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Indonesia doth protest war too
little
By Gary LaMoshi
DENPASAR, Bali - Along with the refusal of
Iraqis to follow the United States and British
"shock-awe-welcome liberators" script, a major surprise
in the first week of the war has been the reaction of
Indonesia. As with the Pentagon's "the outcome is not in
doubt" pronouncements and the fighting in the field,
there's been a decided split between the Indonesian
elite and reaction on the ground.
President
Megawati Sukarnoputri has led active opposition to war,
including a rare public statement by Ibu President
deploring the invasion as "an act of aggression, which
is in contravention of international law". Her
government has moved aggressively in diplomatic circles
against the war, leading the charge for a United Nations
Security Council meeting and lining up support from the
Non-Aligned Movement, of which Megawati's father was a
founding member. The government, in defiance of its
image as inept bunglers on the public-relations front,
has orchestrated a campaign across religious lines
emphasizing that opposition to the war is a humanitarian
and moral issue, not an Islamic one.
In contrast
to their rulers' outrage and activism, the Indonesian
rakyat has had a muted reaction the war. On the
opening day of the hostilities, people waiting for visas
outnumbered demonstrators at the US Consulate in
Surabaya, they spent a longer time outside the heavily
fortified facility, and there was no problem walking
around the corner to the McDonald's for an ice cream to
celebrate a successful application (as my wife and I
did).
You ought to know not to stand by the
window
Since then there have been demonstrations
against US facilities, including tomatoes pelting
American Express Bank branches and the Surabaya
consulate, temporary shutdowns at McDonald's and KFC
franchises, and calls for boycotts of US goods. These
demonstrations pale in comparison with Indonesian
reaction to the US-led attack on Afghanistan in 2001,
and even to the protests against price hikes in January
calling for Megawati step down. The mildness of the
protests has even led officials to call for the United
States, Australia and the United Kingdom to rescind
their latest travel alerts for Indonesia.
Indonesians offer several explanations for the
subdued public response to the attack on Iraq. First,
they say, remember that the strike against Afghanistan
came at an emotional time for Indonesia. President
Megawati had just taken office four months earlier, amid
hopes that real reform would finally go forward. The
September 11, 2001, attacks on the US also served to
ratchet up passions around the world, and Megawati's
visit to the White House later that month put her and
Indonesia in the hot spotlight on the issue.
But
that explanation is not satisfactory. The fire,
figuratively and literally in burning pictures and
effigies of Megawati, shown in the demonstrations
against price hikes or the recent assault on Tempo
journalists (see Indonesia: Tempest over Tempo, March
14) show that Indonesians still have plenty of passion,
whether genuine or for hire. So far little of that
passion has been deployed to protest the war in Iraq.
The sound of gunfire off in the distance, I'm
getting used to it now
Another theory from
Indonesians is that they've seen this movie before. The
US-led attack on Afghanistan established a precedent,
the thinking goes, so this war is nothing new. Moreover,
Indonesians saw that their mass opposition to the war
was futile, and that the conflict's outcome was
inconsequential to their own interests.
That
argument doesn't make much sense. Those condemning the
attack on Afghanistan decried US imperialism and
anti-Islamic prejudice. The Indonesian and US
governments tried the same line about Afghanistan as a
humanitarian issue, not an Islamic one, 18 months ago,
and it didn't quell Muslim demonstrators. The attack on
Iraq is evidence those demonstrators were right.
This time, the US has mounted an attack without
immediate provocation against another Islamic country,
without the fig leaf of UN endorsement that the Afghan
incursion had, and has talked openly, if not yet
sensibly, about occupying the country and installing a
government to its liking. The results of the US
intervention in Afghanistan, renewed warlordism and no
discernible progress toward democracy or massive
rebuilding promised when the action began, bolster the
arguments that the US is more interested in warmongering
than nation-building. So why aren't these activists who
said so out there crowing?
I ain't got time
for that now
Another reason cited for the lack of
interest in protests is that people in Indonesia are
significantly worse off than they were 18 months ago.
That observation is coupled with an assumption of a
growing understanding, brought about by the Bali
bombings and Megawati's stealth PR machine, about the
impact of bad publicity on the Indonesian economy,
particularly in the area of desperately needed foreign
investment.
In their struggle to scrape together
a living, according this line, the masses haven't got
time for protesting a war taking place 8,000 kilometers
away, that, based on previous evidence, won't impact
them significantly, and they're not about the bite the
hand of US and Western investors that could potentially
feed recovery.
The man or woman in the
jalan may be measurably worse off now than in
October 2001 in post-bomb Bali, where tourists remain as
scarce as a real Rolex at the watch shops, but the
overall economic numbers don't support that theory. The
rupiah is holding strong, and growth came in around 3.5
percent last year, with inflation nearly on target at a
tad over 10 percent.
Recovery remains a long way
off, and the estimated 40 million unemployed have no
more hope and less of any cushion than they had 18
months ago. That army of unemployed also provides a
ready rent-a-mob brigade for Rp15,000 and a nasi
bunkus (rice to go).
But, one Muslim
political-science graduate asserted over coffee, maybe
the renters don't have the money to pay them anymore.
That brings up the question of who was doing the renting
in October 2001. As is often the case with mysterious
situations in Indonesia, such as the attacks on Freeport
McMoran mine personnel in Papua six months ago (see Indonesia's gold standard, September
7, 2002), look to the dark side.
This ain't
no party, this ain't disco, this ain't no foolin'
aroun'
For the most part, radical Islamic groups
were behind Indonesia's demonstrations against the war
in Afghanistan. Groups such as Defenders of Islam (FPI
by its Indonesian acronym) and Laksar Jihad were
operating openly and violently in October 2001. In
addition to street protests, FPI specialized in raiding
nightspots in Jakarta and threatens to "sweep
foreigners" out of Indonesia. Laksar Jihad recruited and
paid Muslims to fight Christians in the Malukus and
Central Sulawesi.
A year later came the Bali
bombings, which weren't linked to either of those groups
but other Muslim extremists. Police have theorized that
Jemaah Islamiyah was behind them, and alleged JI
spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, an outspoken
anti-Western agitator, remains in police custody. The
Bali bombings ended police tolerance of these groups,
along with public backing. The Bali bombing
investigation has energized the National Police,
finalizing their post-Suharto divorce from the military
and elevating its status. While the institution still
has miles to go for credibility, figures such as police
chief Da'i Bachtiar and chief investigator I Made Mangku
Pastika have established some integrity. It may be that
police have actually made progress rooting out terrorism
in the country after four years of widespread communal
and random violence.
But more important, the
radical groups' active and retired military backers have
withdrawn their patronage. Within days of the Bali
bombing, Laksar Jihad announced it was disbanding, and
navy ships suddenly appeared in Ambon to carry its
warriors home. The Islamic fundamentalist's dark-side
supporters may have feared implication in the Bali
tragedy, or they may have read the public outrage.
More likely, they assessed the damage their
support for radicals groups wrought. These dark-side
forces represent business interests, including the
military's own, that the Bali bombing severely damaged.
They learned a lesson, one that former president Suharto
understood instinctively until his political dotage:
inflaming religious passions can result in an inferno
that burns you.
Moreover, the US war on
terrorism has directly benefited the Indonesian
military. The Bush administration has taken the first
steps toward reviving the cozy and lucrative
relationship between the Indonesian brass and Uncle Sam.
More than the Indonesian public, it's the military and
its business cronies that now understand the value of
not upsetting the US government or investors.
Over that same period, Megawati's government has
proved itself a compliant partner for the military as
opposed to her predecessor Abdurrahman Wahid, who sought
real reform. So the dark forces no longer want to feed
political ferment. Instead they want to preserve and
protect the current illusion of political stability.
Add it all up, and you see the primary backers
of the protests against the war in Afghanistan have no
interest in stoking anti-US sentiment for this round of
the war on terrorism. If you believe lightning can't
strike twice, Bali may be the safest place on Earth to
wait out this war.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
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