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Indonesia: Radicals steal the
spotlight
By Phar Kim Beng
HONG KONG - As the international spotlight
focuses its glare upon the Bali bombing trial in Jakarta
and renewed separatist violence in Aceh, it is all too
easy to assume that Indonesia is a hotbed of radical
Islam. But this is to ignore the bigger picture, and the
distinctive features of Islam as it is practiced in the
world's most populous Muslim nation.
The
conventional view of Islam in Southeast Asia stresses
its peaceful and moderate aspects. Azyumardi Azra,
rector of the State Institute for Islamic Studies
(IAIN), says it is "simplistic" to think of Indonesian
Islam as the same as Islam in the Middle East. Former
president Abdulrahman Wahid added: "The difference
between Islam in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia is that the
former does not know the difference between Islam and
its culture."
Indonesian Islam gained its
presence in slow and peaceful penetration over the
centuries. In the process, it integrated with folkloric
beliefs and local customs. Because of the less rigid
structure of Indonesian traditional society (including
the active role of women in public life), it is also
more tolerant and inclusive. The inheritance laws in
Minangkabau in Sumatra, for instance, are matriarchal.
Although there are up to 100,000 Islamic schools
(pesantren) in Indonesia, links with the West
remain strong, especially among the leading elites.
Nurcholish Majid, by far the most important intellectual
in Indonesia, has a PhD from the University of Chicago,
a distinction shared with Amien Rais, the current
Speaker of the Indonesian parliament. Azyumardi Azra,
who has considerable influence among Muslims in
Indonesia, is himself a PhD holder from Columbia
University in New York, with a dissertation on the
network of ulama or religious scholars in
Indonesia and the Middle East.
Facilitated by
the role of IAIN, investments in universities and
educational exchanges have also spawned a new Islamic
elite that moves easily between the Muslim and Western
worlds. Thus, while there are many versions of Islam
with competing interpretations, it is invariably the
liberal and tolerant version that remains the dominant
one.
Indeed, Indonesian Islam is not necessarily
in contradiction to democratic values that stress the
importance of government accountability and transparency
- a repudiation of the thesis peddled by Bernard Lewis
of Princeton University that Islam and democracy cannot
co-exist.
To the extent that there is radical
Islamic activism of the Wahhabi variety in Indonesia, it
has been concentrated in Aceh, which is fighting a
separatist war. The radical Islam of Aceh has not
proliferated to other parts of Indonesia. If anything,
its austere Islam has remained localized, this despite
its ongoing conflict with Jakarta - a 27-year quarrel
that is poised to be prolonged given the collapse of the
recent peace initiative.
Granted that the
general characteristic of Indonesian Islam is moderate,
how then do we account for the increasing radicalization
of political Islam in Indonesia?
As recently as
April 27, a bomb exploded in Jakarta's international
airport, injuring 11 people. Although no one claimed
responsibility for the bombing, the blast came four days
after Abu Bakar Ba'asyir - the alleged spiritual leader
of the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic group Jemaah Islamiyah -
went on trial for treason. It also followed the arrest
of 18 members of the group, including three wanted in
the October 12 Bali bombings that killed 202 people.
To be sure, political violence is neither novel
nor new in Indonesia. It has a pedigree from the very
beginning of modern Indonesia. Under its first president
Sukarno, Indonesia was a major source of insecurity
during the first half of the 1960s.
However,
what differentiates the previous spasm of violence from
the current one is the absence of any intense
ideological rivalry. The emerging Islamic parties are
involved in political violence almost by default, due to
failure to control their party members.
Unlike
Indonesian politics of the 1950s, which had the
participation of Islamic parties, currently individuals
are more important than the Islamic parties they seek to
represent. And they can't exert complete control on
their party machineries yet.
Hence, powerful
individuals, rather than parties, continue to maneuver
for office, with some of their members resorting to
unsavory methods to advance their objectives. This is
getting even more intense given the impending elections
of next year.
The two most doctrinaire parties,
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembagunan), otherwise known as
the United Development Party, and PBB (Partai Bulan
Bintang), for instance, continue to focus on the Jakarta
Charter, a proposition that was defeated in the 1945
constitution that held that Muslims must follow
sharia or Islamic law. Yet both are not above the
use of physical intimidation.
In fact, no party
had a paramilitary wing in the 1950s. According to the
findings of Greg Fealy, a lecturer in Southeast Asian
politics and history at Australian National University:
"Now every party, Islamic or otherwise, has an auxiliary
organization, from well-trained cadres to ordinary
hooligans."
Some even believe that groups such
as Laskar Jihad, which has now been disbanded, existed
with the patronage and support of the Indonesian
military.
This speaks as much about the perilous
state of the Indonesian government, which is unable to
control the activities of radical Islamic parties or
groups, as about the weak social structure of Indonesia.
In fact, the social structure of Indonesia
remains very much shaped by transmigration and economic
migrants. Today's Islamic radicals also grew up in the
1970s and 1980s, at the height of Suharto's New Order.
They are currently motivated to taste power in the
vacuum, which reinforces their aggressive tactics.
Economic hardship and weak government enforcement have
also strengthened their level of aggression and
frustration.
Said Rizal Sukma, the director of
studies at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Jakarta: "There are now 40 million people
unemployed, with 1.3 million internally displaced
refugees from ethnic and religious conflicts."
Furthermore, up to 70 percent of the entire
Muslim population, currently estimated to be 212 million
people, lives mainly in Java and Sumatra. The collective
social and political pressures cannot be anything but
acute. Indeed, to put it bluntly, the problem of radical
Islam in Indonesia may not so much be religious as it is
social and political. It is for this reason that almost
all cases of political violence perpetrated in the name
of Islam have been urban-based.
Nevertheless,
the specter of radical Islam in Indonesia should be
assessed in perspective. The largest mainstream Muslim
organizations, the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammdiyah, have
been overshadowed by media attention to radical groups.
In keeping with the news momentum generated by the
horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, followed by the
bombings in Bali last October 12, the media have trained
their sights on FPI (Front Pembela Islam), Laskar Jihad,
the MMI (Majlis Mujahideen Indonesia), otherwise known
as the Indonesian Council of Jihad Fighters, and JAMI
(Jemaah al Ikhwan al Muslimin Indonesia).
These
four Islamic groups share one characteristic: FPI's
Habib Rizq Shihab, Laskar Jihad's Jafar Umar Thalib,
MMI's Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Habib al Habsyi of JAMI are
all of Arab descent. These groups preach a literal
interpretation of Islam and claim that Muslims should
practice only "pure" Islam as practiced by the Prophet
Mohammed and his companions.
Be that as it may,
while all radical groups in Indonesia have some
connections with theological or organizational groups
elsewhere, including the Middle East, it is difficult to
establish a connection with al-Qaeda. The International
Crisis Group (ICG) in Jakarta has not found any links
between al-Qaeda and these groups.
In fact,
leaders of the FPI, Laskar Jihad and JAMI have
criticized Osama bin Laden (only the MMI has withheld
such criticism). If their disavowal of al-Qaeda is to be
believed, their statements imply that radical as they
may be, they are still trying to work within the local
ambit of Indonesian politics, which remain convoluted
and saddled with corruption.
At the same time,
the Islamic parties are themselves unable to rein in the
members of their overzealous members. This is especially
true with the individuals leading the parties. As they
too are no less ambitious, creating a pernicious dynamic
where Islam is easily abused for the sake of power
politics.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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