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What
to do about Myanmar
By David I Steinberg
(Used by permission of the Pacific
Forum CSIS)
 The
reports are still sketchy and contradictory, but there is no question that a
serious incident has taken place in northern Myanmar with the riots connected
with Aung San Suu Kyi's tour. An unclear number of people were killed and more
injured. Whether she was hurt remains in dispute; expatriate opposition groups
claim that she was, but the government has denied this.
Ambassador Sri Tun Razali Ismail, the personal representative of United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Anan, is visiting the country this weekend. He has been
largely responsible over some two years for pushing a dialogue between Daw Suu
Kyi and the military junta, a dialogue that seems to have been stalled for
about a year. He will no doubt try to visit her. If he is denied access, the
only conclusion that the world will draw is that she was injured in the fracas.
Since her release from modified house arrest on May 6, 2002, she has traveled
all over the country, with military approval, to reopen National League for
Democracy (NLD) local offices and to become reacquainted with the rural areas
to which she had been denied access for many years. On all of those trips she
had been enthusiastically received. On a couple, there seems to have been some
modest local harassment. Since the NLD is prevented from publicizing its
activities in the stringently controlled media, her presence in the hinterland
becomes an important event. In a sense, the military inadvertently made each
visit far more significant than it might otherwise have been, turning what
might have been routine into an almost triumphal motorcade, thus defeating the
military's desire to limit her influence.
The latest month-long visit to Kachin state and central Myanmar was marred by a
clash between her growing motorcade, which picked up local supporters as it
proceeded, and the local military-backed Union Solidarity and Development
Association. The USDA is a military-created mass-mobilization organization, as
specified in its charter, founded to support the military and its programs. It
is said to have more than 16 million members, about one-third of the total
population over the age of 10. It has been used in the past to stage rallies
that serve military prescribed activities, such as massive demonstrations
against Thailand in 2002 over border clashes between the two states. It seems
to have been modeled on Golkar, the Suharto-supportive "functional group" in
Indonesia, before it became a political party. Like Golkar, the USDA has the
makings of a military-dominated political base should the country return to the
elective process.
Because the USDA is under military command, and Senior General Than Shwe,
chairman of the State Peace and Development Council (Myanmar's ruling junta) is
its patron, it seems evident that any demonstrations and incidents involving
the USDA must, minimally, have had official military authorization and more
likely military incitement. The demonstrations may have gotten out of hand, and
the NLD supporters may have acted inappropriately, as the government claims,
but the responsibility rests squarely with the military. Years ago, military
intelligence justified surveillance of Aung San Suu Kyi for her own protection,
so they said, for if anything untoward happened to her, the military recognized
they would be blamed. And now they are.
This incident is a major setback for both the internal dialogue process - which
however limited and inadequate was a step in the right direction - and
externally for those foreigners who were trying to appeal to the more
circumspect among the military who realize the dire state of Myanmar's
international relations and internal political economy. Grammatically and
politically, foreigners tend to think of the military in the singular - as a
unified and cohesive force. Yet the most heinous crime in Myanmar, as the
military admit, is attempting to split the military, a crime that Suu Kyi was
accused of some years ago. It is likely that there are elements among the
military leadership who recognize the damage done to the country and to the
military itself by this mishap. What they might be able to do about it is
unclear.
Foreign expressions of outrage may be the final push for the US Congress to
enact additional sanctions on that unfortunate country (see
US Congress moves to put the squeeze on Myanmar ). As a moral
statement, it has obvious resonance. But as a practical matter it simply
reinforces the sanctions that have hitherto proved inadequate to get reform in
that country, and will throw hundreds of thousands of workers, mainly women,
out of jobs that are nowhere else available. The proposal to deny visas to all
members of the USDA, as has been mentioned in the press, would isolate further
a state and people the United States should be trying to influence.
Short of counterproductive sanctions, all countries, including the United
States, Japan and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), need to exert whatever influence they can muster to pressure the
regime to reform and to open the society - not just to the political
opposition, but also to dialogue with the minorities, that one-third of the
population that has been left out of whatever discussions have existed and the
well-being of whom remains the most intractable and vital long-range problem
facing the country. In particular, Japan should redefine "humanitarian
assistance" to include only basic human needs, and stop action on other
projects until this matter is settled.
The tensions in Myanmar could have negative repercussions for the region, with
waves of economic and political migrations causing problems to Myanmar's
neighbors, especially Thailand. It is time for ASEAN, and especially the ASEAN
Regional Forum, which is designed to deal with security issues, to have some
teeth and to pressure the military rulers of Myanmar to recognize that the
internal distress of one country is of concern to all. In other words, the
social aspects of one state are of interest to the group. That is, after all,
the logic behind the Joint Statement of Socially Cohesive and Caring ASEAN,
signed by all member states in July 2000.
David I Steinberg is distinguished professor and director of Asian
studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. His latest book on
this country is Burma: The State of Myanmar (Georgetown University Press
2001). He can be reached at
steinbdi@georgetown.edu. This article is used by permission of the
Pacific Forum CSIS.
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