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2 US risks
chaos on 'new Silk Road' By
Fabrizio Vielmini
Since the fall of the
USSR, the United States has striven to establish
its geopolitical presence in Central Asia,
underpinning its efforts with the imaginative
concepts of a "New Silk Road" [1].
Reformulated in July 2011, the idea
promotes free trade and regional development
joining the potential of the Central Asia
Republics (CARs) with those of South Asia and the
Middle East, especially through the construction
of communication networks and, especially, energy
infrastructure. [2]
However, to affect
regional stability positively, the US strategy
should have implied a parallel harmonization of
the customs policies and border practices among
the states of the region. Quite the opposite,
regional political institutions are fragile and
stand in the way of the
new corridors becoming a sound reality. [3]
The CARs' authoritarian regimes have
resisted regional coordination, while the US has
failed to establish a minimal state structure and
internal reconciliation in Afghanistan. [4] The
most probable result will be that the US will
focus its remaining forces on northern and western
non-Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan (mainly
Tajiks and Uzbeks), a solution wished for by
senior figures in the US diplomatic establishment.
[5] However, this leaves the prospect of the rest
of the country returning to being a geopolitical
black hole.
The above scenario stems as
well from the US misfortune of failing to define a
regional political framework for its project. This
emerged once before, in the mechanism modeled on
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe that the US tried to propose for Turkey at
the end of 2011. Washington could in such a
framework capitalize on increased ties with India.
[6]
However, the Asian players, among
which Iran is prevented by sanctions to be fully
engaged, refused to agree to be encapsulated in a
mechanism that was decided from outside. [7] The
reluctance of the major Eurasian powers to engage
with Washington is also because in its regional
enterprise the latter is even more concentrated on
advancing the security component in its
cooperation with the CARs.
Indeed, if a
"silk road" has taken form, it has actually been
in the traffic of military items along the
Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a logistical
scheme introduced in 2009 after the deterioration
of relations with Pakistan. [8]
Building
on this effort, Washington has striven to expand
its military basing rights in an attempt to
maintain a key player position in the region even
after the withdrawal of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) forces. [9]
In the
past few months, the US has deployed an
unprecedented diplomatic campaign to consolidate
military-to-military relations with the five
former Soviet Central Asian Republics, which
reached its peak in the visit of Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton last February to
Kyrgyzstan - where the US is adamant in its will
to maintain after 2014 the Manas Transit Center -
and Uzbekistan, which has seen the removal of any
restrictions (already symbolic in their nature) on
military aid. [10]
In addition to transit
and other fees paid to each CAR for transporting
equipment out of Afghanistan on the NDN, the US
and British governments have dangled the prospect
of donating some of their military equipment to
their armies. [11]
It should also be
mentioned that Washington pursues its engagement
with the CAR security sectors by building up their
anti-drug capacities. Last year, the US launched
the Central Asia Counter-narcotics Initiative
(CACI). In this framework, even more resources are
poured into the security sector in addition to the
millions of dollars that are provided to each CAR
on a bilateral basis. [12]
Also last year,
through its Drug Enforcement Administration, the
United States allocated US$14 million to the
region. Another $101 million came from the
Pentagon. In fiscal year 2010, the US spent an
estimated $69 million on counter-narcotics efforts
in Central Asia.
The threats from
Afghanistan The increased Western
attention has a major impact for the CARs as it
excites the appetites and ambition of their
regimes, [13] while the growing attention to the
security sector creates a regional trend to
militarization. What is more, the local regimes
are prone to consider the Western presence only as
a financial support and a guarantee to the status
quo. [14] This has a considerable impact on their
internal political dynamics, characterized by the
challenge of radical Islamist opposition to the
post-Soviet elites. Unable to deal with them in
normal terms, the latter have pushed the Islamists
- among whom stands out the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) - to regroup and make Afghan
regions a redeployment ground for insurgence
activities.
The US intervention
disarticulated these groups for some years but
they have been on the rise again since it has lost
its grip on the situation. Moreover, the rising
importance of the NDN for the logistics of NATO's
war effort has encouraged the IMU to reorganize
its bases in northern Afghanistan. The departure
of coalition forces from Afghanistan will likely
exacerbate this trend, leaving areas out of
control and susceptible of being used as a
springboard for armed groups' incursions into
Central Asia and China. As reported by Russian
media, in the first three months of this year
several detachments of gunmen were detected
crossing into Tajikistan and establishing military
bases near the Afghan border. [15]
Drug
trafficking from Afghanistan, the largest world
supplier of heroin and other drugs that transit
through the states of Central Asia, [16] further
feeds these degenerative trends. As a result, an
economy of drugs has been consolidated in Central
Asia, entrenching itself in the local
administrations. This accounts for the absence of
effective response given that considerable sectors
of the governments in both Russia and the CARs are
involved in drug trafficking.
Central Asia
is particularly exposed to the combined threats of
insurgents and traffickers because of its current
geo-strategic configuration. Threats are naturally
international given the precarious character of
the national boundaries, large sections of which
are not demarcated, are guarded by poor security
forces and stretch along harsh mountainous
terrains. Moreover, borders cut across ethnic
communities, and these links are used by
traffickers and terrorist groups to spread around
the region. This is a sensitive point also because
the Atlantic strategy of redeployment toward
northern Afghanistan and the CARs is likely to
shift the burden of the conflict on to the
trans-border ethnic communities of Tajiks and
Uzbeks.
These problems reach their peak in
the Ferghana Valley, a space left divided by the
Soviet demise among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, the three republics that are most at
risk of state collapse. The three countries have
proved unable to settle any of the many
trans-border problems affecting the life of half
of the regional population, who live concentrated
in the valley and have been increasingly subject
to Islamization. The opposition groups benefit
from interstate disputes as well as the
degeneration of their political systems. Against
this background, the Islamists can present
themselves as the only political alternative to
the existent state of things. Also, the
international conjuncture of the "Arab Spring"
inspires new recruits willing to overthrow the
corrupt governments. [17] Although many Islamists
profess non-violence, at least some of them can be
radicalized by way of increased contacts with
Afghanistan. [18]
With the largest and
most porous border with Afghanistan (1,200
kilometers), as well as being the poorest and most
fragile of the CARs, [19] Tajikistan is deeply
concerned by the scenarios opened by NATO's
retreat. Here, Afghanistan's turmoil has already
resulted in five years of civil war with Islamist
opposition groups. Trans-border ethnic links
(Tajiks are the second-largest group in
Afghanistan) create the probability of waves of
refugees hitting the fragile stability of the
country. Even if flare-ups of violence are on the
rise, the regime of President Emomalii Rahmon
seems more concerned with assuring its leverage
vis-a-vis the Russian presence in the country.
[20] The Tajik case shows that the increased
Western attention to local administrations is
boosting their self-confidence externally as well
as toward internal Islamic groups.
This
trend, which is increasing the discontent among
disaffected youth, is clearly visible also in
Uzbekistan. Even being the most problematic of the
capitals in the region, Tashkent has continued to
be the largest recipient of foreign security
assistance as well. The Uzbek regime has used this
support to put pressure on its internal
dissidents, [21] as well as on its neighbors,
especially Tajikistan, against which it has
applied an economic blockade that has frustrated
Western plans for regional trade recovery.
On the other hand, with the largest
security forces in the region, Uzbekistan may
consider itself able to protect its borders from
the worsening situation in Afghanistan. Moreover,
it could also attempt to expand its influence in
the north of Afghanistan, especially if this area
becomes the focus of the remaining Atlantic
forces.
Kyrgyzstan, a state that has
collapsed twice in five years, shows the dynamics
waiting to happen elsewhere in the region. The
ephemeral rule of law of a failing state provides
an easy transit route for traffickers and is a
highly conducive terrain for extremist groups. The
2010 anti-Uzbek pogroms in southern Kyrgyzstan
left that large community (700,000) exasperated
with the national authorities, and a breeding
ground for volunteers in insurgency. As the main
US basing point in the region, Kyrgyzstan is
traversed by serious geopolitical tensions. In
2010 and 2011, a wave of terror attacks took
place.
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have a
somewhat different perspective on developments in
Afghanistan.
While it remains one of the
most isolated nations on Earth, hardly an asset in
the plans to improve the regional economic
outlook, Turkmenistan, the only CAR not part of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, can boost
its own neutrality by mediating between Afghan
warring parties. Before 2001, it was the only
country in the region able to maintain relations
with the Taliban, so it might believe it will be
able to find a modus vivendi with whatever
political reconfiguration emerges in the
neighboring country.
Thus Turkmens
consider Afghanistan an opportunity. Last April,
Ashgabat signed with Islamabad an agreement for
the start of the construction of the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI)
pipeline. However, a signature in itself means
little in the history of a project under
discussion for 16 years. And in the swinging
strategic environment of the region, Turkmenistan,
which shares a large border (744km) with
Afghanistan and has connections with NATO, could
become a target of attacks.
Kazakhstan
stands out as the most balanced diplomatic player
in the region. Economically successful, it is able
to deploy resources to assist Afghanistan through
multilateral/international programs and projects -
notably in providing education to some 1,000
Afghan students. Astana strives to maintain a
neutral position with respect to the US military
strategy given its conflicting character with the
Russian-sponsored integration projects in the
region, for which Kazakhstan represents a
fundamental element. But it risks as well
remaining caught between the increasing pressure
from both sides. [23] Moreover, the dynamic of the
past months showed that even secular Kazakhstan
can become a target for Islamists' attacks. [24]
The Russian position After
having supported the US intervention in
Afghanistan in 2001, Russia has become
increasingly adverse to the Western military
presence in the region, [25] considered as pretext
to implement a far-reaching geopolitical agenda in
opposition to its regional strategy. This aim at
establishing supremacy in the security realm
through a multilateral frameworks with the CARs:
the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). The bloc is in the process of revising its
capacities further to tackle the potential threats
from Afghanistan. It has established an
effectively multilateral Collective Rapid Reaction
Force, which is active in training exercises aimed
at the prevention of possible incursions from
Afghanistan as well as possible internal popular
uprisings.
The CSTO foresees assisting
Afghan security forces with training and equipment
maintenance, but it excludes any direct deployment
on the Afghan territory. [26] The CSTO faces the
risk of not being at the height of Moscow
ambitions. Indeed, when in 2010 the government of
Kyrgyzstan called on Russia to intervene in
stopping the inter-ethnic unrest in its southern
regions, the CSTO failed to be effective. [27]
Accordingly, Russia cannot wish for an
overwhelming US defeat and precipitous exit. As a
matter of fact, Russian territory is invested by
the spillover of the Afghan threats, as is
happening in Central Asia. [28]
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