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Business
as usual at ASEAN, despite Myanmar
By Phar Kim Beng
HONG KONG - The Association of Southeast Asian Nations recently reprimanded
Myanmar over its treatment and continued imprisonment of Nobel Peace Prize
winner Aung San Su Kyi. This led some pundits to affirm that ASEAN had
jettisoned its principle of non-intervention for the first time. They could not
be more wrong.
ASEAN has neither changed nor does it endeavor to be different from how it has
traditionally dealt with Myanmar, or any other member states for that matter.
The history of ASEAN is replete with examples of quiet diplomacy applied
discreetly, although it is anyone's guess if such a method is at all effective.
In 1987 when Philippine
president Corazon Aquino's administration was under
pressure from rebel groups led by Colonel Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan, now a senator, all ASEAN leaders
agreed to attend the Third Summit in Manila to support
Aquino's embattled presidency.
Thailand, in the early years of
ASEAN, frequently mediated between Malaysia and the
Philippines in their conflict over Sabah. Indonesia took
over this role from the 1970s onward.
In late 1986, Indonesian
president Suharto organized an official visit to
Malaysia for the southern capital of Johor Baru, then
crossed the causeway to Singapore, in a gesture designed
to ease conflict between those two countries after they
had fallen out over the visit to Singapore by president
Chaim Herzog of Israel.
Since the 1970s, Indonesia has facilitated negotiations with Muslim rebels,
playing a major part in the 1996 peace agreement between Manila and the Moro
National Islamic Front, a role that is now being taken over by Malaysia.
So, given ASEAN members' history of pledging support to one another, why has
ASEAN yet to change into an organization that embraces some form of
intervention? Instead, terms such as "enhanced interaction" and "flexible
engagement" have been bandied about, often without any substance. There are
three reasons why ASEAN cannot adopt any of the above policies too explicitly.
First of all, with the exceptions of Thailand and the Philippines, most of the
authoritarian governments of ASEAN remain afraid of their internal legitimacy
and staying power. They cannot afford to meddle publicly in other countries'
policy, draconian as it may be, lest their own legitimacy is challenged in
future.
Second, ASEAN is steeped in its purported ability to socialize recalcitrant
members into accepting ASEAN norms, what is conveniently referred to as the
ASEAN Way.
In the 1970s, when Suharto sought to transform ASEAN into a military alliance,
his decision was opposed. Instead, ASEAN opted for a consensus-driven model of
regional cooperation where much leeway was given to a country to explain its
position and policy. Deserving or not, benefit of the doubt was always granted
to current governments.
Third, "intervention" as practiced in the larger international community has
always meant sanction and punitive measures to ASEAN. The latest incarnation -
"regime change" - is even more insidious. ASEAN, to be sure, does not want to
be maneuvered into dead-ends where it is asked to support a member or to
abandon it.
Besides, Vietnam, a new member of ASEAN, had itself been a victim of economic
sanction until 1994. Hanoi does not want Myanmar, a proud and nationalist
country, to be subjected to the same treatment.
In reprimanding Myanmar, ASEAN did not break any protocol other than to change
the method in which such protestation had hitherto been made: This time the
association made it openly.
Be that as it may, even such an explicit protest came under diplomatic duress -
it was served under pressure from the United States.
To be sure, ASEAN is neither above intervening in the domestic situation of
another member state nor beneath such practice. As John Funston, a former
senior analyst at the Institute of Southeast Asia, wrote: "An absence of open
public statements should not be taken as an indication that all representations
have been disavowed." He added: "The principle of non-intervention does not
mean that ASEAN adopts one standard for itself and another one for outsiders.
If ASEAN leaders felt free to intervene in the affairs of non-ASEANs, they
would have to accept the right of such countries to intervene in their own
affairs - which obviously they do not."
If non-intervention has been suspended, it has occasionally been done in the
name of improving the economic capacity of another member state.
Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon has revealed that in 1992
Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew phoned newly elected Philippine
president Fidel Ramos and advised: "You better fix your power shortage - seven,
eight hours a day. No power, no good." Such a frank exchange, Siazon later
noted, "has been going on in ASEAN for many years", albeit behind the scenes.
The current situation facing ASEAN with regards to Yangon is something that it
brought on to itself when Myanmar was inducted into the association in 1997.
Against international opposition, ASEAN stood its ground to admit an
international pariah into its midst. Apparently, ASEAN wanted to prove a point,
especially to the United States, that it could stand up for itself.
In any event, this ill-considered decision went against the advice of the ASEAN
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), a group of 10
semi-governmental think-tanks that had been instituted to advise the
association's respective heads of state.
The admission of Myanmar was considered a strategic necessity then, especially
by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, as Yangon's relations with China had,
over the previous 10 years, improved by leaps and bounds.
Bilateral trade alone had improved by 10 times to reach US$500 million a year,
a figure some believe was only a low estimate. Hence there was the fear,
justified or otherwise, of Myanmar becoming a key ally of China, which would
have permitted the latter to foray into Southeast Asia via the gateway of
Indochina.
Still, strategic decision aside, the goal to socialize Myanmar in the ASEAN Way
was not unprecedented. It was derived from the policy of "constructive
engagement" that had already been initiated in 1991 by the Thai government of
prime minister Anand Panyarachun. This policy was later "regionalized" as an
ASEAN policy.
Even this is not novel, as Thailand, being a frontline state facing off against
Vietnam in the 1970s, had persuaded other member states before to support its
foreign policy in the Indochina conclave.
For Thailand, the reasoning that led to the formulation of the "constructive
engagement" policy with regards to Myanmar was based upon both realities and
aspirations, according to its former deputy foreign minister, Sukhumband
Paribatra: "Myanmar and Thailand had been permanent neighbors, sharing a
2,400-kilometer-long border. Most of this border has not been demarcated and
passes through difficult mountainous and jungle terrain, inhabited by common
ethnic groups, which historically both governments have not found easy to
rule."
The border between the two countries was also porous, with more than 70 passes,
mostly in remote areas. Therefore events in Myanmar often have repercussions on
Thailand.
Currently, events of late are putting ASEAN in a political quandary. The
indefinite detention of Aung San Su Kyi has cast ASEAN in bad light. United
Nations Special Envoy Ismail Razali is currently making his rounds in Tokyo to
persuade Japan to exert some pressure on the regime.
This is because while ASEAN has publicly reprimanded Yangon, most recently in
the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Cambodia, the criticism is no more than a slap
on the wrist: There remains no sustained pressure nor any follow-up action to
compel Myanmar to mend its ways nor to release her immediately. All bets are
now on the diplomacy of Razali to save the day as he makes his rounds in Tokyo.
Among others his mission is to persuade Japan to bring its diplomatic pressure
to bear on the regime.
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the person who nominated Razali for
his role, recently affirmed in a frustrating manner that: "the refusal to
release Aung San has put ASEAN in a dilemma". This is in contrast to his
previous unstinting support to the military regime in Yangon.
In any case, if anyone believes that ASEAN's policy on Myanmar is about to
change, a rethink might well be needed. Over the past few years, ASEAN has come
up with various plans that they call "bold measures", only to become timid
again when faced with political reality.
On each occasion, ASEAN has had to backtrack on its aspirations, be they in the
economic or security realm. This is why it has been more convenient to rely on
the office of the UN special envoy to do ASEAN's diplomatic bidding on Myanmar,
even though ASEAN is not, in practice, averse to subtle intervention when the
occasion is justified.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
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