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COMMENTARY
The other side to Aceh's
rebels
By Kirsten E Schulze
As Indonesia's
military operation against the Free Aceh Movement
(Gerakin Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) is entering its third
month, it is becoming increasingly clear that an end to
violence is not imminent. However, while casualties
among soldiers, insurgents and above all civilians have
steadily increased, there has been no significant shift
in either Indonesian or international popular opinion.
In fact, both have just become further entrenched - at
opposite poles.
Indonesian popular opinion swung
behind its government early on amid a resurgence of
nationalism. If anything, it has become more rather than
less nationalistic over the past two months. Meanwhile
international popular sympathy has remained largely,
although not surprisingly, with the underdog.
GAM's struggle for independence has been cast as
a fight for the noble ideal of liberty while Indonesia's
efforts to protect its sovereignty and territorial
integrity have been widely condemned. But does GAM
really warrant such romanticization? A closer look at
GAM's ideology, its attitude toward the peace process,
and its activities during the recent cessation of
hostilities may suggest otherwise.
GAM was
established in 1976 and has since been struggling for
the liberation of Aceh from what it sees as Indonesian
neo-colonial occupation. Yet while GAM leaders in exile
have attempted to rewrite Acehnese history in pursuit of
independence, the driving force on the ground is
somewhat different. GAM guerrillas are motivated by
parochial ethnic hatred. For them the war is about
killing Javanese. As a result GAM forces have not only
attacked the Indonesian security forces but have also
systemically targeted, killed or forced out Javanese
transmigrants.
Ethnic chauvinism is also evident
in GAM's construction of Acehnese nationalism. While
Indonesian identity is a civic nationalism which is
inclusive, multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and
multi-tribal, Acehnese nationalism is ethnic and
exclusive. It is based upon the imposition of the
identity of the Aceh tribe upon the other eight tribes
in the region in order to create the Acehnese nation.
This nation is defined by blood ties, tribalism, and
Islam.
GAM's ethnic parochialism has been
underscored by a narrow, hardline ideology that has
defined the movement's attitude toward the peace
process. GAM has made it very clear that it is neither
interested in negotiating with the Indonesian government
nor in a compromise solution. It sees the peace process
as a way of internationalizing the conflict with the aim
of forcing Indonesia to relinquish sovereignty under
outside pressure. Thus it is not surprising that it was
not interested in Jakarta's concession of special
autonomy for Aceh and even actively worked to undermine
its implementation by paralyzing the local
administration through threat and intimidation.
In line with this attempt to internationalize
the conflict, GAM's focus has been on ensuring that the
venue for all of its meetings with the Indonesian
government has been outside of Indonesia. It hailed the
introduction of a foreign facilitator - a Swiss-based
non-governmental organization (NGO), the Henry Dunant
Center. It embraced the subsequent inclusion of the
foreign "wise men", including retired US Marine General
Anthony Zinni and former Thai foreign minister Surin
Pitsuan, as advisers to the dialogue. It welcomed the
entry of foreign monitors - Thai and Filipino soldiers -
last December to oversee the cessation of hostilities.
It also regularly appealed to the United Nations for
intervention East Timor-style.
GAM's strategy of
internationalization is also key to understanding why
during the peace process since 2000 the movement
increased rather than decreased its military capacity.
The threat or use of force served the same function as
the dialogue, namely to attract international attention.
Arguably, the higher the profile of the targets such as
ExxonMobil and the higher the civilian death toll, the
greater the prospect of foreign intervention. GAM
guerrilla tactics of striking from and retreating to
residential areas thus served two purposes: to provide
the ultimate cover and to ensure that the casualties of
Indonesian retaliation were civilian.
As
compromise with Indonesia was not the goal, there was no
need for a reduction in violence other than tactical
ceasefires to recruit, regroup, train and arm. This also
held true for the recent cessation of hostilities from
December until May during which GAM increased its active
membership from 3,000 to 5,517 and its arsenal from
1,600 to 2,134 small arms.
It also used the
space created by the so-called peace zones to spread its
ideology, including rather imaginative claims that UN
intervention and independence were imminent. Above all,
however, it used this ceasefire to step up its extortion
activities under the guise of an "Aceh state tax". This
"tax" was levied on all elements of society,
particularly targeting contractors, foreign
corporations, and Indonesia's regional and local budget
allocations. GAM even attempted to "tax" international
humanitarian assistance money.
So does GAM
warrant romanticization? As with most other national
liberation movements, it would be better to it see for
what it really is. It is an organization that has fed
off local grievances but has provided no real
alternative. Its vision is backward-looking, parochial,
and steeped in ethnic hatred. It has maintained control
through intimidation and has funded itself through
kidnapping, the drug trade and extorting from the very
people it claims to represent. And finally, its
involvement in the peace process has shown GAM as
fundamentally unrealistic.
It has wasted the
opportunity provided by the negotiations, the special
autonomy and the cessation of hostilities to improve the
lives of the Acehnese in hope of an imagined grand
salvation at the hands of the UN. This has not only
resulted in the squandering of diplomatic goodwill but
also demonstrates the extent of GAM's misreading of the
international mood since September 11, 2001, which has
endorsed the territorial integrity and rights of
sovereign states, particularly in the face of Muslim
liberation struggles and especially in Southeast Asia.
Dr Kirsten E Schulze is senior
lecturer at the London School of Economics. She has
traveled extensively in Aceh and is writing a book on
democratization and conflict in Indonesia.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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