SPEAKING
FREELY The
Taliban's al-Qaeda problem by
Aasim Zafar Khan
On March 29, 2009, US
President Barack Obama unveiled his new plan for
Afghanistan, which included a major troop surge
and a quicker drawdown than many expected. Two
things the US president said then stand out today.
Firstly, "if the Afghanistan government
falls to the Taliban or allows al-Qaeda to go
unchallenged, that country will again be a base
for terrorists". And secondly, " ... we have a
clear and focused goal; to disrupt, dismantle and
defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to
prevent their return to either country in the
future".
Fast forward three years and what
do we have? The United States has accepted that
the Taliban have a political future in
Afghanistan, and intense (desperate) efforts are
underway to
reopen negotiations for a
peaceful settlement.
Only recently, news
surfaced of high level Afghan officials, including
President Hamid Karzai's adviser Rangin Spanta
meeting with the captured former number two of the
Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, to discuss
exactly that. While this meeting has been denied
by Afghanistan's ambassador to Islamabad, there is
no doubt that any such efforts, if indeed they
happened, or will happen in the future, bode well
for all concerned. The problem is al-Qaeda,
and by association, the Haqqanis.
Much and
more has been written about the Haqqanis and how
they are not the sole problem facing the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United
States in Afghanistan. However, they hold the key
when it comes to defeating al-Qaeda. [While the
reported death of Badruddin Haqqani, the son of
Jalaluddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network,
in a US air strike late last week would no doubt
impact on the group's organizational capabilities,
as of this writing the Taliban insist he is still
alive.]
The Haqqanis over the past three
decades have successfully placed themselves in the
epicenter of jihad (or terrorism, depending on
which side of the fence you sit on) in south Asia
and globally as well. They were the first to
welcome Arab fighters into the fight against the
Soviets, and also the first to welcome Osama bin
Laden upon his expulsion from Sudan in 1996.
The seeds of al-Qaeda were sown in Haqqani
fields and camps, and many of al-Qaeda's top
commanders had previously served under Jalaluddin
as well. Also, as Osama bin Laden began to operate
with impunity in Afghanistan, he drew the ire of
Mullah Omar, who was not very pleased with the
negative publicity. It was for this reason only
that whenever Osama conducted interviews with the
press, or held press conferences to announce his
grand jihad against the United States, it all
happened in territory controlled by the Haqqanis.
And it's not just al-Qaeda. The Haqqanis
have, over decades, forged relationships with
numerous terrorist factions, acting as
facilitators, trainers, planners and recruiters.
Included in this list is the Pakistani Taliban.
However, what the Haqqanis have very cleverly done
is not cross two red lines: direct association
with a) groups fighting against the Pakistani
state (the Pakistani Taliban) and b) groups waging
global jihad (al-Qaeda).
The Haqqanis, in
short, have placed themselves immaculately with
all three major players, al-Qaeda, the Afghan
Taliban, and the Pakistani Taliban.
Returning to the current state of affairs,
the US is desperate to restart negotiations with
the Afghan Taliban and is pressing Pakistan to
take on the Haqqanis. All this is to further
isolate and weaken al-Qaeda.
In the lower
and middle tiers of the Afghan Taliban, there is
support to break away from al-Qaeda; their Wahhabi
form of religion does not mix well with the
Sufi-soaked Islam which is found in most of
Afghanistan. The problem, however, is the upper
tier of the Afghan Taliban: Mullah Omar and the
Quetta Shura (Haqqanis are also a member here).
Recall that in the wake of 9/11, the
invasion of Afghanistan could have been avoided
altogether had Mullah Omar agreed to expel Osama
and cut ties with al-Qaeda. However, he made a
decision, and the rest as they say is history.
It is in the Taliban's best interest to be
accepted as a political force with a stake in the
future of Afghanistan. To do this, it must break
away from al-Qaeda and override the influence of
the Haqqanis. Is a clean break possible? Probably
not. How far has al-Qaeda's vision of global jihad
against the West sunk into the mind of the Mullah
Omar? Nobody can say. It could perhaps be one of
the reasons why the Taliban are refusing to talk
peace.
For Pakistan, there is the bitter
realization that the group it allegedly relies
upon for strategic depth is the same actor that
has nurtured al-Qaeda, helped it grow into a
global organization, and enabled others to pick up
arms against Islamabad as well. However, if it's
strategic depth we need, then a government in
Kabul with Taliban representation is required, and
Pakistan, for its part, should push the Taliban to
return to the negotiating table.
Sadly,
the Taliban is not a democratic institution, and
it's all going to come down to Mullah Omar, and
his decision to stay with, or break away from
al-Qaeda.
Aasim Zafar Khan is
the chief operating officer of a private FM radio
network in Pakistan. He writes opinion pieces for
The News International, one of Pakistan's most
widely read English dailies. He has also
previously been associated with Geo News,
Pakistan's most popular television news
channel.
(Copyright 2012 Aasim Zafar
Khan)
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