SPEAKING FREELY Afghanistan's fractured future
By Shahab Jafry
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click hereif you are interested in contributing.
Despite the longevity of America's Afghan campaign, including the spillover into Pakistan's tribal area, few in the international press really understand the true nature of the Taliban threat, especially its association with al-Qaeda.
Much is unclear about the American drawdown; why now when the insurgency has gained so much strength? Why the shift from "we don't negotiate with terrorists" to discussions in three
countries, sometimes without informing Kabul? Why offer former Taliban commanders future cabinet positions? And what of intelligence reports of rifts between al-Qaeda and Mulla Omar's Quetta shura?
The American press chooses to concentrate more on the Pakistani theater, especially Islamabad's policy of propping up the so-called good Taliban, but in fact the Afghan insurgency has been gaining strength and momentum ever since the infamous spring offensive of 2006. Since then, every spring - when fighting resumes after the usual winter lull - has seen the Taliban gain ground and influence. And even though the Pakistani sanctuary did contribute a little to insurgent activity close to the border area, it never facilitated Taliban initiatives deep in Afghan territory.
In fact, following military action on the Pakistani side, and the retreat of international forces' retreat from Kunar and Nooristan on the Afghan border, the situation has reversed, with Mullah Fazlullah (of the Swat operation fame) orchestrating cross-border attacks inside Pakistan.
The good Taliban have been an essential feature of Pakistan's counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy ever since al-Qaeda funded the multi-party conglomerate that came to be known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Publicaly, it owes fealty to Omar's original Afghan Taliban, but in effect it is the manifestation of a core strategic disagreement between the Taliban and al-Qaeda; the former wish to restrict the jihad to anti-nato insurgency in Afghanistan, whereas the latter have a more globalist agenda.
The good ones are the bunch Pakistani intelligence has persuaded into not attacking local targets, regardless of their activities across the border. They played a crucial role in expelling foreign, mainly Uzbek, militants out of the tribal area in 2007, and prove a formidable bulwark against TTP's growing anti-state activities.
The CIA's January drone strike that killed local South Waziristan commander Mullah Nazir (apparently the best of Pakistan's good boys) and the subsequent capture of Bajaur Agency strongman Molvi Faqir in Afghanistan (also high on Pakistan's good boy list) indicate, according to sections of the Pakistani press closely following the insurgency, a widening cleavage between the ISI and the CIA.
There were reports of such commanders' influence finally coming to bear on the TTP high command, which recently shifted from its long-standing position and offered conditional talks to the government. But the CIA's inability to come to terms with central elements of Pakistan's COIN operation, coupled with its failure to erect a credible strategy across the border, has resulted in renewed strength for insurgents in Pakistan, hence growing suicide bombings in Pakistani mainland.
The Americans were also displeased when the Pakistani military refused to extend the operation into North Waziristan, the last of the seven tribal agencies, which houses the notorious Haqqani network. Since these demands came just as the Afghans invited former Taliban commanders into the political fold, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces no longer manned the Afghan side, a Pakistani military push would have been ridiculous, with militants conveniently crossing over.
Significantly, Islamabad must also take into account that incessant military action in the tribal area has pushed militants into strategic arches around main cities; a sign of desperation from a dying insurgency, yet what can account for a very potent last stand. Pushing elements that have agreed not to harm Pakistani interests into large cities, that too in a war that was not Pakistan's to begin with, makes little sense from Islamabad's point of view, and the government is rightly pushing for dialogue. Yet the Americans find this difficult to understand.
There is little doubt that whatever government replaces the Karzai administration next year, it will be heavily represented, or at least influenced, by the Taliban, and Afghanistan will revert to its typical fractured state with pockets ruled by powerful warlords.
US media rhetoric hides the American military's last desperate attempt to keep influence in important parts of the country once it leaves. Offering sweeteners to former Taliban heavyweights, even as the insurgent hierarchy dismisses them as irrelevant, is meant to prop up regional commanders in an exercise not very different from Pakistan's good-Taliban strategy.
Even a complete withdrawal itself is doubted. Yet there is wide agreement that Washington has been consistently losing the initiative in Afghanistan for more than half of its presence there. Not only has its military let insurgents strengthen on both sides of the AfPak divide, it's presence has also strained relations between Islamabad and Kabul, something that will feature prominently in the immediate aftermath of the American withdrawal late next year.
Shahab Jafry is a political and financial journalist based in Dubai.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say.Please click hereif you are interested in contributing.
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