Baloch militancy resurfaces in
Iran By Chris Zambelis
The Islamic Republic of Iran sits in the
crosshairs of the United States, Israel, and the
Gulf Arab monarchies led by Saudi Arabia. The
array of geopolitical threats that face Iran is
daunting; Iran is surrounded by states that are
threatened by the revolutionary Islamist
principles that define its domestic affairs and
foreign policy orientation. Many of Iran's
regional rivals also host US military
installations.
The effectively permanent
presence of US military forces in the
international waters surrounding its territory,
the increasingly rigid economic sanctions regime
and the steady stream of covert operations
launched by its enemies on its soil to undermine
its nuclear program, pose another set of dilemmas
for Iran. The aggregate impact of these factors is
intensified when considered
in the context of the
shifting regional landscape brought on by the wave
of revolts in the Arab world.
With the
Iranian economy buckling under the pressure of
economic sanctions, its leadership is now facing
the return of a challenge once thought to be
extinguished - a nationalist insurgency in Iran's
ethnic-Baloch community.
Iran
is also contending with internal challenges
stemming from disaffected members of a number of
ethnic and sectarian minority communities and
questions surrounding the character of its
national identify.
A period of heightened
unrest led by ethnic Baloch nationalist insurgents
in recent years, particularly an obscure militant
group known as Jundallah (Soldiers of God) based
in Iran's southeastern province of
Sistan-Balochistan (also known as Iranian
Balochistan), was a testament to the extent that
these issues permeate Iranian society.
Jundallah's campaign of violence
and terrorism was ostensibly motivated by its
desire to defend the rights of the Baloch, a
mostly Sunni ethnic minority that sees itself as
the victims of a state-sponsored campaign of
cultural and religious subjugation.
The
capture or death of most of Jundallah's leaders by
2010, however, was supposed to have neutralized
the threat of Baloch militancy. An October suicide
bombing executed by Baloch radicals claiming to
belong to a previously unknown group that calls
itself Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI - Movement of the
Partisans of Iran) in Sistan-Balochistan,
suggests, however, that a resurgence of Baloch
nationalist militancy in Iran may be on the
horizon.
Conflicting accounts
On October 19, a suicide
bomber detonated an explosives-laden vest in the
port city of Chabahar, in Sistan-Balochistan
province. Two members of Iran's Basij
(Mobilization) paramilitary force were reported to
have been killed and scores of mostly civilian
bystanders were wounded in the ensuing blast.
Several reports issued immediately
following the attack claimed that the perpetrator
detonated his explosives outside of the Imam
Hussein mosque in Chabahar. Subsequent reports
containing further details suggested that the
alleged attacker, dressed as a police officer,
attempted to gain entry into the mosque to
detonate his explosives among worshippers, only to
be chased away by Iranian security officials on
the scene.
Having failed to
gain access to the mosque, the attacker was then
said to have detonated his explosives
approximately 400 meters from his intended target.
HAI
issued a claim of responsibility for the attack on
its network of official English, Persian and
Arabic language websites and social media outlets
a few hours after the operation. HAI's account of
the attack, however, differed markedly from that
released by Iran.
In addition to the
suicide bombing acknowledged by Iranian
authorities, which represented the first in what
the HAI called its "Operation Ra'ad [Thunder] 1"
series of operations, the movement also claimed to
have successfully targeted a detachment of ranking
members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC), including members of its elite Quds
Force, during a secret meeting held at a Basij
base in Chabahar.
According to its
statement, HAI operatives remotely detonated an
explosives-laden van parked near the base just as
attendees of the meeting were leaving the
facility. HAI claims that approximately 20 IRGC
members and other security officials were killed
in the attack. In contrast to the suicide bombing,
Iran has not acknowledged the reported car
bombing.
HAI's version of the
October 19 events has been circulated on media
sources known to be antagonistic toward Iran or
sympathetic toward the Baloch nationalist cause in
Iran.
The confirmed attack in Chabahar
represents the first suicide bombing by Baloch
militants since December 2010, when Jundallah
executed a suicide bombing at the same Imam
Hussein mosque, killing 38 and wounding hundreds
during a mourning ceremony commemorating the death
of Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad's grandson and a
revered figure among the Shi'a.
Jundallah reborn? There is no
conclusive evidence to discern whether HAI is
formally linked to Jundallah in operational and
personnel matters. The capture or deaths of most
of its known leadership and other key operatives,
including the arrest and subsequent execution of
its founder and leader Abdelmalik Rigi, were
widely believed to have devastated Jundallah's
ability to reconstitute its campaign of violence
and terrorism. Jundallah did manage to execute a
series of major attacks in Iranian Balochistan
following Rigi's arrest and eventual execution.
A
perusal of its political and ideological discourse
available online reveals that, at the very least,
HAI draws its inspiration from Jundallah. [1]
HAI's website is adorned, for example, with
pictures of the late Rigi, who is eulogized as the
symbolic "Amir [commander] of the Iranian
Baloch".
In its "Statement of Purpose,"
HAI once again references Rigi as its commander
and outlines an agenda that coincides closely with
the one propagated by Jundallah, including its
commitment to defend what it refers to as the
"oppressed Sunni minorities of Iran". There are
indications, however, that HAI's interpretation of
advocacy on behalf of the Baloch community departs
drastically from the agenda promoted by Jundallah.
Under the late Abdelmalik Rigi, Jundallah
appeared to go to great lengths to rebut
allegations leveled against it by Iran and others
that it harbored an explicitly sectarian or
separatist agenda or any affinities with radical
Islamist ideologies. This point is best
demonstrated by Jundallah's attempt to reinvent
its image by adopting the name People's Resistance
Movement of Iran (PRMI). The obvious religious
undertones apparent in the name Jundallah, left
the group vulnerable to accusations that it was
affiliated with transnational radical Islamist
organizations, including al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Rigi was always adamant that Jundallah never
harbored radical Islamist or separatist leanings.
The language that appears on HAI's website,
however, is imbued with an anti-Shi'a sectarian
vitriol reminiscent of the ultraconservative
Salafist militancy that is spreading in the Middle
East. Salafist militants tend to view Shi'a
Muslims as heretics and apostates.
Just as
important, HAI's discourse also touches on foreign
affairs. While HAI portrays itself as the vanguard
of Baloch rights in Iran, it is also concerned
with events in Syria. In its own words, HAI seeks
to "strike a blow against the Shi'a government in
their own lands, thus damaging their economic,
financial and military capabilities (especially
their ability to contribute to the Syrian
genocide)".
In terms of its tactics, HAI's
resort to a suicide bombing is very much
reflective of Jundallah's operational evolution.
Originally concerned with striking military and
security targets and other symbols of the Islamic
Republic through ambushes, abductions, and other
traditional guerrilla tactics, Jundallah
eventually added suicide bombings to its
repertoire in late 2008.
Jundallah also
began to strike civilian targets such as mosques
with increasing regularity. Its steady resort to
suicide bombings, targeting Shi'a houses of
worship and other locations imbued with religious
symbolism, were reminiscent of the al-Qaeda-style
attacks that have become all too frequent in the
Middle East after the US invasion of Iraq. [2] In
this context, HAI appears to be following closely
in Jundallah's footsteps.
Identified by
the HAI website as the movement's Amir, Abu Yasir
Muskootani, provided further insight into the
group's ideology and the identity of the bomber.
Muskootani declared that the attacker "showed the
enemies of the Ahlus Sunnah [ie Sunni Muslims] of
Iran that the students of our amir Abdul Malik
Baloch are still alive. They showed them that,
till now, the people of Balochistan heed to the
call for Jihad…" Muskootani extolled the actions
of the attacker, a 19-year-old man named Hamzah
Saravani, as those of a hero and martyr.
A
video produced by HAI eulogizing Saravani's feat
described him as a man who toiled his entire life
under the "oppression" of the "Shi'a government of
Iran". This experience prompted him to "join the
Mujahideen to wage Jihad against the Shi'a kuffar
[unbelievers]". The style and presentation of the
video montage, as well as the accompanying
narrative, evoke similar productions released by
radical Salafist and al-Qaeda-style militants.
Internal dynamics Estimated to
number around 4 million, the Baloch of Iran
inhabit one of the poorest and most inhospitable
parts of the country. Critical socioeconomic
indicators in Sistan-Balochistan lag consistently
behind other regions of Iran. As a predominantly
Sunni community, the Baloch religious identity has
often clashed with the Shi'a Islamist character of
the Islamic Republic. The Baloch have preserved a
sense of ethnic and national consciousness
separate from what tends to be viewed as an ethnic
Persian-centric cultural and bureaucratic edifice
that is embodied by the Islamic Republic.
As has
often been expressed in their nationalist
discourse, Iranian Baloch attribute their
difficult predicament to a deliberate policy
directed by Tehran that aims to eradicate their
religious and ethnic identity and undermine their
ability to improve their standing in Iranian
society.
Iran's harsh approach to governance and
security in Sistan-Balochistan has also aggravated
matters. Sistan-Balochistan's proximity to Iran's
eastern borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan
place it along some of the world's most dangerous
narcotics, arms, and human trafficking arteries.
The prominent role of the Baloch-led smuggling
networks in regional trafficking operations that
extend into Pakistan and Afghanistan has also
influenced Iran's treatment of the region.
The specter of Baloch nationalism and the
idea of "Greater Balochistan" remain alive as
well. Most of the region's Baloch inhabit the
Balochistan province of neighboring Pakistan, a
region that is embroiled in its own violent
insurgency. As a result, Iran is worried about the
threat Baloch nationalism poses to its territorial
integrity and regional stability. Consequently,
Iran tends to view the region through a security
prism and its Baloch minority as a national
security threat.
Conclusion For
Iran, the return of emboldened Baloch resistance
in the form of the HAI comes during a heightened
period of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East
revolving around the crisis in Syria, Iran's
closest ally in the region. Iran continues to
blame foreign forces, including the United States,
Israel, and Saudi Arabia, for fomenting
instability within its borders. The attack in
Chabahar occurred shortly after the United States
removed the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK - People's
Mujahideen), an Iranian opposition movement with a
history of violence and terrorism against Iran,
from its list of designated terrorist
organizations in a decision that infuriated Iran.
Reports that Israel may have been behind
an attack against an arms factory in Sudan that
was said to have been linked to Iran, an act some
have interpreted as a possible demonstration of
Israel's potential to launch air strikes against
Iran's nuclear facilities, adds another layer of
concern to Iran's strategic calculus.
When
considered against the larger context of these
threatening developments and the activities of
foreign intelligence services hostile to Iran over
the years, the timing of the Chabahar attack
raises valid questions about HAI's possible links
to Iran's rivals. In this regard, the appearance
of HAI may signal the beginning of a renewed
campaign to destabilize Iran from within by
provoking a new round of ethnic and sectarian
militancy.
The
seeming influence of radical Salafist ideology
among Baloch militants also raises questions about
its potential to gain adherents within the wider
Baloch nationalist movement in Iran, as well as
Pakistan and Afghanistan. In a telling insight
into HAI's philosophy, a Pakistani Baloch
insurgent asked about his movement's connection to
the Baloch cause in Iran replied: "We know the
people fighting in Jundallah [ie HAI] are also
Baloch but we have no relation with them. Ours is
a pure nationalist war, miles away from
Jundallahดs religious
extremism."
At this stage, HAI's
Salafist-influenced ideology does not seem to
resonate within the broader Baloch nationalist
current, even as it is making inroads into Iranian
Balochistan.
Chris Zambelis is
an analyst and researcher specializing in Middle
East affairs with Helios Global Inc.
Notes: 1. The
official website and Facebook page of Harakat
Ansar Iran (HAI) are available at:
http://www.ansariran.blog.com/ and
https://www.facebook.com/ansariranen,
respectively. 2. For more background into
Jundallah's operational evolution, see Chris
Zambelis, "A New Phase of Resistance and
Insurgency in Iranian Balochistan," CTC Sentinel
2(7), 2009, pp. 15-18.
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