A
US-China entente in Afghanistan By M K Bhadrakumar
The involvement of
China in the decade-long war on terror in
Afghanistan by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has been virtually nil. This
was so despite the Western alliance's repeated
urgings on Beijing to raise its head above the
parapet and become an active participant.
The United States doggedly kept at arm's
length persistent Russian overtures to become
involved in NATO's war - except ruthlessly
exploiting them to its selective advantage - but
it kept an open mind on a role for China, which,
incidentally, used to be its ally supporting the
Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s during the "jihad"
against the Soviet army.
Yet, while Moscow
responded with alacrity to Washington's need
for opening a Northern
Distribution Network, Beijing did not even respond
to the US's demarche to open the Wakhan Corridor
as a transit route for supplying NATO troops in
Afghanistan.
The big question is whether
all that is going to change now that the Western
troop withdrawal from Afghanistan is a foregone
conclusion. The signs point towards a more
hands-on approach on the part of Beijing over the
enterprise of stabilizing Afghanistan in the
post-2014 period. In some ways, this also forms
part of a reassessment of Chinese policies toward
Central Asia.
In retrospect, the visit by
Zhou Yongkang, China's security chief and member
of the Communist Party Politburo Standing
Committee, to Kabul last September signified a
shift in the Chinese stance from one of extreme
wariness and reserve to one of willingness to
become engaged. Zhou's visit was, of course, the
first by a senior Chinese leader in 46 years and,
indeed, Beijing pays much attention to formalism
in its political culture.
While in Kabul,
Zhou signed agreements on increased security and
economic cooperation between China and
Afghanistan, which included a deal to "train, fund
and equip" the 149,000-strong Afghan police, which
was until then trained almost exclusively by NATO.
Zhou's visit also followed talks held by Afghan
President Hamid Karzai in Beijing in June and the
agreement reached during the visit on Sino-Afghan
cooperation in combating terrorism in the region.
In a statement in Kabul, Zhou had said,
"It is in line with the fundamental interests of
the two peoples for China and Afghanistan to
strengthen a strategic and cooperative partnership
which is also conducive to regional peace,
stability and development." Beijing would most
certainly have taken stock of the resonance of
that profound statement made by Zhou from Afghan
soil and since decided that the international
community found nothing unnatural in it.
Overarching consideration What
could be the considerations underlying the new
"proactive" approach in the Chinese policies
toward Afghanistan? Evidently, China is a key
stakeholder in the stability of Afghanistan. For
one thing, the imperatives of the security
situation in Xinjiang are such that China's vital
interests will be affected if Afghanistan were to
become once again the revolving door for
international terrorists.
The involvement
of militants from the Afghan-Pakistan border
regions in subversive activities in Xinjiang is an
established fact. Beijing has been putting
pressure on Islamabad - even voicing its disquiet
in public at times - to clamp down on the Uyghur
militants working with the Taliban groups, but it
cannot be unaware that a long-term solution to the
problem would lie in the stabilization of the
Afghan situation.
Again, China's
cumulative investments in Central Asia have
aggregated over the years to a big enough heap by
now that could attract the evil eye and, in turn,
bring on obligations on Beijing to assume the role
of a provider of security as well. The Central
Asia gas pipeline is only the most vivid example
of China's growing stakes (and its new
vulnerabilities) in that vast region.
Meanwhile, there are also indications that
China is reassessing its role in Central Asia
against the backdrop of the renewed push by Moscow
on Eurasian integration (with indifferent results
so far) and the withdrawal of Western forces from
Afghanistan and the ebb of US involvement in the
region that may ensue.
A recent article in
the state-owned Global Times seriously doubted the
efficacy of the Moscow-led integration processes
in the Central Asian region and suggested that a
"multipolar cooperation system involving outside
countries would be very attractive for Central
Asia". The article focused on the numerous
obstacles that come in the way of Russia's
attempts to integrate the region and took note of
the competing interest of various external players
- US, Japan, India, Turkey, Iran, etcera.
Arguably, China does not believe that its
regional interests are irreconcilable with the
US's. Finally, China's involvement in
Afghanistan's economy is rapidly expanding, and
the multi-billion Chinese projects and the growing
work force that is to be counted in the thousands
would require security.
However, in all
this an overarching consideration may escape
attention. This concerns the overall US-China
relationship. Afghanistan promises to be a theater
where China can work with the US on regional
security issues. Put differently, Afghanistan
holds the potential to become a game changer in
"the new type of relationship between big powers"
that Beijing and Washington have been talking
about since the state visit by President Hu Jintao
to the US in January last year.
North
Korea is a turf where the US-China cooperation has
of late dramatically picked up; the Iran nuclear
issue has been another area where China has been
broadly responsive to the US's core concerns,
including the US's sanctions against Iran; again,
the possibilities of Washington and Beijing
working on a peaceful transition in Syria cannot
be ruled out in a foreseeable future.
But
the stabilization of Afghanistan falls in a
category by itself. It is a regional conflict the
resolution of which is of great mutual interest to
Washington and Beijing and, more important, China
also happens to possess the kind of geopolitical
leverage that can make all the difference to the
success of the US regional strategy.
Indeed, even a year ago, it would have
seemed preposterous to speak of a joint US-China
program to mentor the Afghan diplomatic service.
Surprisingly, it is not only happening today, but
according to a recent Associated Press report, it
also happens to be the only one of its kind that
Washington has ever partnered with another
country.
The AP report disclosed that the
US brought 15 Afghan diplomats to Washington, DC,
last month "after they had received similar
training in China". It would appear that the US
and China are pleased with the three-way program
of "capacity-building" in Afghanistan to the
extent that they are now developing similar joint
efforts to cover the fields of health and
agriculture.
A strategic asset
However, it is one thing to be involved in
"capacity-building" in the civilian sector and
another thing to plunge into the crucial elements
of the stabilization Afghanistan, which lie in the
politico-military domain of security and
peacemaking. To be sure, China's "all-weather
friendship" with Pakistan becomes a strategic
asset for Beijing to emerge, if it chooses, as a
key arbiter of peace in the Hindu Kush, given the
Taliban's continuing dependence on Pakistani
support.
It is an asset on the Afghan
chessboard that the US cannot match, as the
US-Pakistan relationship is unlikely to regain its
traditional closeness anytime soon. Both China and
Pakistan take a dim view of the prospects of peace
in Afghanistan and both have been critical of the
US's war strategy. China supports Pakistan's
grievances regarding the US's drone attacks. China
also subscribes to the belief that the instability
in Pakistan is directly traceable to the US-led
war in Afghanistan.
Most important, China
is willing (up to a point) to give Pakistan the
benefit of doubt as regards the latter's claims of
having limitations in resources to crack down on
the militant groups.
Having said that, the
Chinese assessments of the Afghan situation also
reflect differences from the way Pakistan says it
sees things. Thus, while Beijing concedes the need
to encourage Taliban to return to mainstream
Afghan politics as a factor for ensuring durable
peace, Chinese commentaries show that Beijing is
nowhere near a readiness to countenance a Taliban
takeover in Afghanistan.
Indeed, Chinese
commentaries express strong disapproval of the
Taliban's continued recourse to violence and even
question the Taliban's sincerity of purpose.
Equally, Beijing appears skeptical of the
Pakistani argument that the Taliban have revamped
their past ideology and are now willing to
co-habitate with other Afghan groups.
Again, the Chinese reports have been
highly skeptical regarding the prospects of peace
talks between the Taliban and the Afghan
government and implicitly question the wisdom of
the Pakistani decision to release Taliban
prisoners.
A recent Xinhua commentary even
put a question mark about the Afghan government's
doctrine of the "good Taliban", pointing out that
not a single important Taliban figure has so far
taken up Karzai's overtures and switched
allegiance - implying that Kabul's
"reconciliation" policy is a virtual non-starter,
given the Taliban's obduracy that they won't
negotiate until the foreign occupation ended.
The bottom line is that the Chinese
reports have consistently factored in the
formidable obstacles to reaching a negotiated
settlement in Afghanistan, "as there are several
splinted groups within Taliban and foreign hands
supporting specific factions".
Taking all
factors into consideration, therefore, China will
tread carefully in assuming any lead role in
forging peace in Afghanistan, no matter the US's
efforts to promote a shift in the Chinese thinking
in that direction. Also, certain contradictions
remain, which are not easy to reconcile.
While China could be genuine in its
keenness to ensure a stable and secure Afghanistan
and the Chinese motivations need not be
questioned, and although China is showing today
greater willingness to work with the US to
stabilize Afghanistan, it nonetheless keeps a safe
distance from the debris of the war and appears to
disfavor a long-term US troop presence in
Afghanistan so close to its borders with the
Central Asian region. Yet, China was probably
considering according diplomatic recognition to
the Taliban regime in Kabul in 2001 and, but for
the 9/11 attacks, it might actually have done so.
Again, while China is deeply concerned
about a security vacuum developing in Afghanistan
in the aftermath of the Western troop withdrawal,
it is in no tearing hurry to fill that vacuum
(although an expanded role by China could be
generally acceptable to the Afghans).
China's security cooperation with
Afghanistan so far is limited to intelligence
sharing and training the security personnel, which
are no doubt useful but amounts to a mere scratch
on the surface of the grave security agenda.
Capitalizing on blood and sweat
On the other hand, the US is manifestly
encouraging a stepping up of Chinese participation
in peace-seeking initiatives. Washington promoted
the creation of the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan
trilateral forum last year, which has so far met
twice.
Conceivably, so long as China works
on its own steam - instead of, say, riding the
chariot of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
[SCO] or partnering with Russia - Washington seems
to feel no real conflict of interests.
The
point is, while China would pay lip service to
conceiving a major role for the SCO in stabilizing
post-2014 Afghanistan, its real accent continues
to be on the bilateral initiatives. From the US
viewpoint, this has implications for the big-power
rivalries in Central Asia.
Interestingly,
China's comfort level is perceptively rising with
regard to the US's intentions in Central Asia. An
article featured in the Global Times last month
noted that "the Pamir mountains are too high and
the steppe too far away for the US to focus on the
region." It added:
China's ascendant investments in
Central Asia are something that also stands in
contrast to Russia's declining ones. This is a
more complex picture, as Russia, for many of the
same reasons as China, has a clear strategic
interest in Central Asia. But it is no longer
the regional hegemon that it once was. Russia's
power has been diluted by growing Chinese
interest and Western attention paid to the
region as a strategic launching pad into
Afghanistan.
Russia may still exert
considerable diplomatic influence and soft power
in the region, but it is clearly not investing a
huge amount in the region. Instead, seen from
the ground, the scope and range of Chinese
investments is clear, and China is increasingly
shaping itself to be the most consequential
power in the region.
China is
increasingly reshaping Central Asia to becoming
its backyard rather than Russia's, and this will
bring with it some regional responsibilities
that China has not yet figured out how to
address. China needs to formulate a proper
strategy for Central Asia.
Without doubt, China is unique
among the big powers in having the economic
wherewithal to commit financial resources to
investments and aid on a scale that could make all
the difference to the revival of the Afghan
economy, and this is indeed a most crucial
template of the overall US strategy in the
post-2014 period. Thus, contrary to
the earlier whispering campaign that China was
only interested in Afghanistan's resources and
would be aiming at capitalizing on the blood and
sweat of the American and NATO troops, Washington
has now veered round to encouraging Beijing to
boost its presence and step up investment and aid
to Afghanistan. The eagle has decided that the
dragon dance in the Hindu Kush can be a
many-splendored thing.
Ambassador M
K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included
the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and
Turkey.
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