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Can Indonesian President Megawati
survive?
By Alan Boyd
SYDNEY
- Washington's efforts to draw Jakarta back into the
Western security blanket are being frustrated by
resurgent Indonesian nationalism, as President Megawati
Sukarnoputri is put to the sword over her more strident
response to Islamist extremism.
But she may have
to defer to pressure of a different sort from the
nation's tainted military apparatus, which has sensed an
opportunity finally to scuttle the three-year-old US
embargo on weapon procurements.
Indonesia has
been swinging back into Washington's foreign-policies
compass since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
and a belated recognition by the George W Bush
administration that it could not indefinitely isolate
the world's largest Muslim population. In practical
terms Indonesia remains well below Afghanistan, Iraq and
North Korea in the US diplomatic and security lexicons,
reflecting the traditional US reluctance to get involved
in the southern half of the Asian continent. Instead,
the US State Department is relying on close ally
Australia to do the dirty work of reviving a prickly
relationship that is defined by human-rights
sensitivities, secessionist pressures and military
ambition.
Yet the deteriorating political
situation in Jakarta, coupled with Canberra's prickly
track record with Indonesia, may force the United States
to adopt a more direct route in the interests of
regional stability. Many diplomats and academics are
concerned that Megawati could lose control of the
opposing forces of multilateralism and nationalism that
are tearing the Indonesian democratic fabric, already
weakened by five years of unrelenting economic struggle.
"Will she survive? If this were 1998, probably
not. But one really needs to consider just how much the
political landscape has changed since Suharto. The TNI
[armed forces] are depoliticized, we have an elected
president, reforms of the civil service, arguably a more
independent judiciary," said one diplomat. "But of
course we have to weigh these advances against the
realities of a very complex social system and an
immature democracy. On the balance, I think she will
come through, but there will have to be a trade-off to
domestic opinion."
This is most likely to occur
in the security arena, as Megawati has already paid a
stiff price for stepping up counter-terrorism
cooperation, even though it still falls short of the
levels sought by Washington and Canberra. She has been
vilified for allowing 100 Australian, British and
American investigators to sift through the Bali rubble
alongside Indonesian police, while these same countries
were clamping down on their own Muslim populations.
Even moderate Islamic groups, the voice of
reason in the fluid political climate of the late 1990s,
and the basis of her own political support, were
incensed when western countries issued safety warnings
on travel to Indonesia that have devastated the crucial
tourism industry.
Echoing threats by Megawati,
Indonesia's acting ambassador in Canberra, Imron Cotan,
cautioned on Thursday that public anger over raids on
suspected extremists in Australia could force Jakarta to
end the joint investigation into the Bali bombings. "I
will not be surprised if one day the Indonesian people
will turn their attention to your police forces
operating in Bali because the [raids] were conducted by
the federal police as well as [intelligence agencies],"
he said. "I will not be surprised if the people of
Indonesia ask us to stop cooperating with your police
forces."
Canberra, caught off guard by the Bali
bombings, which killed almost 90 Australians, has much
to gain from the tentative partnership as it beefs up
its thin intelligence capability. Sharing of information
and possibly operational support head the list of
priority areas for cooperation.
Relations with
Indonesia hit rock bottom in 1997, when an
Australian-led international peacekeeping detachment
shepherded the renegade province of East Timor to
independence and pushed military units of the two
countries perilously close to a border showdown.
Responding to evidence of human-rights atrocities by the
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) army and its
special-forces Kopassus units, Australia subsequently
downgraded military relations and cut off arms
shipments.
Publicly at least, Canberra was
putting human rights ahead of strategic interests for
the first time since the mid-1960s, when it helped
install Suharto as a hardline counterbalance to the
spreading community insurgency in Southeast Asia.
In fact, the security linkage remained far more
active than has been widely acknowledged. "The defense
relationship was never turned off completely, even after
East Timor, and we are now rebuilding it, quietly,
step-by-step and in ways that serve practical interests
on both sides, and are based on realistic expectations,"
departing Australian ambassador Richard Smith said at a
farewell function in Jakarta on the same night as the
Bali bombings. "Two weeks ago we held another round of
our regional security and disarmament talks. These were
annual meetings until 1999, but they lapsed for a few
years thereafter, and it is very timely now to have them
back on the bilateral agenda."
Just how far this
agenda would extend will be determined more by Megawati
than her Australian counterpart, Prime Minister John
Howard. She has already shot down suggestions that
Australian troops help hunt down terrorists. Howard has
offered more direct aid, on top of the A$121.5 million
(US$68.5 million) package that Jakarta will get this
year in the form of development assistance and education
grants. Most armed-forces expenditure is for training
purposes.
If the limited military partnership is
to be elevated to operational level, as Washington and
Canberra apparently desire, they will be confronted by
the same human rights issues as the embattled Megawati.
Can the TNI, and more specifically, the
Kopassus, be entrusted with the responsibility for
spearheading a tripartite campaign, given its own murky
links with extremist groups and organized crime?
Will the army be prepared to turn on its own
provincial commanders, some of whom are known to protect
and even bankroll terrorist cells such as Jemaah
Islamiyah, which has been blamed for the Bali attacks?
"The inherent risk is that in overlooking the
TNI's excesses for the sake of a short-term security
foothold, an external armed force could be marked by
association, we could be giving the TNI the legitimacy
it is now being denied," said the diplomat. "In view of
the delicate state of democracy in Indonesia, it is
something that has to be considered judiciously, as it
will be difficult to roll this sort of arrangement back
if Megawati stumbles."
Megawati maintains a
comfortable relationship with the army by ignoring its
transgressions, which have included assassinations in
West Papua and East Timor and support for an Islamic
"holy war" against Christian enclaves in Indonesia's
eastern provinces. However, she is being boxed into a
corner by a reported push within the TNI for Jakarta to
comply with Canberra's demands for the sake of improved
relations with Washington - and the ultimate prize of
resumed weapons shipments.
Signaling an end to
the post-Timor chill, TNI leaders endorsed a memorandum
of understanding in February with Australian defense
chiefs for a new accord on counter-terrorism that is
already paying dividends.
Indonesia's security
chief, ex-army general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, has
said he favors closer military ties. But Bambang has
little effective control over the freewheeling TNI and
its intelligence wing, the BAIS. Nor can he speak on
behalf of the civilian intelligence agency, BIN.
The TNI can be relied upon to put its interests
first, as it always has done, without regard for
nationalist sentiments. Megawati doesn't have this
luxury, but in the end it may not matter much what she
thinks.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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