presenting an undeniable deterrent to Chinese
aggression in the South China Sea.
Hanoi
has also recently granted the Indian Navy basing
rights at the Nha Trang port, providing a foothold
in the South China Sea and intensifying Chinese
fears, demonstrated by the July 22, 2011,
confrontation of INS Airavat when operating
off the Vietnamese coast.
Indo-Japanese
security relations provide a real security dilemma
for China, as close ties between these two
historically contentious neighbors pose the
possibility of a pincer movement by two great
powers and complete the encirclement of China by
land and sea.
Ties between India and Japan
are continuously growing and expanding further
into the security field with the MALABAR naval
exercises. These relations and encirclement of
China is further complemented by expanding ties
with Japan's old ally and China's greatest threat,
the United States. While ties between New Delhi
and Washington remain fairly low key, partially
due to India's non-alignment strategy, they hold
the greatest potential for containment of China.
Both sides hold their relations in high esteem,
with President Barack Obama proclaiming that their
relationship "will be one of the defining
relationships of the 21st century".
Despite the constant rhetoric emanating
from India proclaiming it has no intention of
encirclement or containment of its communist
neighbor, its actions, as so often found in
international relations, speak much louder volumes
about its intentions and reveal a great concern
over China's rise to Great Power status.
However, these concerns may be well placed
as China has been undertaking many actions which
can easily be interpreted as an effort to encircle
India and contain its rise, tying it down to the
Indian subcontinent. So depending on which angle
one observes the situation from, either side can
be construed to be the aggressor or just acting in
a defensive manner.
Daniel Thorp
is an International Politics graduate of Brunel
University, UK, specializing in Asia-Pacific
security and international relations
(Copyright 2012 Daniel Thorp)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online
feature that allows guest writers to have their
say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular
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