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Myanmar: The
case against sanctions
By Nelson Rand
BANGKOK - When US Senator Mitch McConnell stood
before the Senate last week to propose new legislation
that will ban all US imports from Myanmar, he stated
bluntly, "It's time for tyrants to fear in Burma."
But will they?
"Total US imports from
Burma are not extensive, about US$356 million in 2002,"
said Harry Clark, a US lawyer and expert on
export-control laws. "Given the limited trade levels
between the United States and Burma, [tougher] sanctions
would not have a major impact on the Burmese economy.
"They would presumably have a substantial impact
on a relatively few US companies that rely heavily on
Burmese imports," he said.
According to the US
Census Bureau, US imports from Myanmar last year totaled
$356.4 million. In comparison, Myanmar's natural-gas
exports last year were more than double that figure,
bringing in $846 million to the cashed-starve junta,
according to a recent report in the Chinese People's
Daily.
Border trade in timber, gems and seafood
with Myanmar's neighbors - mainly China, Thailand and
Malaysia - is largely unofficial and is hard to get
reliable figures on. The Thai Farmers Bank estimates
that Thai imports from Myanmar on border trade alone was
worth $389.4 million in the first six months of 2002.
The isolationist regime in Myanmar has never
relied heavily on the international community for
commerce and trade.
So as Washington and the
European Union step up pressure on the generals in
Yangon to release opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
and implement democratic reforms in the country, the
question remains: Just how effective will tougher
sanctions be against the junta to bring political change
to the country?
Proposed new US sanctions, which
US President George W Bush is expected to sign into law,
would include banning all imports made in Myanmar and
companies owned by Myanmar's rulers, freezing assets of
Myanmar's rulers in US banks, directing US
representatives to international financial institutions
to oppose lending to Myanmar, and expanding the visa
blacklist on Myanmar's rulers to the United States. This
is in addition to the current investment ban and arms
embargo implemented by the administration of president
Bill Clinton in 1997.
Most analysts and
economists agree that unless China, Singapore and
Thailand - Myanmar's three largest trading partners -
follow Washington's lead and restrict trade, sanctions
just won't deliver the knockout punch to the regime.
There is no indication that China, Singapore and
Thailand will.
Retired World Bank economist
Bradley Babson told the Far Eastern Economic Review for
its June 19 edition that Myanmar's generals will not
change their behavior because of tougher sanctions. He
said the burden would fall mainly on the estimated
350,000 textile workers in the country.
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
also believes that tougher sanctions will be of little
effect to bring change in Myanmar. "America has taken
the sanctions route in the past," he told reporters on
Wednesday at the Association for Southeast Asian Nations
Regional Forum (ARF) in Phnom Penh. "Those sanctions
haven't worked, haven't changed anything in Burma."
In the past 10 years, Washington has imposed
sanctions on at least 35 countries, which in most cases
have done little except to make the situation worse for
the people in those countries. Critics say sanctions are
incapable of achieving significant results within the
timeframe of foreign-policy goals. Just look at Iraq.
Thirteen years of sanctions wasn't enough to topple
Saddam Hussein. Only a decisive military invasion
accomplished that.
"US unilateral sanctions have
a poor record with regard to advancing US foreign-policy
goals," said legal expert Clark. "Current sanctions [on
Myanmar] plainly are not 'working' in the sense that
they have not induced [Myanmar's] military dictatorship
to adopt policies and practices that satisfy minimum
international human-rights standards."
So what
will tougher US sanctions on Myanmar accomplish?
Probably not much of anything, says William A Reinsch,
president of the US National Foreign Trade Council, a
corporate-backed organization.
He said it's a
"lose lose lose" situation for the junta, US companies
and the Myanmese people. For US importers, it's more of
an inconvenience than anything, he said.
"Burma
is not unique. Lots of countries produce their products.
If [US companies] can't buy shoes from Burma, they will
say 'Fine, we'll try Pakistan or Bangladesh or
Thailand.'
"It's the Burmese people I feel sorry
for," he said.
Supporters of sanctions argue
that since the junta controls the nation's economy, any
restriction on trade hurts the government. Isolation -
not engagement - is also the preferred course of action
that Suu Kyi urges the international community to take
on Myanmar.
Many US giants have pulled out of
Myanmar in recent years, including Wal-Mart, Adidas, and
Tommy Hilfiger, bowing to pressure from human-rights
groups.
"We are hopeful that sanctions will
increase pressure on the regime and that other
[countries] will also participate in this," said Steve
Lamar, senior vice president of the American Apparel and
Footwear Association - a staunch supporter of boycotting
Myanmar. "Engagement is preferable, but it is clear that
this is a regime that does not respond to the norms of
engagement."
Clark maintains that although the
economic impact on tougher sanctions against Myanmar
would be minimal, the political impact on such sanctions
may be more significant.
"The proposed sanctions
represent more of a political gesture than an economic
tool," he said. "At the same time, my sense is that
Burma's junta has, at various points, moderated its
policies and practices somewhat in response to
international pressure."
For now, as Myanmar's
ruling generals remain defiant in the face of
international pressure to release Suu Kyi and restore
national reconciliation talks, it seems the big losers
are still the poverty-stricken people of Myanmar.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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