General ducks Afghan scandal
evidence By Gareth Porter
WASHINGTON - Lieutenant General William B
Caldwell, the former commander of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's training mission in
Afghanistan, denied to a US Congressional panel
that he had cited the impact on congressional
elections in opposing the timing of a request for
an investigation of high-level Afghan military
corruption and its impact on neglect of patients
at the Afghan National Military Hospital (NMH) two
years ago.
But Caldwell and his former
deputy, Brigadier General Gary Patton, both made
statements suggesting that Caldwell had indeed
wanted to stop the investigation by the Department
of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) because it
might give ammunition to opponents of the US
mission in Afghanistan.
The hearing on
Wednesday, attended by only five members of the
House Government Oversight Committee's
Subcommittee on
National Security,
reflected the lack of political interest in
Washington in a scandal that might have been
expected to generate a major national debate.
Although both Caldwell and Patton were
questioned on the allegations that Caldwell had
cited US elections in opposing the proposed
investigation, there was no effort by committee
members to determine what actually happened. Nor
did they show any interest in the larger issues
posed by the episode.
The scandal involves
"Criminal Patronage Networks" - the term used by
the US military in Afghanistan itself - extending
all the way to Mohammed Qasim Fahim, the former
commander of the Northern Alliance, who is the
country's vice-president but more importantly
leads the tight-knit group of Tajik generals who
control the Afghan National Army (ANA).
In
the late summer and autumn of 2010, Caldwell's
aides gathered evidence that the criminal military
network had systematically looted tens of millions
of dollars of US medical supplies and other
assistance, leaving virtually nothing for patient
care at the NMH.
The patients were left to
lie in filth and die of untreated wounds and
malnutrition, as US military personnel assigned as
mentors at the hospital documented during that
period.
It was in that context that the
inspector-general for Caldwell's command, Colonel
Mark Fassl, initiated the request for a DOD IG
investigation. In testimony before the
subcommittee on July 24, Fassl recalled that
Caldwell had been angry about a request for a DOD
IG investigation of the national military hospital
so close to US Congressional elections.
Fassl testified that he had been
reprimanded by Caldwell in two separate meetings
on October 29, 2010, for having made the IG
request. Fassl recalled that, in the smaller staff
meeting, Caldwell had said, "How could we do this
or make this request with an election coming?"
Caldwell went on to remark that President
Barack Obama "calls me Bill", according to Fassl's
testimony, which was supported by Caldwell's judge
advocate, Colonel Gerald Carozza.
Caldwell
denied in his testimony that he had invoked the
election as a reason for delaying an
investigation. He admitted that he was very upset,
but said it was only because he felt it would harm
his strategy for the removal of the corrupt Afghan
surgeon general in charge of the hospital, General
Ahmad Zia Yaftali.
"We had not yet set
conditions with our partners," said Caldwell. "The
only reason we were bringing this outside team in
was to remove Yaftali. I would need the president
[Hamid Karzai] to do it."
Caldwell did
acknowledge, however, that he had told his staff
on another occasion that, after he had briefed
President Obama on the Afghan National Army, the
president had "referred to me by my nickname".
Patton's testimony appeared to confirm
Fassl's claim that the 2010 congressional
elections had been mentioned by both generals in
discussing the request for the investigation.
Describing an October 29 staff meeting at which
Caldwell was not present, "My recollection was
that the subject of elections was discussed very
briefly and dismissed and had nothing to do with
my request."
Patton did not say who
brought up the subject of elections at the meeting
or why, suggesting that it was Patton himself who
had done so. No subcommittee member questioned
Patton on the point.
Caldwell also
strongly implied that he had indeed been concerned
about potential domestic political fallout from
such an investigation.
"When you don't do
the necessary coordination," he told the panel,
"you have second and third order effects. You
could have those in the United States who would
use it in the wrong way."
Caldwell did not
elaborate, and was not asked to clarify the
statement.
The committee also failed to
question Caldwell and Patton about Fassl's
testimony clearly contradicted Caldwell's claim
that he had only been concerned with getting
buy-in from Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak
and President Karzai.
Fassl testified said
that Patton had insisted at the same October 29,
2010, meeting on changing the proposed
investigation into an assistance visit, which he
suggested would be perceived by the Afghan
authorities as less intrusive.
On November
2, 2010, Fassl testified, Caldwell again
"screamed" at Fassl and two other officers about
their introducing the idea of an IG investigation
of US assistance to the medical program. "There is
nothing wrong with this command that we can't fix
ourselves," Caldwell said, according to Fassl.
Then, after another deputy commander,
Canadian Brigadier General David Neasmith, urged
Caldwell to allow the DOD IG investigation to
proceed, Caldwell approved it, but "strictly as
assistance to improve logistics channels for ANA's
medical supplies", according to Fassl. It was not
to mention "Auschwitz-like conditions at NHM".
The subcommittee did not ask Caldwell and
Patton about that testimony.
When IPS
asked Patton directly following the hearing if
Caldwell had insisted on limiting the IG mission
to "logistics issues" and excluding conditions at
the hospital, Patton responded, "The IG mission
did what it was directed to do."
When the
question was repeated, Patton turned and walked
away.
Caldwell also sought to claim that
he was unaware of the shocking conditions at the
NMH when the IG investigation came up. "The first
time patient neglect [at NHM] was brought to my
attention was November 10, 2010," he declared to
the panel.
That claim was questioned,
however, by committee members as straining
credibility.
Committee Chair Jason
Chaffetz pointed out that Caldwell had sent an
e-mail to then commander of US forces in
Afghanistan David Petraeus on September 25, 2010,
saying that military corruption was resulting in
"hundreds of ANA [patients] being denied care".
Colonel Schuyler K Geller, then the
command surgeon for the training mission and now
retired from Army, was one of those gathering the
information on the impact of corruption on patient
care at NMH. Geller told IPS in an interview that
the horrific "Auschwitz-like" conditions were
being documented in reports filed almost every day
by US military mentors stationed at the hospital
beginning in August.
Geller sent those
reports through General Neasmith to General
Patton, so Caldwell would have been informed of
the actual conditions in the hospital, according
to Geller.
"But he can say Patton didn't
tell me," Geller told IPS.
Caldwell
continued to try to keep the conditions at the
hospital secret in 2011. A memo dated September
12, 2011, signed by Geller's replacement as
command surgeon, prohibited any pictures, videos
or audio recordings of conditions in the hospital
from being "shared outside this command,
transmitted by e-mail, or duplicated in any way
without prior approval of the Command Surgeon".
Gareth Porter, an investigative
historian and journalist specializing in US
national security policy, received the UK-based
Gellhorn Prize for journalism for 2011 for
articles on the US war in Afghanistan.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
