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Why thugs can hijack 'jihad'
By Phar Kim Beng
HONG KONG -
The bombings on Tuesday at the airport in Davao City,
Philippines, have resurrected the fear of Islamic
militancy in Southeast Asia, a problem that began to
take on a greater urgency with the October 12 bombings
in Kuta, a prime tourist haunt in Bali, Indonesia. The
bloodshed in Kuta compelled the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) to look at the problem as a
regional threat, rather than a national one. But there
were signs of trouble long before last October.
As early as September 2000, a year before the
September 11 attacks in the United States,
decision-makers from ASEAN had already identified the
ramifications of Islamic militancy.
Speaking at
a June 2000 conference in Hong Kong organized by the
Asian Wall Street Journal, former Thai foreign minister
Surin Pitsuwan, himself a Muslim, raised the alarm of
the possible rise of Islamic militancy. He linked the
problem to the onset of globalization.
During a
working visit to Malaysia that same month, Singaporean
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew spoke of the possible rise
of Islamic militancy in Indonesia and the rural
heartland of Malaysia: "You have to watch Islamic
militancy carefully, because if it takes root in
Indonesia and they go up to the islands south of
Singapore, or if they take root in Malaysia and come
down to Johor, then we are vulnerable," Lee warned.
Lee further affirmed that the recent rise of
political Islam in Indonesia started when then president
B J Habibie canceled a decree imposed by former
president Suharto that outlawed the use of Islam or
Islamic symbols for political parties. As a result, more
than 20 political parties eventually used Islamic
symbols, and several splinter groups won in Indonesian
elections, making them a faction that could be courted
by whoever was in power to maximize their gains. Thus,
in one stroke of the pen, Habibie, considered by many as
an eccentric though devout Muslim, re-legitimized the
presence of "Islamic politics" in Indonesia after a
break of some 50 years.
However, only preemptive
arrests were made in Malaysia. In September 2000,
Malaysian authorities took 10 members of the Kumpulan
Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), a militant group accused of a
spate of robberies and at least one murder, into custody
under the draconian Internal Security Act (ISA) that
allowed indefinite detention.
But the KMM
arrests were deemed political, as the group was led by
the son of Nik Aziz, currently the chief minister of
Kelantan, an Islamic stronghold in northern Malaysia.
When the arrests were made, Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad was accused of using ISA to silence dissidents.
Be that as it may, Mahathir spoke of the threat posed by
members of KMM who fought in Pakistan and then trained
in Afghanistan.
Malaysian authorities charged
that the group had attempted to form a regional network
of militants bent on creating a union of Islamic states
in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines; a charge now
used by the Singaporean government to crack down on
Islamic militants in the republic too.
As can be
seen, while the September 11, 2001, attacks in the
United States made global headlines, the issue of
Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia had at least
received some prior attention at the highest levels. Nor
were the policymakers merely standing watch. A month
before the September 11 attacks, decision makers from
the security agencies in ASEAN had met in Kuala Lumpur
to discuss the nature of the threat.
However,
occasional bombings in Southeast Asia have shown that
mere coordination of the intelligence apparatus is
simply not enough. Islamic militancy is very much a
hermeneutic problem the world over, increasingly with
serious impact on Southeast Asia.
An apt example
of how the term "jihad" is vulnerable to contradictory
interpretation is clearly brought home by events prior
to the start of Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait, for
example. In the midst of the early phase of the
operation, both Saudi Arabia and Iraq sought
international Islamic sanction for their policies. The
International Congress of Ulama (religious scholars),
convened by Iraq in December 1990, issued a declaration
supporting the Iraqi position, urging Muslims to
undertake jihad and revolution against those Arab Muslim
leaders who had joined coalition forces under US
leadership.
On the other hand, a
counter-congress of ulama met in Saudi Arabia
during the same month, calling for war against Saddam
Hussein as the highest form of jihad. In the end, the
groups issued two different fatwas, each
declaring their side's cause to be a "just" war.
Indeed, fatwas, declarations and
proclamations originated not in Islamic countries alone
but also in several Islamic communities in the Muslim
diaspora, including Europe and the United States. The
Islamic Council of Europe, for example, called for an
independent Islamic vision, absolutely rejecting the
presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil - a position
that echoed the views of al-Qaeda. It supported the
conclusion that "those who provide a fatwa that
legitimizes the seeking of aid from the non-Muslims
under current circumstances have not an iota of support
in either the Koran or the Sunnah" (recorded deeds of
the Prophet Mohammed).
The above controversies
amply showed the internal confusion of Muslims over the
meaning of "jihad". Indeed, other than the consensus
that jihad should be defensive, to this day Muslims
continue to disagree on the terms in which jihad may be
initiated or conducted. The result is a free-for-all
where any aggrieved Muslim group can seize on its own
version of jihad in the name of God. So, depending on
one's political perspective, jihad can be flexibly used
and abused.
Thus if regional security
organizations in Asia wish to curtail the rise of
Islamic militancy in Ambon, Aceh or even Mindanao, there
has to be a common charter agreed by every member
states' religious authorities on what jihad means. The
goal is to benchmark "jihad" lest the term is hijacked
by illegitimate sub-state actors for their pet political
causes.
Barring this collective endeavor,
Islamic militancy will be akin to a hydra-headed monster
where all religiously inspired individuals or groups can
launch their own jihad against the authorities. This is
what Asian authorities should deter as they become
increasingly aware of the importance of containing
Islamic militancy.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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