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SPEAKING
FREELY
ASEAN on Myanmar: Creative damage control
By Khoo How San
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please
click here if you are interested in
contributing.
SINGAPORE - This is a rejoinder to Dr Hiro Katsumata's argument in this column
(
Why ASEAN criticized Myanmar , June
24) that the unprecedented joint call by the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations members for Aung San Suu Kyi's release was motivated "not only by their
concern for image and reputation, but also by their own beliefs in the value of
human rights and democracy".
Wow! He also made two other related points that I feel require comment. First,
he said the joint call was a "voluntary action to address the serious
human-rights problem in Southeast Asia". Second, the "behavior of the ASEAN
ministers ... should be seen as a result of this process", that is, a fairly
recent but unquenchable intramural debate over the discussion of domestic
affairs.
I submit that, on balance, what the ASEAN foreign ministers - including
Myanmese Foreign Minister Win Aung - did at the June 16-19 meetings was simply
damage control to avert cracks in group solidarity. As such, it was certainly
no voluntary action. As for situating the joint call as part of a process, can
we therefore predict that domestic issues such as the "serious human-rights
problem in Southeast Asia" will hereafter become a regular major plank on the
grouping's agenda?
In other words, will we be seeing a progressive diminution of the
non-interference principle? Will this not weaken ASEAN solidarity, then?
The starting point for understanding what makes ASEAN tick is what should be an
unremarkable restating of the obvious: it is above all an inter-governmental
organization (IGO). That surely makes it unsuitable to be a mutual
self-criticism body. Member governments accept one another without questioning
one another's domestic politics. Moreover, because ASEAN is primarily an IGO,
ordinary people in the member countries have yet to feel an affective sense of
identification with it.
To say that ASEAN has been driven by its IGO agendas is not to say this is a
bad thing. Regionalism in Southeast Asia has never had it easy, and ASEAN has
been remarkably successful since its creation in 1967 in maintaining its image
of group solidarity and in keeping to its core purposes.
These purpose are: to mitigate the mutual suspicions among its members and
cooperate where possible, which in practice means bilateral arrangements tend
to be more durable; to get their act together where possible in co-opting the
big powers and the so-called international community to take account of their
interests; and in creating stability for economic benefits.
In thinking about ASEAN, it also helps if analysts mentally think "ASEAN
members", that is, ASEAN statements and actions have to reflect the grouping's
solidarity defined as outcomes, which must not compromise the comfort level of
any member government.
Having said that, ASEAN members have been creative in diplomatically projecting
group solidarity in the face of potential minefields. ASEAN's famous "minus X"
principle has allowed the organization to proceed with certain proposals by
allowing any dissenting minority member or members to opt out without
foreclosing the possibility of joining up later. A close examination of other
ASEAN schemes such as its position on foreign bases in member countries and its
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) concept will uncover diplomatic
language that accommodates every member government's interests.
ASEAN's finest period might well have been during the Cold War when it
functioned well as a diplomatic community in helping prevent Vietnam from
consolidating on its invasion of Cambodia. Even then, there were occasional
cracks in ASEAN solidarity, which required damage control. The ending of the
Cold War provided, in the words of the Thai prime minister then, the chance to
change "battlefields into marketplaces". ASEAN's expansion in the 1990s was
thus a calculated move to co-opt all the 10 countries of Southeast Asia -
regardless of their domestic politics - into this mutual benefits society cum
neighborhood watch group. Cambodia, the last member, was fretted over as the enfant
terrible but, as it turns out, it is Myanmar that now has this "honor".
ASEAN's acceptance of Myanmar was predicated on preventing its strategic
isolation and in the power of economics to act as the "unseen hand" to
ameliorate the country's economic and political conditions. By virtue of it
being an IGO, ASEAN could not play any significant role in Aung San Suu Kyi's
circumstances.
But, as I have argued, the manner of Suu Kyi's recent detention coming just
before the grouping's annual series of ministerial meetings prompted ASEAN once
again to engage in creative damage control. Individual ASEAN governments may
indeed cherish human rights and democracy, but to push these at ASEAN forums
risk disunity.
The joint communique cannot be seen as a voluntary action to address the
serious human-rights problem in Southeast Asia. Finally, I do not yet foresee,
absent a more proactive civil society in all the member countries, a process of
intramural discussion over domestic affairs.
Dr Khoo How San is a Singapore-based independent strategic analyst who
has written extensively on ASEAN affairs. He can be reached at
xiaosan@starhub.net.sg
(Copyright 2003 Khoo How San)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Please
click
here if you are interested in contributing.
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