Maoists: India spreads the red rash
By Prathapan Bhaskaran
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India's programs to contain the spread of Maoist insurgency are hampered by the absence of key social content to combat caste-based and feudal exploitation of marginalized communities.
When Indian and Chinese soldiers were eyeballing each other on the barren heights of the Himalayas in April-May, India's Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid dismissed the border standoff as "one
little spot ... of acne". But his government's security planners must be far more worried about the rapidly spreading red rashes across the country in the form of Maoist insurgency with apparent support from across the northern border.
The problem of Maoist violence that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described in 2009 as the biggest threat to India's integrity - even more than religious extremism - is said to be creeping into hitherto unaffected areas.
Though the government in New Delhi announced what it calls the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) sculpted around the "carrot-and-stick" theme of an economic and security push to contain the spread of the red menace, experts say the absence of a social content has hobbled it from the beginning. Tribal people and Dalits continue to be exploited by the feudal land-holding class who belong to the upper castes.
The worsening situation was evident on July 3, when the police chief of Pakur district of Jharkhand was gunned down along with four others in an area that had been considered unaffected until then. The security detail of Amarjit Balihar, the superintendent of police, was so surprised by the attack it could not retaliate while Maoists pumped in 150 rounds, a senior police officer told media.
The Congress party-led government in New Delhi claimed that the Maoist insurgency had lost its raison d'etre after the implementation of the IAP in areas predominantly inhabited by tribal people, but the militants sprung a nasty surprise by ambushing a big convoy of Congress leaders in the neighboring Chhattisgarh state on May 25, killing 27 people including 17 politicians.
Singh, accompanied by Sonia Gandhi, the president of his Congress party that heads the ruling coalition at New Delhi, rushed to Chhattisgarh to mourn the deaths. It was only two days before that Prime Minister Singh had published what was considered a report card of his government's performance over the past year with smug claims that Maoist violence had reduced because of targeted development programs.
The attack underscored the fact that a huge swathe of land from Bihar's northern border with Nepal to all the way down to boundaries of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka in the south is still red. Nearly 80 rural districts, most of them along fringes of heavy forests, are considered still affected by Maoists, with many pockets out of government control where only the writ of the Maoists run. The Maoists have been particularly violent in confrontations with Salva Judam, the vigilante group set up allegedly at the behest of Congress leaders.
It is no surprise that Maoist militancy has taken roots mostly among the tribal people displaced from the forests that traditionally provided their livelihood, as documented by many social scientists. They blame the internal displacement on forest conservation programs that ignore many stakeholders' claims and aggressive invasion of mining corporates with political blessing in the name of economic liberalization.
The displaced thousands gravitated towards villages and towns, where they joined the other landless poor suffering economic and caste-based oppression at the hands of the land-holding upper castes. Sociologists have long been calling on the authorities to rectify this deprivation, but little has changed on the ground. It is into this fertile ground that Maoists, inspired by ideals of iconic Chinese leader Mao Zedong, stepped in with the promise of a proletariat state.
The hilly, forested terrains also suit guerrilla tactics, as attackers can withdraw into inaccessible forests after each strike. They routinely glide across state boundaries in defiance of state police forces. Some estimates show that Maoist militancy from 1989 to 2012 has taken nearly 12,000 lives, of which roughly half were civilians. The number of Maoist combatants in the country is estimated variously between 9,000 and 20,000.
Government agencies accuse Maoists of abduction and killing of alleged informers, kidnapping of youngsters from villages to swell their ranks, extorting money from villagers and businessmen as well as companies holding mining license. Maoists deny these but blame police atrocities and the feudal system under which land remains concentrated in the hands of a few for people's continued allegiance to their cause. Social activists point out that the worst-affected states are not only among the most backward in India in economic development, but also the slowest in implementing land-ceiling laws. The truth must be somewhere in between.
Indian security agencies have always known the connection of Indian Maoists with their Nepalese brethren with reports of Nepal's People Liberation Army combatants often suspected to be directly involved in attacks inside India. However, the insurgency's Chinese links were revealed in 2011 when Delhi police arrested two leaders of Nepal's Peoples Liberation Army - N Dalip Singh and Arun Kumar Singh Salam - from a crowded Delhi area and seized a wealth of incriminating material.
The suspects told the police that the PLA political wing's chief, Irengbam Chaoren, was operating from China. Maps showing PLA's terror camps along Myanmar's border with India were also among the seized documents. They also revealed they received funding support, often in counterfeit Indian currency, from outfits operating in the Pakistan-administered region of Kashmir.
Though the contacts PLA leaders had with Pakistani groups suspected to be receiving the backing of that country's military intelligence got a lot of publicity, the fact that their top leadership was ensconced in China did not seem to have been given the gravity it deserved.
The failure of some disillusioned former PLA combatants to fully integrate into the Nepalese society after last year's reintegration deadline lapsed has been worrisome to the Indian security establishment. They were seen as ripe for picking by agencies from other countries with an eye on sustaining militancy in India. Indications are that India's worst fears are coming true.
But the fact remains that India can do little to prevent elements in unfriendly regimes from trying to sustain trouble inside India. However, what is more poignant is the Indian government's failure to immunize its own communities from external meddling.
The major flaw in India's programs to contain the insurgency, has been the absence of the social content, according to E N Rammohan, a former director general of the Border Security Force. The central government had asked the reputed Indian Police Service officer to look into one of the most brazen attacks ever by Maoists who gunned down 74 troopers of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in Dantawada forest of Chhattisgarh state on April 6, 2010. In a paper titled "The Naxalite Maoist Insurgency" and published by the Forum for Strategic and Security Studies, Rammohan has called for implementing land reforms as in order to prepare the ground for a lasting solution to the insurgency problem.
The fact remains that the government has not been able to give its programs the critical social orientation. The IAP sculpted around a "carrot-and-stick" theme included only economic and security elements, while ignoring the more fundamental social maladies.
Though the "carrot" part of the drive had some initial appeal, systemic inefficiencies of the Indian service delivery system have caught up. India's conventional government service delivery is plagued by debilitating leaks and blocks. Government surveys have shown the systems to be so inefficient that the intended beneficiaries receive only a fraction of allocated resources. Some estimates show the benefits that reach the ground are as small as 10% after filtering through various levels of administration and power brokers. The lack of effectiveness of the planned economic offensive highlights the importance of coming up with a service delivery that is more efficient and targeted, removing the middlemen.
The fate of the "stick" part of the strategy has not been much different. After a spurt in Maoist violence in 2009, then Home Minister P Chidambaram called on the states to increase coordination with the central forces in tackling the problem. But a serious lack of coordination continues to hobble the efforts. This continues to affect the different states involved and relations between the central and state agencies.
Though the CRPF, which is 222,000 strong, is the premier central force fighting the Maoist insurgency, it is hamstrung by poor quality of intelligence and limited access of local police personnel to troubled areas. Security analysts have pointed out that for any operation of this kind, the effectiveness is circumscribed by the quality of intelligence input. The fact that governments of the affected states have different priorities in their fight against militancy has also not helped the offensive.
In an May 29 interview with Tehelka, Rammohan said that unless special councils are set up to empower tribes under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, weaning them away from Maoists is going to be difficult.
For a lasting solution to the problem, the center and the state governments will have to ensure social changes in the afflicted areas, even if the government manages to get its "carrot-and-stick" strategy back on track, he says.
However, the biggest impediment to change will continue to be the political class, which is in fact the mutated feudal class that owns most of the rural lands in the Maoist-affected districts and has interests in corporate exploitation of the mineral resources.
Prathapan Bhaskaran is an India-based freelance journalist writing on South Asia affairs.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. Articles submitted for this section allow our readers to express their opinions and do not necessarily meet the same editorial standards of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.
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