SPEAKING
FREELY Afghanistan takes stock of
rebuilding By Ajmal Shams
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In 2002, when the
interim government of President Hamid Karzai came
to power in Afghanistan, it virtually started from
a scratch. The state machinery, for all practical
purposes, did not exist. This degeneration of the
state had already started during the post-Najib
Mujahideen’s anarchic rule, civil war and
continued fighting among warlords for power and
political influence and non-stop interference by
neighboring countries.
The Taliban's rule
had further exacerbated the nature and quality of
the state institutions. Such were the
circumstances when
Karzai came to power.
Expectations were high and government had limited
or no capacity to deliver services. The
international community came up with a system of
forming Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) for
delivering their development projects in
provinces.
Therefore, it was quite natural
for the PRTs' mechanism for delivery of
infrastructure services to have people and the
fledgling Afghan government's support. The PRTs
were more active in border areas than other parts
of the country because of the former's higher
political significance and vulnerability to
potential insurgency. Also, these were the trouble
spots where the new government needed critical
linkages with local population for extending and
legitimizing its rule.
After more than a
decade of the PRTs engagement, they are gradually
being phased out as a consequence of the
transition [to full Afghan control of the
country]. It is important at this stage to revisit
the accomplishments and shortcomings of PRTs, the
impact they have had on the lives of Afghans and
what did not go right during various phases of
PRT-sponsored projects.
The main focus of
PRTs development efforts was obviously the
infrastructure where transportation topped the
list of priorities followed by administrative
buildings, clinics and schools. Roads and bridges
were important not only for the rapid movement of
people and goods but also for providing quick
supply routes for security forces stationed at
various geographical points across the country.
PRTs built thousands of kilometers of roads
particularly in remote provinces whose
accessibility to Kabul was one of the main
challenges both for the security operations and
reconstruction activities.
In the
beginning of the Karzai administration, provinces
had few administrative buildings in dilapidated
conditions. In order for the state to exhibit its
credibility, it was vital to establish functional
building facilities for the government operations
both in provincial capitals and districts. A
remarkable job was done by PRTs in this regard
despite shortcomings. Of all the nations that had
military presence in the country, US PRTs were
predominant both in terms of available funding and
capacity to provide development and humanitarian
projects.
PRTs mainly worked with
provincial administrations that identified
priority and most-needed projects. Although
provincial authorities provided essential
institutional support, they had limited role when
it came to the planning, design and implementation
of the projects. This was partially because
provincial governments had low technical capacity
and little connectivity with the center, which is
the legitimate source of official planning for
each individual province. That situation, however,
varied from province to province
The
ability of the provincial governor to effectively
communicate with PRTs also played an important
role in how the PRTs shaped the development
trajectory in a certain province. There are
instances where the capability of the governor and
good working relationship resulted in attracting
adequate funding and good coordination. Jalalabad
and Kunar are good examples, where a proactive
role by the provincial governors Gul Agha Shirzai
and Fazlullah Wahidi respectively has resulted
into effective and efficient utilization of
provincial funds by PRTs. Other provinces might
have their own success stories or less effective
PRT engagement.
Although a timely response
to urgently needed infrastructure services, the
PRT mechanism was not without faults. PRTs
contracted a large number of projects to Afghan
contractors who had little or no capacity and/or
previous experience. Most of these contractors
would claim financial and technical resources,
which they did not possess. PRTs, however, had
limited technical and monitoring resources for
oversight. There was hardly a system of check and
balance and most of these projects went to the
lowest bidders. It was here that the quality was
compromised for lower cost, which was the only
criterion for awarding projects.
That
situation, however, did not persist for long. PRTs
continued to evolve by increasing their technical
capacity and adopting measures that required
contractors to comply with technical standards.
Supervision and monitoring by engineering teams of
PRTs increased. The appearance of the Army Corps
of Engineers added value and technical quality to
PRTs financed projects.
In spite of all
the measures, PRT projects remained least
cost-effective. While the lack and/or compliance
with institutional, legal and regulatory
frameworks are the main reasons for the generally
higher cost and lower quality of infrastructure,
the excessive greed of the Afghan construction
industry is also to be blamed.
Regardless
of the technicality and engineering quality of
PRT-financed projects, the economic value of this
huge development intervention has been remarkable.
Thousands of unskilled laborers, technicians and
engineers were recruited. This has had an
important impact on the lives of people in
provinces. This has also given rise to a new class
of the rich, who proverbially became rich
overnight by winning projects due to being the
lowest bidders. Social problems created by
this phenomenon, partially spurred by PRTs speedy
procurement procedures, remain a challenge for
Afghan society. The PRTs mainly followed their own
country-specific regulations with little
consideration of Afghan laws. However, virtually
all PRTs projects had the endorsement of the
provincial governments, implying ownership and
responsibility of operation and maintenance by
directorates in each relevant sector.
One
of the challenges of the infrastructure created by
PRTs is its sustainability due to limited, or no,
institutional operation and maintenance plan in
place as part of the project design. Moving
forward, the Afghan government must obtain a
complete inventory of the assets created by PRTs
and the equipment and resources provided to
provincial and district governments as a first
step to take over the complete ownership.
It is quite noticeable that the PRTs
operational policy was driven mainly by a sense of
urgency to spend the planned annual budget rather
than the long-term national development plan.
However, the question arises as to whether any
such development strategy existed when the PRTs
intervention was launched.
The much
reputed Afghan National Development Strategy
(ANDS) was completed in late 2008. Regardless of
its shortcomings, the document's completion
timeline did not keep pace with the work
undertaken by PRTs, and there was no way this gap
could be bridged. Despite all the inadequacies,
the work done by PRT nations in rebuilding the
war-ravaged Afghanistan is remarkable and has had
a tremendous impact on the lives of ordinary
Afghans. Now that the beginning of the end has
already started, as a grateful nation, Afghans
must appreciate the great job done by PRTs and the
nations they represent.
Ajmal
Shams is based in Kabul and is Policy Advisor
to the Afghanistan Transition Coordination
Commission. He holds a Master Degree in Civil
Engineering from South Dakota School of Mines and
Technology in the United States, is certified
project management professional engineer and
Licensed P Engineer in the state of Kentucky, and
is also President of the Afghanistan Social
Democratic Party. Shams can be reached at
Ajmalkhan7200@yahoo.com)
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows
guest writers to have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
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