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THE ROVING
EYE
Deadlock in
Cambodia
By Pepe Escobar
PHNOM PENH - The final results will be available
only on August 8, but political deadlock is the name of
the game after the third general election of the
10-year-old Cambodian democracy. Once again it's prime
minister Hun Sen against both of his most bitter rivals,
Funcinpec leader Prince Norodom Ranariddh and the leader
of the main opposition party, Sam Rainsy.
Funcinpec and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) are now
de facto allies. Funcinpec secretary general Prince
Norodom Sirivudh and Sam Rainsy said in a joint press
conference that the parties were forming a "liaison" to
protest the preliminary election results, and they will
demand recounts and even re-votes in several areas of
Cambodia.
All of this because the ruling
Cambodian People's Party (CPP) has taken the initiative
already, on Monday evening via its spokesman and state
secretary of information, Khieu Kanharith. According to
the CPP's first projections - widely broadcast on
state-owned TVK - the party was set to clinch the
absolute majority of votes for the first time (73 seats,
against 64 in the 1998 elections), although not the
necessary two-thirds to govern without a coalition.
According to TVK director Mau Ayuth, the broadcast
orders came directly from Kanharith.
CPP
preliminary figures were not confirmed by any other
source. These figures also stated huge progress for the
SRP - possibly 24 seats, against 15 in 1998 - and
something like a disaster for the royalist Funcinpec -
26 seats, against 43 in 1998. Probably none of the 20
small parties will win any seats - so inevitably most of
them started complaining about the fairness of the
election as early as Monday.
After pointing to a
series of irregularities, from "feeble voter turnout"
(in fact 83 percent, according to the National Election
Committee, or NEC) and "the Vietnamese vote" , Prince
Ranariddh was quick to add that these results "don't
reflect the will of the population". Sam Rainsy for his
part denounced "CPP manipulations on TV" and said the
SRP would complain about registration problems, which
prevented many from voting. But Sam Rainsy had one very
good reason to be cheerful: he was sure to win the urban
vote in Phnom Penh, with close to 50 percent of the
votes in the capital, which would give his party six of
the 12 Phnom Penh seats in the 123-seat National
Assembly. On Monday, both Sam Rainsy and Prince
Ranariddh had already denounced what they called
"psychological warfare" by the CPP. On Tuesday,
Funcinpec and Sam Rainsy went into overdrive. Rainsy
said "the CPP-produced results will most likely be
confirmed by the National Election Committee. This shows
the NEC is just a tool for the CPP to manipulate the
vote."
Has the CPP actually stolen the
elections? Sam Rainsy simply could not make that
accusation on the record. But from Monday to Tuesday, he
changed tack: at first, it was not as bad as he feared;
then it became "anything but free and fair". According
to Sam Rainsy, the partnership between Funcinpec and the
SRP will last "until democracy prevails".
Antonio de Menezes, spokesman for the huge
European Union observer mission, was quick to say that
"anyone who is pronouncing on the elections is being
hasty". Most foreign observer missions refuse for the
moment to make a summary assessment of the whole
process, preferring to adopt a "wait and see" attitude.
In none of the preliminary results so far has
the CPP managed to win the necessary two-thirds of votes
for a no-coalition government. Both actors of the new
"liaison", Prince Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy, have
endlessly repeated they will not join a coalition led by
Hun Sen.
The deadlock could be broken by one of
two solutions: either the CPP calls for an amendment to
the constitution, or a new election has to take place.
Most Cambodian observers are betting on the second
option. According to the constitution, once a winning
party is declared - in this case the CPP - the new
123-seat Assembly must hold its first formal session in
a maximum of 60 days. Their first job is to vote on a
new government. The proposal to be voted must be
formulated by the CPP. The party has to recommend the
names of the prime minister and the members of the
Council of Ministers. And the names have to be approved
by two-thirds of the Assembly.
Kao Kim Hourn,
executive director of the Cambodian Institute for
Cooperation and Peace, remains optimistic that a
coalition government will be finally agreed upon. At
least in Phnom Penh, people don't seem to be very moved
by accusations of irregularities. Villagers who came to
the capital in search of a good job stress the good
things the CPP brought them - such as electricity, roads
and schools - and dismiss the whole complaining game.
Bit Seang Lim, an economist, suggests that the CPP,
Funcinpec and SRP should reach an agreement very soon,
for the sake of Cambodia's economy: "Any dispute will
keep investors out of the country." The Ministry of
Social Affairs, taking no chances, has ominously warned
workers in the crucial garment industry that until the
formation of the new government, everyone must "work
normally".
Millan Lov, a marketing consultant in
Phnom Penh, is a typical urban, educated SRP voter. His
family is pure Chinese diaspora: his grandfather came to
Cambodia from Guangzhou in the 1920s. His father, a
mathematics professor, was the victim of a political
assassination before the United Nations-sponsored 1993
elections, when he was tipped to become a governor.
Millan voted for the SRP, but knows the party will need
a lot of resources over a long time to build trust in
the countryside. He totally agrees with the party's
platform of fighting against corruption, but also admits
that Hun Sen since 1998 has become a much smarter and
efficient politician. And he knows Sam Rainsy needs more
government experience. So he is ready to give Hun Sen
another five years. Transparency and modernity in
Cambodia's young democracy may eventually win - but only
in 2008.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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