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Malaysian coastline easy
pickings
By Arun Bhattacharjee
KUALA LUMPUR - Poor coordination among about 11
government agencies continues to make Malaysia's
coastline one of the least protected in Southeast Asia.
The onslaught on its coastline is largely due to its
relative prosperity in the ASEAN (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations) region.
Unlike many
other countries with a large coastline, Malaysia has no
coast guard. Responsibility for protecting the coast is
divided among several agencies, often with overlapping
duties, and while the total number of boats patrolling
the coast is quite large, many of them are old, slow and
outgunned.
The need for a strong coastal defense
has come into focus as the government fears that
troubles in neighboring countries may lead to
gun-running into Malaysia.
The Malaysian coast
has been under strain since kidnapping of tourists
started three years ago by the Philippines-based Abu
Sayyaf group of terrorists-cum-bandits. Instability in
the southern Philippines and, in Indonesia, economic
instability and the recent trouble in Aceh, have made
Malaysia's coast vulnerable to gun-running and attacks
from terrorists and pirates.
To set it right
Malaysia may have to spend nearly US$1 billion,
according to one estimate, and raise its defense
spending beyond 2 percent of its gross domestic product.
Malaysia considers this a normal growth in defense
spending over a five-year period from 1.6 percent of GDP
in the 1998-99 financial year, when its military
expenditure was declared as $1.211 billion.
Malaysia's slow response to the problems with
its coastal defense is believed to have been slow
because Kuala Lumpur is involved in long-term strategic
military plans to increase the size of its air force and
navy.
Although Malaysia has never clearly
spelled out its threat perception, it appears the new
defense strategy puts more emphasis on South China Sea.
One research institute on strategic studies in Malaysia
considers the earlier exclusion of coastal defense from
the comprehensive defense strategy to have been a major
mistake.
Malaysia is placing more stress on air
power to cover the South China Sea, but strategists
argue that without a backup from a strong coastal
defense service, air superiority may not be helpful.
Malaysia has agreed to buy 18 Russian-made fighter jets
SU-30MKM worth about US$900 million. They can largely be
used against sea-based targets. It has also agreed to
buy eight F/A-18 long-range fighters from the United
States. The US agreement was signed in 1993.
Malaysia further signed a 10-year agreement with
the supplier of the F/A-18s, McDonnell-Douglas, to
produce F/A-18 components locally. Unless extended
further, which appears doubtful in the post-Iraq
environment into which the two countries have drifted,
the agreement is supposed to end this year. Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad's statement during his visit
to Russia that Malaysia should look to that country for
defense equipment appears significant in this
connection. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov was
in Malaysia this week to confirm the sale of the
SU-30MKM long-range fighter-bombers.
Some
diplomats earlier were doubtful that McDonnell-Douglas
would sign a 10-year agreement on a sale of aircraft
whose value was unlikely to exceed $500 million to $600
million and permit Malaysia to produce F/A-18 components
locally unless there was a strategic understanding of
far more significance.
A country slightly larger
than New Mexico, Malaysia has 2,068 kilometers of
coastline on its peninsular portion and 2,607 kilometers
in Sabah and Sarawak and has an exclusive economic zone
of 200 nautical miles. Yet although oceanic trade
accounts for 13 percent of the country's GDP at current
prices, Malaysia has not signed any major contract for
acquisition of medium-size naval vessels needed to
protect this trade.
A bureaucrat in the Ministry
of International Trade admits that Malaysia was more
concerned with a trade policy than a comprehensive ocean
policy to defend its coastline and protect its revenue
by preventing smuggling of contraband as well as illegal
immigrants and other human cargo. According to one
estimate, smuggled cheap cigarettes from Indonesia cost
Malaysia about RM40 million to RM60 million ($10.5
million to $15.75 million) a year. The International
Maritime Bureau, which has its Asia headquarters at
Kuala Lumpur, recently commented that in spite of
repeated warnings issued by the bureau on piracy in the
Straits of Malacca, Malaysia's response has been
lukewarm.
A senior police official says
Malaysia's slow response to coastal incursions - if
indeed any response occurs - is mainly due to poor
coordination among 11 government agencies responsible
for law enforcement at sea or in the coastal areas.
These agencies employ 5,300 people and own a total of
480 motor vessels - a comparatively large fleet -
including fast customs boats. Government spending on law
enforcement at sea, including staff payment, is about
RM3 billion a year. The police official says Malaysia's
concept of a "coast guard" is a force to protect the
country from illegal entrants. Quite often
misunderstanding over jurisdiction of various
enforcement agencies hampers law enforcement.
Recently, Defense Minister Najib Tun Razak said
Malaysia needed fast boats to protect its territorial
waters. One boat costing about RM30 million has already
been pressed into service.
Malaysia is a
signatory to the Rio Declaration, which asks each
government to have a single maritime-law enforcement
agency so that it can provide multiple services such as
protecting coastal resources, preventing poaching,
halting smuggling in endangered species as well as human
cargo, and working against pirates and ocean-going
terrorists.
But 13 years after Rio, Malaysia has
multiple agencies such as the Royal Malaysian Navy,
Marine Police, a separate Marine Department, Department
of Environment, Customs and Fisheries Department and
others, all more or less doing the same job.
A
government source explains that even if the country
decides to have one powerful agency to look after its
maritime interests, it may not be achieved before 2006
because of the time required to purchase fast coastal
boats, train people and redeploy those now involved in
coastal law enforcement.
(Copyright 2003 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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