India risks unity with Naga
deal By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - A political solution to the
protracted Naga conflict seems to be within reach
with the most powerful Naga insurgent group, the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah
(NSCN-IM), reportedly agreeing to a solution, at
least for the "interim," within the Indian
constitution.
This is a major
breakthrough. If the Indian government takes the
opportunity that has opened up to its logical
conclusion, it could end one of India's longest
running conflicts. It has the potential to set in
motion a process that could transform the
insurgency-wracked northeast.
The Naga
conflict predates Indian independence. Naga
leaders raised the banner of revolt on the eve of
Indian independence, demanding a sovereign Naga
state. Mahatma Gandhi is reported
to have assured them
that they would not be forced into a union with
India.
But that was not to be. The land of
the Nagas became a part of India.
In the
1950s, a powerful armed insurgency against the
Indian state erupted under the leadership of the
Naga Nationalist Council (NNC). The Indian
government responded by deploying its armed forces
in the region. The spiraling violence in the Naga
hill districts soon spread to other parts of the
northeast, when other tribal and non-tribal groups
raised an array of demands against the Indian
state. Many of these were violent uprisings
pushing for secession from India.
The
northeast has always felt distant geographically,
culturally and psychologically from the rest of
India. The use of extreme force by the Indian
government to quell the protracted insurgencies
there has added to this alienation.
However, violence was not the only means
the Indian state used to deal with these
conflicts. It did extend major concessions that
provided for self-governance. With regard to the
Nagas, for instance, a separate state ie Nagaland
was created in 1963. Subsequent talks resulted in
the Shillong Accord of 1975 that sought to draw in
sections that remained underground into the
democratic mainstream. However, these measures
failed to address the underlying grievances and a
major section of the insurgents remained committed
to armed struggle and independence.
It was
after a ceasefire came into place in 1997 that
talks began between representatives of the Indian
government and the NSCN-IM's founder-leaders, Isak
Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah. These have
dragged on with the NSCN-IM putting forward two
demands that were impossible for the government to
concede. One was conceding sovereignty to the
Nagas and the other, the integration of all
contiguous Naga-inhabited areas including those in
Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, even Myanmar,
into a single administrative unit.
The
latter demand if conceded would have required a
major redrawing of boundaries in the northeast
that had the potential to reignite insurgencies
across this already restive region.
The
NSCN-IM is said to have conceded significant
ground on both these demands now. It has
reportedly committed itself in writing to the
Indian constitution and to Nagaland's present
territorial boundaries. But this comes with a
condition. It wants the Naga population living in
Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh to enjoy the
same rights as those in Nagaland, ie in harmony
with Naga customary laws and cultural and
educational aspirations.
While ruling out
independence or redrawing of boundaries in the
northeast, the government has now promised the
Naga government considerable autonomy and a
pan-Naga social body. Indian passports held by
Nagas will indicate their residency in Nagaland.
Nagaland will get a separate "state flag" and its
Assembly will be renamed "Tatar Hoho." These
require an amendment to the Constitution. On the
issue of "decommissioning of weapons," the
government has agreed to absorb several thousand
NSCN-IM cadres into the Indian Army's Naga
Regiment and the paramilitary forces.
The
Indian government is expected to make additions to
the constitution's Article 371A that grants
special status to Nagaland, with some elements
borrowed from Article 370 that provides Jammu and
Kashmir with a special status. Former interlocutor
K. Padmanabhaiah was quoted in the Kolkata daily
The Telegraph as saying that either the government
could expand Article 371A or add another part
specifically on the Nagas to the Constitution.
Amendment of Article 371-A will have to be
passed by both houses of India's parliament. While
some experts are skeptical over the United
Progressive Alliance government's ability to forge
the necessary consensus, one of the most
remarkable features of the roughly 15-year long
talks is that it was initiated by the United Front
government in 1997, given momentum under the
Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic
Alliance government (1999-2004) and pursued by the
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance
government. Thus it has enjoyed the support of
most of the country's major parties so far.
Will the sheer stubbornness of various
political parties defeat the determined effort to
end the conflict? Will the opposition strike to
deny the UPA a 'victory' on the Naga conflict? If
the UPA could summon the generosity to share the
'victory' with the opposition this obstacle could
be overcome. After all it was a prime minister of
a BJP-led government, Atal Behari Vajpayee that
took the bold step of agreeing to a solution that
would "reflect the uniqueness of the Nagas".
The question is whether India's
much-weakened ruling coalition has the energy or
the imagination to grab the immense opportunity
that has opened up.
There are several
landmines on the road to peace. The NSCN-IM's
bitter rival, the NSCN-Khaplang could emerge a
spoiler.
In 1980, a large number of
insurgents left the NNC to form the NSCN. The NSCN
then split in 1988 into two factions, NSCN-IM and
NSCN-Khaplang. That division was along tribal
lines with the Tangkhuls forming the NSCN-IM and
the Konyaks setting up the Khaplang faction. The
two have engaged in much bloodletting since.
The Indian government will have to
redouble its efforts to draw the Khaplang group
into the peace process. An agreement without their
consent is unlikely to survive.
Past
experience with peace accords in the northeast do
not bode well. Every accord has been followed by a
surge in fighting and an eruption of new
insurgencies.
In the past Delhi has
entered into agreements with the main insurgent
group. This led to 'smaller' ethnic groups whose
grievances were left out in the agreement to pick
up arms or intensify their armed struggle against
the state.
It will need to avoid such
mistakes of the past if it wants the agreement
with the Nagas to initiate a process that would
result in lasting peace.
If it is able to
stitch up an accord with the NSCN-IM and other
groups it could pave the way for their
transformation into political parties that could
then contest elections to Nagaland state assembly
that are due in March 2013.
While much
praise is being heaped in the Indian media on the
NSCN-IM for making the bold compromises and the
government for the immense flexibility it has
shown, one of the main actors that has patiently
facilitated the peace process has gone unsung.
The role of Naga civil society, the Church
and women's organizations have gone by unnoticed
and unrecognized. It was organizations like the
Naga Mothers Association, which kept the ceasefire
alive for 15 years. Others too have worked
relentlessly to achieve reconciliation between
rival Naga groups.
As India and the
NSCN-IM enter the critical home stretch on the
road to a peace agreement, Naga civil society will
have to redouble its energies to push the various
Naga groups and parties to work together.
Importantly, a peace agreement with the
Nagas has promising implications for other
conflicts in the northeast and beyond.
As
an editorial in a recent issue of Economic and
Political Weekly observes,
"It will, firstly, lead to a
democratization of the federal structure of the
Indian Union. Those who claim that the Naga
leadership has accepted the Constitution through
such a solution, should realize that such
"acceptance" may alter the very nature of the
federalism inscribed in it and open up another
layer of sovereignty.
It also indicates,
for all the criticisms of the many acts of
omission and commission of the Indian state,
that there remains space for solutions to vexed
conflicts. In the present context this holds
hope for a similar flexibility on Kashmir. ...
Apart from Kashmir, such a reworking of the
Constitution, by signaling the flexibility of
its very structure, will open up many
possibilities for democratic solutions to many
other seemingly difficult demands, like in other
parts of the northeast region, Gorkhaland,
Telangana and others."
The
ball is now in Delhi's court.
Sudha
Ramachandran is an independent
journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.
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