India's Eurasia strategy leverages
Iranian ports By Roman
Muzalevsky
In March, Indian ships unloaded
thousands of tonnes of humanitarian aid bound for
Afghanistan at the Iranian port at Chabahar. This
seemingly inconspicuous event may have long been
forgotten, but its geopolitical undercurrents are
far-reaching as the recent talks on the
development of the port among Iran, India, and
Afghanistan demonstrate.
On August 26, the
parties agreed to establish a working group to
explore the trade and transit potential of the
port in the effort to boost economic development
and interregional connections.
As an
active actor in the process, New Delhi is unlikely
to pass
an opportunity to expand
ties with Kabul and Tehran to complement its
strategy for the broader Eurasia. This is despite
the strong calls by the world's mightiest military
power, the United States, on allies and partners
to pursue stronger sanctions against the regime in
Iran, which is suspected of pursuing a nuclear
weapons program.
It is therefore hardly
surprising that, in the multi-centric world
characterized by dispersion of power and the
arguable need for flexible foreign-policy
approaches, India views Iran as an opportunity
while other actors consider it solely as a threat.
India's planned investment in the Chabahar
port, whose translated name "four seasons"
suggests a possible use of the port throughout the
year, will help Delhi solidify ties with the
energy-rich Iran, which already serves as a strong
commercial partner and a bridge for India's trade
with the Middle East.
It will also allow
India to gain access to Central Asian markets,
including in Afghanistan, as India "battles" rival
Pakistan over influence in the broader region
ahead of the withdrawal of coalition forces from
Afghanistan by 2014. Finally, it would give Delhi
a stronger position vis-a-vis China - its
geo-economic contender and Islamabad's patron that
already has helped Pakistan build a functioning
port at Gwadar amid the lingering plans to develop
the port at Chabahar. In its dealings with Iran, a
rising Delhi has no desire to offend Washington.
But nor does it wish to see the interests of other
powers dictate those of its own.
India
views it a success to have moved so close to
finalizing the decade-long project. Iran has
already invested approximately US$340 million in
the port, while India is expected to invest $100
million. India reportedly spent $136 million to
connect Chabahar to Afghanistan's ring-road
highway, a logical extension of the deal concluded
by Iran, India, and Russia in 2000 to develop
North-South transport corridors linking the Indian
sub-continent and the landlocked Central Asia.
Over the past 10 years, Delhi has invested
more than $2 billion in infrastructure in the
war-torn Afghanistan. It now considers linking
Chabahar to Hajigak by rail to exploit iron ore
deposits; the Hajigak area in Afghanistan could
contain mineral deposits worth $1-$3 trillion.
Iran, in turn seeks to build a railway line to
link its city of Mashhad with Heart in
Afghanistan.
The development of the
Chabahar port would enable Delhi to trade with
Afghanistan without having to rely on Pakistan,
which does not allow trade from India to
Afghanistan and on to Central Asia. Iran would be
able to develop its eastern regions and diversify
its ties with other countries amid sanctions and
strained relationship with the Arab states in the
neighborhood.
Perhaps more importantly,
the project would be crucial for development of
Afghanistan, which, besides posing plenty security
risks, also offers numerous development
opportunities whose impact can extend as far as
the energy-rich yet potentially explosive region
of Central Asia.
Landlocked Afghanistan,
which imports half of its oil from Iran, would be
able to enjoy access to the Arabian Sea not only
though Pakistan but also via Iran, thereby
reducing its dependence on Pakistan. It would also
raise its potential to stimulate more investment
from and trade with outside powers like India.
This is especially important given the planned
drawdown of coalition forces and the distrust that
is still plaguing the relationship between
Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The development
of Afghanistan according to India's vision would
in turn enable Delhi to pursue its recently
launched "Connect Central Asia" policy toward the
energy-rich Central Asian region more effectively.
India needs this policy to work fast. Otherwise,
it risks remaining a permanent shadow of China,
whose rapidly spreading regional economic and
political influence may soon not only dwarf that
of Russia and the US but also translate into its
military presence.
India's trade with
Central Asia amounts to $500 million, while
China's is $29 billion. Delhi now plans to
establish 14 flight connections with the five
countries to promote regional development, hoping
that its "Connect" policy will boost trade with
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan. This policy adds structure to
Delhi's overall strategy for the region, focusing
on development of information technology, energy,
banking, and pharmaceutical industries and
security cooperation to address the issues of
terrorism and extremism. Afghanistan, connecting
Central and South Asia, is an inescapable part of
India's new policy.
The development of
Afghanistan is closely linked to the use of the
Chabahar port and the US-launched New Silk Road
initiative designed to promote trade and transit
in and between Central and South Asia. But
promoting regional trade and prosperity is harder
without having Iran, a perceived hostile enemy,
and Pakistan, an alleged distrusted partner,
partake in cross-regional trade and transit
development projects.
Considering the need
to ensure a responsible transition in Afghanistan
ahead of the pull-out of coalition forces, the US
seems to acknowledge this line of thinking, at
least in public statements.
"These three
countries are neighbors. They have to get along,"
State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said
on September 27 when responding to questions on
the agreements involving India, Iran, and
Afghanistan to develop the Chabahah port. "We are
obviously interested in increased trade and
commerce back and forth there. So anything that
ameliorates that situation is something that we
would support."
Washington has seemingly
agreed to overlook India's growing ties with
Tehran in exchange for Delhi's decision to reduce
oil imports from Iran, but India is expected to
cooperate more, rather than less, with Iran now
that the development of the port is close to
reality.
India already depends on Iran for
approximately 12% of its oil needs. The trade
between the two countries stands at $16 billion
and is expected to increase further as Iran and
India expands their search for trade partners. In
March, India and Iran agreed that India would pay
for some Iranian oil in Indian rupees,
facilitating bilateral trade in general and the
Indian exports to Iran in particular.
This
is not to say that India has ignored Washington.
It has cooperated with the US on civil nuclear
cooperation, having signed the US-India Civil
Nuclear Agreement in 2008. It has voted against
Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency
several times. And it has started to reduce oil
imports from Iran amid oil sanctions by purchasing
crude from other countries (albeit more slowly
than expected given its still high dependence on
oil imports). This later move can also be
interpreted as India's genuine desire to diversify
its energy imports.
As it seeks to ensure
access to resources in the tough neighborhood to
feed its booming economy and buttress its power,
India is more than willing to pursue cooperation
with Iran and Afghanistan. As it does so, it is
cautious not to challenge the US in fundamental
ways.
But nor is it hesitant to promote
its own vision of cross-regional development
involving broader Eurasia, seen as also sharing
and reinforcing the New Silk Road concept promoted
by Washington. The development of the Iranian
Chabahar port is the cog allowing Delhi to do just
that, especially given India's vivid need to stay
ahead of its perceived rivals like China and
Pakistan.
Roman Muzalevsky works
for iJet Intelligent Risk Systems Inc, focusing on
global and regional security analysis. He is also
a contributing analyst on Eurasian affairs and
security at Jamestown Foundation and a
contributing an alyst on the North America, Russia
and Central Asia, and Globalization desks at the
geopolitical and security consultancy
Wikistrat.
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