Taliban prisoner release high risk,
low-reward By Frud Bezhan
After having little success playing it
safe, the Afghan government is gambling on a risky
new strategy to convince the Taliban that the road
to peace runs through Kabul.
In recent
months, scores of Taliban officials and
rank-and-file have been freed from prisons in
Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. Now,
Afghanistan is upping the ante with the expected
release of thousands more within its borders while
pushing Islamabad to free some of the Islamist
militant group's most dangerous characters.
The prisoner releases are seen as a signal
of good faith from the administration of Afghan
President Hamid Karzai, who is wary of peace
efforts not led by Kabul but whose overtures for
direct talks with the Taliban have been refused.
But there are no assurances that the freed
detainees will, as
Kabul predicts, help bring
the Taliban leadership to the negotiating table or
convince militants to reintegrate into Afghan
society. Analysts say the move is fraught with
risk and has little chance of succeeding.
"The worst-case scenario, which is
actually quite likely, is having these individuals
return to the Taliban, bolster their ranks, and
increase their efficacy on the battlefield," says
Jeffrey Dressler, a senior analyst and team leader
for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the Institute for
the Study of War in Washington. "It would not
surprise me one bit if the majority of these folks
were recaptured or killed on the battlefield six
months to a year from now."
Dressler says
that even those who might be ready to give up the
fight would be highly reluctant to facilitate
reconciliation.
'Doomed from the
start' The Afghan authorities announced on
January 4 that 80 prisoners captured in operations
against the Taliban and other groups had been
released from Bagram military prison, which houses
some 3,000 Taliban fighters and suspected
terrorists. A further 1,200 prisoners, it was
announced, would be freed in the coming weeks.
In neighboring Pakistan, 26 Taliban have been
freed in recent months amid reports that Kabul had
presented a 40-man wish list to Islamabad. The
release of about 100 more prisoners is reportedly
forthcoming.
David Young, a
Washington-based conflict-resolution expert and
adjunct fellow at the American Security Project,
says the Afghan government's latest effort to get
the Taliban leadership to the negotiating table is
"doomed from the start".
Released
Taliban prisoners sit on chairs and pray during a
ceremony in Pul-e Charkhi jail on January 4.
Observers wonder how many of them will simply
rejoin the fight?
He
says that even before the detainees were released,
it was unknown what role the freed militants might
play in bringing Taliban leaders to the
negotiating table, what connections they still
have to the group's leadership, or even their
stance on negotiations.
Under a "safe
passage" agreement between Kabul and Islamabad,
according to Young, prisoners have been released
with no conditions and many have simply
disappeared. A better approach, he suggests, would
have been to home in on key individuals.
"In order to work, a strategy like this
would require the release of officials who still
hold significant weight in the Taliban's political
apparatus, but are reconcilable. Secondly, it
would be far more effective if Afghan officials
had taken the time to build relationships with the
prisoners before they were released," Young says.
"Their sincerity and access to the Taliban
could have been tested while they were still in
prison. And then perhaps arrange their release
once it became clear that they would be more
effective on the outside."
Key
personalities The list of 40 prisoners
Kabul reportedly asked Islamabad to release
appears to contain few who would fit that mold.
The list includes Mullah Noorudin Turabi, a former
Taliban justice minister who oversaw the regime's
infamous public executions.
Then there is
Anwar ul-Haq Mujahid, a military commander who
headed Taliban operations in Tora Bora, the
reputed hiding place of al-Qaeda founder Osama bin
Laden.
Others on the list include top
advisers to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar.
One exception could be the man at the top
of the 40-man list, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.
The former Taliban deputy leader was arrested in
Karachi in February 2010, some believe because he
was facilitating secret talks between Kabul and
the Taliban leadership.
Young says the
fact that Islamabad has not yet released nor
extradited Baradar could be seen as an indication
of Pakistan's reluctance to hand over individuals
truly capable of aiding Kabul's reconciliation
efforts.
"Mullah Baradar would clearly
qualify. But Pakistan is not releasing him, in my
eyes, because he would be more effective than all
the rest combined," Young says. "Baradar is
clearly the golden goose, free of coercion, and he
has already shown the intent and capability to
deliver."
What incentive does Taliban
have? Afghan-led peace efforts have
suffered a string of setbacks over the years. The
Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program, which
offered jobs and security to Taliban foot soldiers
and benefited from some US$140 million from
international donors, has convinced only about
1,000 militants to drop their weapons.
The
assassination in 2011 of Burhanuddin Rabbani, a
former Afghan president who headed of the Afghan
High Peace Council, deprived the body of a
high-profile leader.
And while some
contact between Taliban representatives and Afghan
officials has taken place - including informal
meetings in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, the Maldives and, most recently, in
France in December - progress has been minimal.
Despite its overtures the Taliban has
refused to directly talk to the Afghan government,
labeling it "illegitimate" and a "Western puppet".
Ryan Evans, a research fellow at the
Center for National Policy, an independent think
tank based in Washington, says that Kabul's recent
strategy is intended to show the Taliban
leadership, as well as the Afghan public, that it
can act independently of its Western allies. But
with international forces preparing to withdraw by
the end of the year, the timing couldn't be worse.
"The incentives for the Taliban to
negotiate a deal just aren't there," Evans
explains. "The incentives do exist for them to
talk about talking in a way to get concessions and
cause friction between the Afghan government and
the International Security Assistance Force and
within the Afghan government," Evans adds. "But we
cannot create these incentives for them to make a
deal while we are leaving."
Top Taliban
prisonersMullah Abdul Ghani
Baradar: Mullah Baradar is without
question the top Taliban prisoner on the list.
Kabul sees the high-ranking Taliban official as
key to its negotiation efforts. Baradar, who
formerly headed the Taliban's military and
political wings, has shown both the intent and
capability to facilitate talks between Kabul and
the Taliban leadership.
Baradar was
detained by Pakistani authorities in the southern
city of Karachi in February 2010, reportedly for
facilitating talks between Kabul and the Taliban
command without approval. His arrest is seen as a
main reason why earlier attempts at peace talks
broke down.
Mullah Noorudin
Turabi: Turabi, the Taliban's former
justice minister, was freed by Pakistan in
November 2012. During the Taliban's 1996-2001 rule
in Afghanistan, the one-legged Turabi was
considered a religious hard-liner and had legal
responsibility for the regime's brutal public
executions. Turabi was also reportedly behind the
decision in 2001 to blow up Afghanistan's ancient
Bamiyan Buddha statues, an incident that caused
international outcry.
Turabi was captured
in Afghanistan soon after the US-led invasion but
controversially released by the Afghan government
in 2002. He was arrested in Pakistan in 2005.
Reports suggest the 60-something Turabi is in poor
health.
Anwar ul-Haq
Mujahid: Mujahid is reported to have been
released from a Pakistani prison in November 2012.
He was the Taliban's military commander in eastern
Afghanistan and head of Taliban operations in Tora
Bora, the reputed hiding place of Al-Qaeda founder
Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Mujahid was
appointed as head of his own faction of the Hezb-e
Islami after the demise of his father, Yunis
Khalis. The elder Khalis, who died in 2006, was a
militant commander in Afghanistan's Nangarhar
Province, near the border with Pakistan. Anwar
ul-Haq Mujahid was arrested by Pakistani
authorities in 2009 and was a member of the
Taliban's military council.
Mullah
Abdul Ahad Jahangirwal: Jahangirwal is a
former adviser to Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad
Omar who was never promoted to a senior position.
Jahangirwal, who was also the Taliban's spokesman
in Kandahar, the group's spiritual birthplace, was
arrested by Pakistani authorities around 2009.
Agha Jan Mohtassem:
Mohtassem, a former Taliban finance minister, is
Mullah Omar's son-in-law. He was reportedly
arrested in the Pakistani city of Karachi around
2009.
Sayed Tayeb Agha: Agha
is another close advisor to Mullah Omar. Agha was
arrested as part of a wider crackdown on the
Taliban by Pakistani authorities in 2009. He was
detained in Karachi, like many Taliban members at
the time. Some reports have suggested that he was
arrested because he was seeking negotiations with
Kabul.
Copyright (c) 2013, RFE/RL Inc.
Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW,
Washington DC 20036.
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