SPEAKING
FREELY Time to bridge Sino-Indian
border differences By Namrata Goswami and Jenee
Sharon
The Sino-Indian border dispute
in India’s eastern sector is one of the most
intractable land conflicts. The quarrel has
entangled China and India since 1949, and resulted
in the 1962 border war which saw India defeated at
the hands of China. Both countries have entered
negotiations, but "incompatibilities" are
constantly stalling the process.
There are three major
obstacles. Firstly, India wants to recognize the
McMahon line, a line agreed to by Britain and
Tibet as part of the Simla Accord signed in 1914,
as the permanent border between China and India.
However, China views the McMahon line as a legacy
of British imperialism, and hence unacceptable to
China.
The underlying assumption
behind China’s reluctance to accept the McMahon
line is that if China recognizes that line, that
would
automatically signify that
China recognizes the 1914 accord signed by Tibet
as an independent country. This is a no-go area
for China.
Secondly, China has made
aggressive territorial claims to over 90, 000
square kms of territory in India's eastern sector
resulting in overt military postures by both
sides.
Finally, there is the
presence of the Tibetan government-in-exile and
the Dalai Lama in India, which adds fuel to
Chinese suspicions that India must be harboring
some future designs for an independent Tibet.
China and India set up a
"Special Representatives" mechanism in 2003 to
carry forward the border talks, resulting in a
framework agreement in 2005 on the guiding
principles for negotiations. However, the
"incompatibilities" have created obstacles and the
Special Representative talks have been
characterized as an impasse in recent years.
Despite 50 rounds of such negotiations and three
major bilateral agreements following their 1962
clash, China and India's border dispute seems no
nearer resolution.
Assessments of the formal
talks suggest both parties lack the incentive to
arrive at a negotiated solution. While there is
limited progress, both parties seem interested in
maintaining the status quo. This does not augur
well for future Sino-Indian relations as the
border dispute has the potential to thwart greater
broader bilateral cooperation
The
framework of the talks therefore needs a rethink.
The issue of who negotiates is important and this
aspect has slowed progress in the past. Before the
Special Representatives were appointed in 2003,
many talks took place with lower-level officials
on both sides who did not have the authority to
make the decisions necessary to arrive at a
sensible agreement. It is critical that both China
and India select lead negotiators with advanced
knowledge of the situation, the ability to manage
complex issues, the authority to make political
decisions, and the ability to creatively identify
the decisions that are necessary to create optimal
outcomes for both parties.
The
Sino-Indian negotiations are currently at a
stalemate, as both parties have stuck hard to
their positions rather than explore common
interests. Consequently, Sino-Indian negotiators
must first of all, not only understand their own
party's interests, but also have a good sense of
the other side's stance.
An
understanding of each other's values and culture
is important. For instance, social stability is of
great importance to China; thus India should seek
to understand the implications this has on the
dispute over Arunachal Pradesh, particularly the
Tibet and Tawang issues. In the same vein, China
should seek to understand why India has staked its
claim over Arunachal Pradesh and the significance
of this issue from an Indian perspective.
Internationally, China sees
itself as acting in reaction to being victimized,
with its posturing a way of asserting itself so as
to maintain claim over the border areas. India
must appreciate how China might view India's
support for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan
government-in-exile in India within the larger
perspective of suspected "containment" theories. A
recent upsurge in US-India strategic relations
adds further fuel to such feelings of victimhood by China.
An analysis of the 2005
Sino-Indian framework agreement illustrates some
of the challenges both parties are facing in
reaching a settlement to the dispute. While the
document employs lofty, diplomatic language, the
agreement itself is rather vague and allows for
different interpretations. For example, Article 4
of the guiding principles states that both parties
should "give due consideration to each other's
strategic and reasonable interests," but this is
vague and subjective to each party's
interpretation.
It is also troubling that
China has not observed Article 9, which states
that the "two sides should strictly respect and
observe the line of actual control and work
together to maintain peace and tranquility in the
border areas". While there are certainly areas of
the border which are not clearly delineated,
China's military has conducted incursions into
Indian territory in recent years especially in the
Ladakh sector.
These varying interpretations
and actions that do not support diplomatic
language have prolonged the negotiations. Hard
bargaining alone will not resolve these issues.
Negotiators must concentrate on determining
preferences for alternative outcomes to identify
areas of compromise and create outcomes with the
best joint gains.
The physical location of the
negotiations is another key factor that has been
overlooked in the past. Negotiation expert Daniel
Druckman suggests in his piece "Negotiating in the
International Context," that talks should be held
at a comfortable, peripheral location rather than
a central location within the conflict zone. This
is key for the Special Representative talks, which
typically take place in either China or India.
Often times, the physical
location has created issues exposing the
aggressive nature of both parties. For instance,
Special Representative Talks originally scheduled
for November 2011 in New Delhi were likely
postponed because China objected to the Dalai Lama
addressing a Buddhist Conference in New Delhi at
roughly the same time.
While some have argued that
it is a "sign of determination" that talks have
persevered despite these issues, one can also
argue that while talks are still occurring, they
are largely diplomatic shows and these
provocations serve to disrupt and prolong the
progress - though this may be a tactic in itself.
Actions like this undermine
any attempt for meaningful dialogue, reduce any
sense of urgency, and counteract efforts to
seriously build a trusting, collaborative
relationship between the two nations. Mistrust is perhaps another
significant obstacle to both parties' development
of a joint solution. A major issue in the last
seven years is that while China and India have
engaged in Special Representative talks, they
concurrently make assertive moves that intensify
the atmosphere of mistrust and jeopardize
trust-building dialogue.
In
the last five years, while simultaneously
participating in the talks, the Chinese have been
increasingly making more incursions into disputed
territory to assert their claim. In November 2012,
China issued passports displaying Arunachal
Pradesh and Aksai Chin as Chinese territory - just
a week before the scheduled Special Representative
talks.
In an almost immediate
response, India stamped visas with revised maps
indicating the disputed territories as theirs.
Such escalations damage trust-building exercises
and hinder progress. The Sino-Indian media also
contributes to seed mistrust in portraying the
aggressive nature of both parties. It is unlikely
that a lasting negotiated settlement will be
reached without seriously engaging to building
trust and as much as China and India attempt to
separate the border issue from their bilateral
relationship, the two are inexplicably linked.
One
of the most viable ways to address the China-India
border negotiations is through a problem solving
approach. This is crucial in the China-India
negotiations because China's behavior outside of
the negotiations clearly has an impact on the
progress of reaching a settlement on the border
issues.
Each time the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) aggressively moves into
perceived Indian territory, this breeds mistrust
between the parties, preventing them from
understanding each others interests beyond their
asserted positions.
Rather than continuing to
make escalatory territorial claims, both parties
need to have an honest dialogue about their shared
future. However, this approach can only be applied
if both parties are willing. It seems, when
analyzing the negotiations on the border, that
both China and India have viewed the border
dispute through a realist perspective, relying on
a future of hard bargaining to attain their
respective areas near the border.
For
the border dispute to be resolved in the near
future, both China and India must realize the
issue's impact on progress in Asian geopolitics.
Dr Namrata
Goswami is senior
fellow at the United States Institute of Peace
(USIP) and research fellow at the Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Jenee Sharon is a
research assistant at USIP. The views expressed in
this article are solely that of the authors.
(Copyright 2013 Namrata Goswami
and Jenee Sharon.)
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