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Jemaah Islamiya: Down but not
out
By
Phar Kim Beng
KUALA LUMPUR - With the recent
capture of Hambali, the terrorist mastermind who
allegedly plotted the Bali bombings, the noose on Jemaah
Islamiya (JI) has further tightened. Yet as long as the
reasons that drive Muslim extremists to reject
legitimate political remedies and turn to violence
remain unclear, authorities are doomed merely to scratch
the surface of the problem.
JI's link with
al-Qaeda, while not entirely severed, must now be in a
stage of serious disrepair. According to authorities in
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the
infrastructure and operations of JI have been disrupted.
Malaysian and Thai police are now looking for Dr
Azahari Husin, a Malaysian who is believed to be the
organization's bomb expert. He is perhaps the last of
the most prominent JI members to elude the dragnet cast
by the authorities in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand.
Had Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, another
key member of JI, not escaped from his jail cell in
Manila few weeks ago, the "war on terror" in Southeast
Asia would have been deemed a resounding success.
But what should one make of JI's prospects for
political violence in Southeast Asia? Now that JI has
been partly decapitated, will it still be able to
spearhead random bombings on soft targets in the region?
The quick and easy answer is yes, it will.
There
are primarily two ways to understand JI's
sustainability. The simplest is to measure JI's
numerical strength; in other words, its membership. The
second way is to understand JI's independence from
al-Qaeda, which is considerable.
To begin with,
Singaporean officials have estimated a total JI
membership of about 5,000, scattered throughout
Southeast Asia. The Singaporean ministries of Home
Affairs and Defense also believe that the number of JI
members who are operationally oriented probably amounts
to several hundred.
According to the Terrorism
Research Center Online, a private outfit, JI's exact
numbers are still unknown, but press reports approximate
that the Malaysian cells may comprise 200 members. The
US State Department seems to concur with this finding.
The State Department International Terrorism
Report of 2002 affirmed: "The exact numbers [of JI] are
currently unknown, and Southeast Asian authorities
continue to uncover and arrest additional JI elements."
As for JI's independence from al-Qaeda, this has
been materially proved on more than one occasions. JI's
operation in Southeast Asia has always been divorced
from the military and strategic objectives of al-Qaeda,
both before and after the attacks of September 11, 2001.
The fact that Hambali was the only Southeast
Asian in the military council of al-Qaeda does not
necessarily oblige JI to fulfill any of al-Qaeda's
objectives.
Indeed, despite the enormity of its
attacks on the United States and its allies, al-Qaeda
has had relatively limited objectives. In the main, they
include the withdrawal of the US presence from Arab
land, and now cessation of the "war against terror" and
release of the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Yet, even as al-Qaeda was weakened after the
fall of the Taliban regime, it is alleged that JI was
able on its own to launch attacks in Bali, Jakarta and
elsewhere.
Unlike al-Qaeda, which has focused on
military or other strategically significant targets, JI
has also trained its sights on "soft" targets.
Nightclubs, bars and hotels were selected for revenge
attacks, as was the case with the August 5 bombings of
the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, days prior to the
handing down of the death sentence on a JI perpetrator
involved in the Bali bombings.
In any event,
while no one should entirely discard the possibility of
JI launching more attacks, the "war on terror" is in
need of much revision in Southeast Asia. The current
effort, which is based on capturing as many JI members
as possible, can only skim the surface of the problem of
Islamic extremism.
In Malaysia and Singapore,
the Internal Security Act (ISA), originally used by the
colonial administrators to put a check on communist
elements, has been invoked to place suspected JI-related
terrorists in indefinite custody. In Thailand, two
government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra last
week issued two pieces of anti-terrorism legislation by
executive decree. Thus, what the region has observed is
crackdown, rather than a considered resolution of the
problem of Islamic extremism and the causes behind it.
More precisely, ASEAN authorities should seek to
find out why JI members, largely males in their 30s,
have resorted to political violence and suicide
bombings. What impels them to use violence, despite the
fact that they have the options to pursue their
political causes through the Islamic parties in Malaysia
and Indonesia?
Most of the JI members caught by
the Indonesian authorities so far have had Malaysian
permanent residency; this was also the case with
Hambali, although his permanent-residency status has now
been revoked by the Malaysian authorities. In other
words, they were one step away from becoming Malaysian
citizens, which would have entitled them to vote and
seek office.
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the Indonesian
cleric thought to be the spiritual leader of JI, is
another good case in point. Before returning to
Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, he made Malaysia
his home. Given his charisma and rhetorical ability, he
could have easily drummed up political support in
Malaysia. Instead, he chose to return to Indonesia to
foment more violence through his students who had become
members of JI.
Amrozi, who was recently
sentenced to death for his part in the Bali bombings,
has has also lived and legally worked in Malaysia. JI
members in Singapore have had Malaysian permanent
residency as well.
So why didn't JI members
contemplate the prospect of joining the fundamentalist
Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), for instance?
Obviously, investigators must ask why political
violence is more attractive to Islamist radicals than
political participation, the latter being an option that
they have been freely allowed to exercise in Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines.
JI is
not finished yet. Bombings will occur, as JI members
have shown that they are not keen on any form of
political participation even when the option of joining
Islamic parties is readily available.
Indeed,
the stated goal of JI, which is not the least
practicable, is to create an Islamic state comprising
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the southern
Philippines. The fact that such an unrealistic notion
can form the ideological blueprint of JI is a testament
to its dissatisfaction with all options. The unanswered
question is: Why?
When spates of bombings
happen, it is not for lack of police coordination and
effort across Southeast Asia. Rather, it is due to the
fact that investigators in the region remain oblivious
to treating the causes that are driving members of JI to
violence.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co,
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