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COMMENTARY
America's image problem in
Southeast Asia
By Ralph A Cossa
HANOI - "Once
the Bush administration is done attacking North Korea,
will Vietnam be next?" This seemed to be the burning
question in the back of many people's minds as I visited
Vietnam for a series of lectures on US foreign policy.
While I came to talk about proliferation of
North Korean weapons of mass destruction (WMD), my
primary concern quickly became proliferation of Chinese
motorcycles; nearly everyone under the age of 30 - and
many considerably older - appeared to have traded in
their bicycles since my last visit less than two years
ago. Although this made crossing the street much more
challenging, it was a welcome sign of increased
prosperity, as were the numerous small enterprises that
had popped up along virtually every main thoroughfare in
Vietnam's capital city.
By their own account,
and readily confirmed by the US Embassy, US-Vietnam
relations were good and getting better by the day. Sure,
there were still disagreements, including continued
expressions of US concern over human-rights issues, but
when one of the most contentious issues between us
revolved around catfish, things seemed to be generally
on track. That's why I found the "Are we next?" question
particularly disturbing, on at least three levels.
First was the assumption that the US was intent
on pursuing - indeed, may actually prefer - a military
solution to the Korean crisis; this accusation was made
repeatedly throughout my visit. Second was the belief
that the administration of President George W Bush had a
preconceived list of countries targeted for regime
change. Third was the fear that Vietnam (or any other
country that failed to embrace US-style democracy) would
inevitably be on this list, despite the current upward
trend in relations. "If we are still not a democracy
within five to 10 years," one journalist asked, "would
America still tolerate us?" The barely veiled belief
that Washington might still hold a grudge and thus
planned one day to "get even" for the Vietnam War was
also implied in several conversations, most
distressingly among some who were too young to have
directly experienced the war.
In my own
presentations, I stressed the logic behind a
multilateral approach in dealing with Pyongyang and
Bush's often-stated desire for a peaceful, diplomatic
solution. But "actions speak louder than words", my
Vietnamese interlocutors politely argued, citing Iraq as
their "proof", while also bringing up Under Secretary of
State John Bolton's harsh words during his recent Asian
visit as further evidence that North Korean regime
change was Washington's primary objective and that the
use of force was the preferred option.
Actually,
Bolton's remarks in Seoul were relatively (for him)
measured; he even noted that "there is still hope that
Kim Jong-il may change course". But Bolton also
mentioned the North Korean leader by name no fewer than
41 times (a fact his spokespersons were eager to point
out), underscoring the personal nature of his attack
against a leader North Koreans are compelled to revere.
This has led many to conclude that he was attempting to
undermine the six-party talks (among North and South
Korea, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia) even
before they were officially scheduled.
As
Vietnamese increasingly surf the World Wide Web -
Internet cafes are springing up all over Hanoi - new
evidence of Washington's desire for regime change (in
North Korea, Iran, Syria and elsewhere) is obtained
daily, especially when one fails (as is often the case)
to distinguish between official government statements on
the one hand and comments made by congressmen, editorial
writers, unofficial advisers, and even visiting
academics. In the Korea case, Washington's rejection of
a bilateral non-aggression pact adds to this perception.
While I believe many good reasons exist for not going
down this path, the Bush administration needs to make
its case more effectively.
Concerns about US
"unilateralism" and "arrogance" are not restricted to
Vietnam. In multinational meetings in Kuala Lumpur and
Singapore over the past two weeks, this has been a
recurring theme. When evidence of US support for
multilateral initiatives is pointed out, this is either
dismissed as non-genuine, or described as "unilateral
multilateralism": the United States may be inviting
others to board the train - indeed, may be demanding
they do so (under the "you're either with us or against
us" doctrine) - but only Washington gets to steer.
Clearly, the Bush administration has a growing
image problem in Southeast Asia. Rightly or wrongly,
Washington is increasingly seen as unwilling to listen
others or to take their interests or concerns into
account when pursuing its America-first policies. True
or not, this perception persists and is growing and
forms the basis of policy responses as well as public
attitudes toward the United States.
A
Singaporean colleague summed it up best: "Please tell
Washington that we want and need America's help in
fighting terrorism and providing regional stability, but
we want to feel that Washington is listening as well as
talking and is taking our domestic security concerns
into account. In the process of defending your homeland,
please don't neglect or jeopardize ours."
Message delivered; is anyone in Washington
listening?
Ralph A Cossa is president
of the Pacific Forum CSIS (e-mail pacforum@hawaii.rr.com
), a Honolulu-based non-profit
research institute affiliated with the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and
senior editor of Comparative Connections , a
quarterly electronic journal.
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