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Quiet power: ASEAN
By
Stanley Chan
The conventional wisdom regarding
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is that the
organization has become unwieldy and weak. Critics blame
the rapid expansion of the 1990s that added new members
such as Vietnam and Cambodia, and the lack of a single
unifying mission for leaving it adrift. The failure of
ASEAN to address effectively the Asian financial crisis,
the collapse of Indonesia, and China's creeping
annexation of the South China Sea are cited as evidence
of the group's weakness.
While these criticisms
of ASEAN are largely correct, they tend to overstate the
limitations of the group. It is also necessary to
examine the individual actions of the ASEAN member
states, not just the high-profile initiatives that it
carries out as an organization. The individual members
have their own separate foreign-policy initiatives.
These initiatives may actually serve the broader
interests of ASEAN, despite not being publicly justified
as supporting organizational goals.
While it is
not strongly emphasized, one of the primary missions of
ASEAN is to prevent the domination of Southeast Asia by
external powers - specifically China, Japan, India, and
the United States. This mission is an extension of the
Cold War goal of preventing the spread of communism in
the region.
The individual actions of the ASEAN
states, as well as the high-profile initiatives of the
organization itself, have allowed the members to balance
off the major external powers. ASEAN states have been
successful at taking advantage of the fears and
ambitions of the major external powers to
counter-balance each of them, while extracting
concessions along the way. They have done this without
greatly sacrificing either their own independence.
Giving face to China ...
With the
exception of the Philippines, the ASEAN member states
have avoided any blatant verbal provocations toward
Beijing. While there is quiet concern regarding China's
long-term intentions, ASEAN political leaders have taken
pains to avoid the fearful rhetoric used by officials in
Washington, Taipei, Tokyo, Manila, and New Delhi. They
have also emphasized dialogue via the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) instead of deterrence in dealing with
Beijing on the South China Sea issue.
The ASEAN
states have also studiously avoided involvement in other
potential disputes with China. While the ARF has added
Korean Peninsula issues to its agenda, it has
conspicuously avoided including the issue of Taiwan. It
is also very unlikely that any ASEAN state, including
those with close security ties with the US, will involve
itself in the issue. Singapore's Senior Minister Lee
Kuan Yew has even gone so far as publicly berating
Washington for its continued support of Taiwan.
Despite the ongoing fears that China's entry
into the World Trade Organization could draw away trade
and investment opportunities, the ASEAN states agreed
last November to negotiate a free-trade agreement (FTA)
with Beijing within five or 10 years. Such an agreement
would not only boost China's economic presence but could
theoretically give China political influence as well due
to the size of her economy.
All of the
aforementioned items have coincided with several years
of active Chinese diplomacy within the region. Thus, one
would presume that China is successfully carving out a
role as a regional leader. The more alarmist analysts
would even argue that Southeast Asia is drifting into a
Chinese sphere of influence.
Appearances,
however, can be deceiving.
... While
capitalizing on regional rivalries
While the
ASEAN states have accommodated China on a number of
issues, they have quietly used their relationships with
other external powers to undermine broader Chinese
regional interests. They have exploited India's
competing regional ambitions, Tokyo's and Washington's
anxieties regarding Beijing's ambitions, and the abiding
desire of the US remain the guarantor of regional
security.
China has made it explicitly clear in
meetings with the ASEAN states that it believes that
"countries from outside the region" should not be
allowed to conduct joint military exercises with ASEAN
states. This has not prevented the members from both
continuing and expanding upon the regular bilateral and
multilateral military exercises with the US Pacific
Command. The annual US-Thai Cobra Gold Exercises now
include Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesia, Malaysia, and
the US are also reported to have carried out joint
military exercises throughout the late 1990s.
Much has been made of Washington's growing
security presence in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of
September 11. The administration of George W Bush,
however, was likely to have pursued a greater regional
role even without the war on terrorism. During visits to
the region in the spring of 2001, administration
officials complained that China had "eaten our lunch"
diplomatically. Even if the threat of terrorism in the
region were to subside, Washington would still seek a
more active role in the region, finding ways to
reinvigorate relationships with individual ASEAN states.
The ASEAN states have taken advantage of India's
"look east" policy to invite the Indian military into
the region. India now has the annual "Milan" military
exercise with ASEAN, as well as separate exercises with
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. India is
also reportedly interested in a security accord with
Thailand, and signed defense industrial cooperation
agreements with Vietnam and Malaysia.
As a
further snub to Chinese sensitivities, India military
exercises with the ASEAN states has coincided with
India's initiation of military exercises in the South
China Sea. Beijing has stated explicitly its opposition
to any country staging military exercises on what it
deems to be Chinese territorial waters.
China
has also made it clear that it is not pleased by ASEAN's
engagement of India. A Singaporean proposal in 2000 to
include India in the ASEAN + 3 was dropped as a result
of Chinese opposition. Nevertheless, ASEAN diplomats
have encouraged India to resolve its internal political
and economic issues so that it can apply more energy
towards being active in the region. In the economic
arena, the ASEAN states have been in discussions, both
individually and collectively, on establishing FTA with
Japan, as well as China. Japan's recent push for an FTA
with the ASEAN states is seen as a response to China's
own work in this area.
A regional FTA need not
exclude either China or Japan, and the proposals being
discussed include both Northeast Asian powers as well as
South Korea. But the Northeast Asian power that takes
the lead in developing an FTA with the ASEAN states
could gain greater influence as a result of being the
agenda setter at major ASEAN meetings and the
coordinator for the policy initiatives that result from
these meetings.
If a regional FTA proves too
difficult to create, bilateral free-trade agreements
with Japan could be carried out instead. Tokyo and
Singapore have already agreed to pursue a bilateral
agreement. Thailand has proposed one as well. Individual
ASEAN states could use the bilateral FTA play Tokyo and
Beijing against each other, to see which country will
offer them the best concessions in their respective
bilateral economic and diplomatic relationship.
Implications for understanding
ASEAN
Discussions regarding Southeast Asian
regional politics often place ASEAN and its member
states as passive actors with limited capability to
affect the regional environment. The ASEAN states are
also often seen as having only two policy choices: work
together to contain major external powers, or acquiesce
to them, thereby becoming part of their sphere of
influence.
The reality has been that the ASEAN
states are more effective at shaping the regional
security environment than outside observers realize.
Their options for dealing with the major regional powers
are not limited merely to containment or acquiescence.
While the presence of four ambitious major regional
powers is fraught with dangers to both the organization
and its members, it has also presented opportunities
that they have learned to exploit.
(©2002 Asia
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